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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Innovation comprises the processes of invention and commercialization. While the 
importance of innovation, especially commercialization, has been widely recognized, 
existing studies have largely overlooked the commercialization process. By examining 
the determinants of uses and nonuses of patented inventions from firms at the levels of 
technology, organization, and project/invention, this study attempts to help fill a critical 
gap in the literature. In doing so, it enriches theoretical understandings of innovation and, 
in particular, builds on the evolutionary explanation of technology development, the 
Teecian framework on profiting from innovation, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
the Knowledge-Based View (KBV), and open innovation and innovation network 
perspectives. It also reveals an empirical reality of commercial use and strategic nonuse 
of patents. The study is based on a novel dataset constructed from multiple sources: 
inventor surveys, the United States Patent and Trademark Office online database, and 
COMPUSTAT, among others. 
  
After examining the factors affecting overall propensity to commercialize patented 
inventions, this study explores the factors that affect the organizational paths of 
commercialization. The empirical estimation indicates that technological uncertainty and 
a strong internal position of complementary assets raise the propensity for internal 
commercialization. The study argues that openness of innovation processes and network 
relationships should affect the choice of commercialization paths. Consistent with the 
xv 
hypotheses, empirical estimations show that external industrial knowledge increases the 
propensity of internal commercialization. The study also indicates that collaboration has 
diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths. While collaboration with 
firms in vertical relationships tends to favor internal commercialization, collaboration 
with firms in horizontal relationships tends to favor external commercialization (licensing, 
start-up).  
 
Finally, the study reports findings on the strategic use of patents and then tests 
hypotheses about the factors driving strategic nonuse. It concludes that a significant 
portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed for strategic reasons. It also finds that 
characteristics of technology and firms are significantly associated with different 
strategies. In particular, firms are more likely to use a patent for strategic defensive 
purposes when they have larger amounts of assets. The study concludes with discussing 
managerial and policy implications.
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CHAPTER 1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
Innovation has played increasingly important roles in both national and industrial 
competitiveness (Cantwell, 2005). Along with the global trend toward the knowledge-
based economy and globalized competition, building up innovation capabilities is taking 
the central place in the agendas of policy makers as well as firms. Technological 
innovation is, by definition, a new technology (or a new combination of existing 
technologies) put into (commercial) use (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988; Schumpeter, 1942). 
Thus, innovation processes complete only when new ideas or a new combination of 
existing technologies (“invention process”) are transformed into commercial applications 
(“commercialization process”). In practice, two processes are often carried out in an 
intermingled and iterative way. Nevertheless, they require distinctive focus, skills, 
resources, and other capabilities to be successfully carried out (Roberts, 1988; Teece, 
1986). Schumpeter (1942) clearly pointed out the distinctiveness between them by stating 
that invention “does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of itself … no 
economically relevant effect at all.” Commercializing inventions is an important issue 
both in practice and in theory. Economic and social impacts of innovation can be 
identified only if the whole innovation processes are taken into consideration. Certainly, 
inventions of no or little commercial use may generate value to the society by 
contributing to the progress of science and technology. However, ultimate economic and 
social benefits will be realized when they are linked to some real-world applications. For 
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example, competitiveness crisis of the United States in the 70s and 80s was driven not by 
the lack of generating new scientific and technological ideas but by ignoring 
commercialization processes of them.  
 
In studying innovation, patents are one of the most important sources for numerous 
reasons. First, patentability requires novelty, non-obviousness, and, commercial 
applicability which conforms to the meaning of innovation, especially the inventive part 
of innovation. Second, by law in most countries, patentability is rigorously scrutinized by 
professional examiners and the results are published for public access. This enhances 
reliability of the data. Third, patent publications are well maintained and easily accessible. 
In many countries, patent data are available as a form of online databases and regularly 
updated and corrected by the patent authorities. Most of all, rapid increase of patenting 
and patent propensity (or propensity for an invention to be filed for patents) (Kortum and 
Lerner, 1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008) has enhanced the coverage and 
comprehensiveness of patents data. While an invention being patented indicates that the 
invention has a certain level of technological quality and commercial potential it does not, 
however, indicate whether and how the invention is commercially exploited nor how 
much commercial value it has, which is an essential information required to evaluate the 
whole innovation processes. 
 
Intellectual property policy, especially patent policy, is an important policy instrument 
affecting innovation. Patent systems were designed to promote the progress of scientific 
and technological knowledge. A core mechanism is to promote investment in new 
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technology and its commercialization by allowing temporary monopoly over the 
technology developed as such. However, patents in the contemporary world play much 
diverse roles, some of which may not necessarily serve to the design goal of the patent 
systems. For example, patents are used as a tool for hindering competitors’ technological 
advancement as well as securing exclusive rights on own uses. Hence, the growth and 
extended usage of patents have brought up new possibilities and threats to the systems of 
innovation. While diversified ways of profiting from patents may promote investment in 
research and development and division of innovative labors, increase of non-practiced 
patents may work as an thicket or fence to ultimately retard innovation (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000). Some would benefit from enlarged opportunities but 
some others would suffer from additional investment required for developing alternative 
technologies or from additional payment for licensing or infringing others’ patents. This 
complex and diversified development of patent uses casts a fundamental question on the 
effectiveness of the current patent systems and has ignited the debates about the patent 
systems reform. In sum, studying uses and nonuses of patents is of crucial importance for 
innovation policy. 
 
While the importance of commercializing inventions (and especially commercial and 
strategic uses of patented inventions) has been recognized for a long time, it has not been 
reflected in empirical studies of the innovation literature. Most empirical literature has 
focused on the invention process of innovation and, thus, overlooked the 
commercialization process. More severely, many studies regard invention and innovation 
as equivalent concept. Certainly, invention process must play a significant role in 
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innovation but, as we argued above, it can provide only a partial picture. In inventions 
being transformed into commercial application, technological superiority is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition. By examining commercialization process, this 
dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the literature and provide empirical evidence to the 
current discussion on innovation and patent policy.  
 
This study examines the determinants of uses and nonuses of patented inventions from 
firms. We focus on firms because firms account for the largest share of patented 
inventions and play the protagonist’s role in the scene of commercialization. Patented 
inventions are appropriated in various ways. First, they can be integrated in commercial 
products. Enhanced or novel product functionality, more efficient manufacturing 
processes, or enhanced product development processes driven by a new technology 
rewards the integrator with enhanced product competitiveness and profitability. This is a 
traditional use of appropriating patented inventions. We call this mode of uses as 
“internal commercialization”. Second, patented inventions can generate direct revenue to 
the inventor in the form of licensing royalties when they are traded in the market for 
technology. In other cases like cross-licensing the rents are represented as an access to 
the technology owned by others. This mode becomes more and more important because 
all the technology components required for making a product tend to be hardly kept 
within a single organization as product technology becomes more complex and patenting 
becomes more pervasive. Because the first-hand benefits from the invention are 
generated by external parties and then a part of them transferred to the inventor 
organization, we call this mode as “external commercialization”. In some rare cases, 
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patented inventions become an important instrument to start a joint venture or a new 
company. This form of appropriation is also categorized as external commercialization. 
 
Patent nonuse can be broken down into two classes: strategic nonuse and other nonuse. 
Some patented inventions that are not integrated into products or sold in the market for 
technology may generate strategic rents. In the discrete industry where products are built 
on relatively small number of technologies, development of substitutable technology by 
competitors will be a big threat to the owner of original technology. For example, in 
pharmaceutical or polymer industries, profits from a particular chemical material of a 
certain effect will not accrue to the original inventor if he fails to prevent alternative 
methods of synthesis to lead to a material of the same effect. In this industry, the original 
inventor often files for “fence” patents to prevent competitors from inventing-around the 
own technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). In the complex industries where 
large number of technologies is integrated into a final product, such as electronics or 
semiconductors, patents are often filed to block competitors from further developing the 
downstream complementary technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Either case 
benefits the filer of fence or blocking patents with strategic rents as represented by 
hindering entry to a certain product market or blocking or slowing down competitors’ 
innovation processes. Some blocking patents are used strategically for the advantageous 
position in negotiation of future cross-licensing deals (called “bargaining chips” or 
“player strategy”). The rest of nonuse patents are classified as “other nonuse”, albeit its 
diversity. The classification of uses and nonuses of patented inventions are summarized 
in Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1 Uses of patented inventions 
Types of benefits First-hand 
benefits 
generated by 
Commercialization Strategic rents Others/none 
Inventor’s own 
organization 
Product/Process 
Research tool 
Preventing inventing 
around (fencing) 
Blocking 
Signaling to investors 
Reduce potential 
litigation risk 
External/ new 
organization 
Licensing and cross-
licensing 
New company 
“bargaining chips” or 
“player strategy” 
Spillovers/leakage 
None NA NA Sleeping patents 
 
 
 
The first part of this study examines the propensity of commercialization. According to 
the classification shown in the above table, we examine the factors affecting the patents 
between the first column (i.e. internal and external commercialization) and the right two 
columns (i.e. all types of nonuses). In particular we submit novel arguments that the 
evolutionary stages of technology development and the strength of alternative 
appropriability would affect the commercializing patented inventions. We argue that the 
patented inventions in mature technology are easier to find a path to commercial 
applications because of incremental nature of innovation and lower uncertainty. Also, we 
argue that the patented inventions from capital intensive firms are less likely to 
commercialize because of the presence of alternative competitive advantage, 
progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value than 
commercialization value of patents. We also argue and test how a characteristic of 
product technology influences on this relationship. Our empirical results drawn from a 
U.S. inventor survey support both hypotheses. 
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The second part addresses the factors affecting internal and external commercialization 
paths (the first and the second row of the first column of Table 1.1). Departing from 
Teecian framework on the profitability of innovation (1986, 2006), we submit enriched 
arguments incorporating Transaction Cost Economics, KBV, open innovation and 
innovation network theories. This part pictures an empirical reality of the market for 
technology and contributes to theoretical and empirical aspects of theories relevant to the 
market for technology and organizational trajectories of innovation.  
 
The last part takes a detail look on the nonuse patents. In particular, we focus on the 
strategic nonuse patents (middle column of Table 1.1). Strategic nonuse patents had 
attracted attention from both policy makers and academic researchers because of their 
negative potential to innovation. We first show how the strategic nonuse patents are 
associated with various firm- and industry-level characteristics in our sample. Then, we 
submit and test the hypotheses about how financial and technological assets of a firm 
affect the propensity of strategic nonuse. We also submit and test a hypothesis about the 
impacts of bargaining failure and technological uncertainty on strategic nonuse.  
 
This study takes advantage of both direct and indirect measures of innovative activities 
using a data set constructed from multiple information sources including patents, a large-
scale inventor survey and financial information of firms. Our sample covers patenting 
firms across multiple industries in the United States.  
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Previous innovation surveys such as the Yale survey of 1983 (Levin, 1988; Levin, Cohen, 
and Mowery, 1985; Levin et al., 1987), the Carnegie Mellon Survey of 1994 (Cohen et al., 
2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000, 2002), the recent PATVAL survey in Europe 
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007), and the Community Innovation 
Surveys in Europe have provided many valuable insights on innovation. We use our 
inventor survey to expand our understanding innovation on this tradition. This study will 
also have the broader impact of contributing to current policy debates on patent reform, 
which currently suffer from a lack of systematic data on the uses of patents. 
 
Next chapter reviews the relevant previous works. Then, subsequent Parts follow. The 
final chapter summarizes the findings from all Parts, draws overall policy and managerial 
implications and then discusses some limitations and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1. Invention, Patents, and Innovation 
 
Innovation has played increasingly important roles in both national and industrial 
competitiveness (Cantwell, 2005). Along with the global trend toward the knowledge-
based economy and globalized competition, building up innovation capabilities is taking 
the central place in the agendas of policy makers as well as firms. In order to understand 
innovation, scholars widely depend on patent information—probably because of an 
increasing number of patent filings, legal linkage of patentability to commercial 
applicability, quality screening attributed to the well-established patent examination 
procedures, and publicly accessible databases. Due to well-maintained and readily 
accessible patent databases, various aspects of innovative activities are captured through 
patent indicators, which are constructed from published patent documents. Ever since 
Schmookler (1954) examined American inventive activity using patents, patent indicators 
have contributed to our better understanding innovation.  
 
Intellectual property policy, especially patent policy, is one of the most important policy 
instruments affecting innovation. Patent laws in the United States were introduced more 
than 200 years ago to promote the progress of scientific and technological knowledge. 
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The U.S. Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Article I 
Section 8). However, the patent system in the contemporary economy does not stay 
within this traditional role but expands its influence on innovation in various ways. As 
patents move toward a more central position in innovation strategy, more versatile uses of 
patents are discovered. Now, a patent is not only a tool for securing exclusive rights to 
commercialize the invention covered by the patent, but also a tool for selling the 
technology, inducing investment, and hindering competitors’ technological advancement.  
 
The growth and extended usage of patents, thus, bring up both a new possibility and a 
threat to innovation. Increasing investment in new technology and rapid growth of the 
market for technology may promote innovation. However, an increase in the number of 
patents, especially non-practiced patents, may retard innovation by fundamentally 
preventing a new firm from participating in some product markets because they are 
protected by a thicket of patents or because potential new competitors would incur 
additional development costs . The role of patents in promoting innovation is indeed a 
significant policy and legal issue. In eBay Inc. et al. v. MercExchange (2006), the 
Supreme Court denied the categorical application of an injunction, admitting that some 
patents are intended to be licensed or to be used for blocking competitors. In KSR 
International v. Teleflex (2007), the Supreme Court emphasized a broader interpretation 
of obviousness (as a way of invalidating a patent). These two legal cases implicitly admit 
the potential negative impact of strong patent on competition and innovation, and the 
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decisions can be seen as weakening the strength of patents. Similarly, Congress is 
currently debating patent reform, including how to improve the patent system to promote 
innovation rather than retard it. In sum, the study of patents in the context of their 
commercial usage is a critical issue for contemporary science and technology policy. 
 
Despite all the virtues of patent indicators, they are far from perfect in capturing 
innovative activities. Two major weaknesses are especially prominent. First, only a 
portion of all inventions that may contribute to economic and commercial application and 
scientific and technological advancement is patented. The recent explosion of the number 
of patents is not necessarily linked to an increased propensity for patenting. The existing 
studies do not reach a unified explanation behind this phenomenon (Hall, 2004; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008; van Zeebroeck, 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and Guellec, 2006). According to survey-based research, 
many innovative companies adopt non-patent appropriability schemes, such as secrecy or 
complementary capabilities (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). The 
Carnegie Mellon survey in 1994 reported that only 20 to 30% of innovations are 
protected by patents (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). So, do all these stories tell us 
that patents are not appropriate in studying innovation? Our answer is that patents are still 
a useful and powerful vehicle to lead us to understanding innovation. While there is no 
confirmatory evidence that patent propensity has decreased over time, there is plenty of 
evidence that firms utilize patent systems more heavily and more diversely. In this sense, 
even without understanding entire invention activities, which look almost impossible to 
capture, patents should explain an important subset of inventive activities. Thus, we 
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conclude that the first point raised as a weakness of patents in understanding innovation 
does not degrade the importance of patents in innovation studies.  
 
Innovation is generally recognized as a coupling of invention with commercialization 
(Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988). Schumpeter emphasizes this point by asserting that 
invention “does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of itself … no 
economically relevant effect at all” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84). The fact that an invention 
is patented indicates that the invention is successful and commercializable because it 
must have passed patentability tests (which include quality, novelty, non-obviousness, 
and the potential for commercial application). However, patents per se do not tell 
anything about how the patented invention is or will be commercially exploited. In order 
for an inventor to commercialize his inventions, he needs to put an enormous amount of 
effort, often composed of skill sets different from those required for invention, into 
additional research to transfer the inventions into manufacturing (Roberts, 1988). 
Therefore, patent indicators may be not only a bad proxy for innovation (Harhoff et al., 
1999; He and Deng, 2007; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty, 2000; Lanjouw, Pakes, and 
Putnam, 1998) but also an indicator of something innovative that is not an innovation. 
Most innovation research based on patent information has overlooked this critical last 
step of innovation.  
 
Survey methods overcome some of the weaknesses of patent indicators. By asking 
directly to inventors or other persons knowledgeable in the innovation process, surveys 
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can reveal detail information about motives, background, processes, outcomes, or 
contexts of a particular invention or innovation.  
 
However, patents are neither a perfect measure of innovation nor a technological change. 
First they are only a subset of invention. And a patented invention is not necessarily 
innovation in the sense that it is not commercialized. Although the patent propensity is 
reportedly increasing recently in the U.S. and other countries, secrecy still is regarded as 
an important means of appropriation. Moreover the usages of patents to contemporary 
firms are much more diversified now than in the past. More seriously, patents of today 
are utilized for a variety of purposes beyond their original role—a protective role for 
commercialization. These include licensing, enhancing the position of negotiation, 
blocking competitors’ technological advance, signaling technological competence to 
employer or investors, or misleading competitors (Langinier, 2005).  
 
 
2.2. Commercialization of Patented Inventions 
 
Firms invest their valuable resources into inventive activities because they expect to 
benefit from the results or process of invention. The benefits from innovation, however, 
do not accrue automatically to the innovator. Intellectual property rights, especially 
patents, traditionally have been recognized as the most important legal instrument to 
enhance the appropriability of innovation. By excluding the rights of use of an invention, 
patents enable an inventor to secure temporary monopoly status over the invented 
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technology. Other than patent, an inventor can use numerous mechanisms to appropriate 
the profit from the invention. 
 
2.2.1. Appropriability Mechanisms from Iinnovation 
 
Schumpeter (1942) pointed out two such mechanisms that critically affect the 
appropriability of innovation: scale economy of production and market power.1 When the 
volume of a product is large, the unit cost for innovation invested for product 
development spreads more thinly over products and, thus, the amount of profit for a given 
investment will be large (Cohen and Klepper, 1996b). Appropriability will also enhance 
if the product market is protected by an entry barrier or market power. Schumpeterian 
arguments of appropriability have been massively tested, though indirectly, by studying 
the relationship of the rate of innovation to the firm size or market structure. The 
empirical results are largely inconclusive; These will be reviewed later in another section. 
Although briefly referred to here, Schumpeterian appropriability focuses on the product’s 
market conditions and competitive environment. And by focusing on them, Schumpeter 
relatively ignores the firm-level mechanisms (such as lead time or secrecy) that can 
enhance product market position or reduce the possibility of imitation by competitors 
(Winter, 2006). However, several recent surveys consistently found that firm-level 
mechanisms are indeed important appropriability mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
1 Schumpeter meant these two separate elements when referring to “large monopolistic firm.” 
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Both the Yale survey (Levin et al., 1987) in 1983 and the Carnegie Mellon survey (CMS) 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) in 1994 asked R&D managers of 
U.S. firms2 about the effectiveness of several appropriability mechanisms. Surprisingly, 
both surveys found that non-patent mechanisms such as lead time, secrecy, and 
complementary capabilities are at least as important as patents. Also, both surveys found 
that the appropriability mechanism’s effectiveness varies significantly across industries. 
Surveys conducted in Switzerland (Harabi, 1995), Japan (Cohen et al., 2002), and 
Finland (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007) also resulted in a similar 
conclusion. The Finnish survey claimed that appropriability of innovation should depend 
on contractual and employee relationships as well as patents, secrecy, or lead time. By 
examining the relationship between appropriability and imitativeness, the researchers 
argued that human factors are important to appropriability because knowledge and 
information can flow to competitors through communications and employee mobility. 
This broad interpretation of appropriability implies that appropriability conditions are not 
just subject to technology- or industry-specific factors but also to those factors at the firm 
or invention level. The Finnish survey also found that the effectiveness of patents was 
ranked only behind lead time, secrecy, learning curve, and contract strength. In sum, the 
relative effectiveness of patents in appropriating benefits from invention and protecting 
the competitive advantage is evaluated lower than secrecy or lead time across type of 
innovation, time, and country, except for product innovation in the early period (Yale 
survey) and in Japan. However, we cannot say that patents are not important in 
appropriating innovation. Indeed, the perceived importance of patents has increased 
                                                 
2 Firms included in both surveys are limited to R&D-performing firms, and the samples are biased toward 
large firms. The Yale survey collected responses from 130 publicly traded firms. The CMS collected 
responses from 1,478 R&D labs. 
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during the last few decades. In a survey conducted by the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee to the OECD (BIAC)3 in 2003, 67% of respondents answered that the average 
value of patents had increased over the past ten years (Sheehan, Martinez, and Guellec, 
2003). In the same survey, 89% of respondents reported that the risks of not patenting 
had also increased over the past ten years. The recent surge in the number of patents and 
patent propensity supports this observation (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 
1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). The rankings of the effectiveness of each 
appropriability mechanism from these surveys are summarized in Table 2.1.  
.  
 
                                                 
3 The respondents to the BIAC survey are 105 firms from Europe, North Americas, and Japan. About 80% 
of responses came from firms with 1,000 or more employees or with R&D budgets above USD 10 million. 
We could not find methodological descriptions of this survey, so we cannot say whether this survey is 
representative or not. This survey is only indicative. 
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Table 2.1 Effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms (rank) 
Yale 
survey in 
1983 
Swiss 
survey in 
1988 
CIS in 
1993 
CM 
survey 
(U.S.) in 
1994 
CM 
survey 
(Japan) in 
1994 
Finnish 
survey in 
2004   
Appropriability 
mechanisms 
Product, 
process 
Product, 
process 
Product, 
process 
Product, 
process 
Product, 
process Product 
To prevent 
duplication 4, 5 6, 6 
Patents 
To secure 
license 
income 5, 6 4, 5 4, 4 5, 5 2, 4 5 (IPR)  
Secrecy 6, 4 4, 4 2, 3 2, 1 5, 2 2 
Lead time 2, 1 2, 1 1, 1 1, 3 1, 3 1 
Complementary 
sales/svc 1, 3 1, 2 - 4, 4 4, 5 - 
Complementary 
manufacturing - - - 3, 2 3, 1 - 
Learning curve 3, 2 3, 3 - - - 
3 
(tacitness) 
Complexity of 
product design - - 3, 2 - - - 
Contracts/ other legal - - - 6, 6 - 4 
HRM - - - - - 7 
Labor legislation - - - - - 6 
Yale survey (Levin et al., 1987): 650 responses from 130 lines of businesses 
Swiss survey (Harabi, 1995): 358 responses from 127 lines of businesses from R&D 
performing firms 
CIS survey in 1993 (Arundel, 2001): 2849 R&D-performing firms in Norway, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland 
CM survey (Cohen et al., 2002): 1478 U.S. firms. 643 Japanese firms 
Finnish survey (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007): 299 Finnish firms. 
Patents include other IPRs. HRM includes restrictions on employee mobility and 
communication. Labor legislation includes employment contracts and employee non-
competes. 
 
 
 
Patents, although recognized generally as ineffective means of protecting invention 
across all of these surveys, seem to be effective in some industries. Also, the protective 
effectiveness of patents for product technology is different from process technology. In 
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the Swiss survey, the process patents were rated low in protective effectiveness in all 
industries. However, the product patents were rated higher than secrecy (but still lower 
than lead time, complementary sales, and learning curve/cost advantage) in the 
machinery and metal processing industry and the chemicals industry. According to the 
Carnegie Mellon survey for the U.S. firms (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000), drugs, 
electrical equipment, basic chemicals, and medical equipment industries are relatively 
highly ranked in the effectiveness of patents. Industries in which patent is not an effective 
means of appropriability include food, textiles, and printing. 
 
In this section, we briefly reviewed various appropriability mechanisms identified in the 
literature. In sum, the literature finds that appropriability of an invention depends not 
only on the legal institution, but also on other factors such as competitive environments, 
internal capability of a firm, and appropriability strategy.  
 
2.2.2. Commercial use of patented inventions 
 
According to the literature, about half or more patents are put into commercial use. One 
study conducted during the late 1950s reports that the rate of use of the U.S. patents 
issued in 1938, 1948 and 1952 was 49.3% at the time of the survey (Sanders, Rossman, 
and Harris, 1958).4 However, this rate is much lower than that of recent European patents. 
The PatVal-EU reports that about 63.9% of European patents filed between 1993 and 
1997 inclusive had been used by the time of survey, 2002-2003 (Giuri et al., 2007). 
                                                 
4 The rate including expected use during the full lifetime of a patent calculated by Sanders, Rossman, and 
Harris is about 57.2%. 
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Recently, more detailed information about reasons to patent had been reported through 
surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Germany. The rank order 
of importance of each reason is summarized in Table 2.2. Two common findings across 
the surveys are worth mentioning here. First, commercial exploitation is ranked in the 
highest position across all surveys. Second, even the patents not intended for commercial 
uses may generate value to the patentees. Such uses include blocking competitors, 
reducing litigation risks, and enabling entry into new/foreign markets. The first two 
reasons are highly ranked in the U.S. and Japan, while the entry motive is highly ranked 
the German survey.  
 
Licensing or cross-licensing is reportedly important in Swiss and OECD surveys but not 
important in the U.S., Japan, and German surveys. Industry heterogeneity is also mixed. 
Cohen et al. (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) found that there is a clear discrepancy in 
motives for patenting between “complex” industry and “discrete” industry. In the German 
survey, motives for patenting were not different across sectors except for exchange 
motives between the biotech industry and other industries (Blind et al., 2006).  
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Table 2.2 Reasons to patent (rank) 
 Swiss 
(Harabi, 
1995) 
OECD 
(Sheehan, 
Martinez, 
and 
Guellec, 
2003) 
CMS U.S. 
in 1994 
(Cohen et 
al., 2002) 
CMS Japan 
in 1994 
(Cohen et 
al., 2002) 
German 
survey in 
2002* 
(Blind et al., 
2006) 
 Product, 
process 
Aggregate Product, 
process 
Product, 
process 
Aggregate 
Commercial exploitation/ 
preventing duplication 
2, 1 1 1, 1 1, 2 1 
Licensing 1, 1 3 6, 6 5, 5 8 
Cross-licensing/ to 
improve bargaining 
positions 
2, 3 2 4, 4 4, 4 6 
Blocking competitors 
(w/o primary purpose for 
own use) 
5, 5 NA 2, 2 2, 1 5 
Preventing inventing-
around other key patents 
NA NA NA NA 3 
Preventing suits NA NA 3, 3 3, 3 3 
Employee evaluation/ 
inventor reputation 
6, 6 NA 7, 7 6, 6 7 
For entry into 
foreign/new markets 
4, 4 4 NA NA 2 
Firm’s reputation NA 5 5, 5 7, 7 4 
German survey (Blind et al., 2006): 522 firms which had filed at least three patents at the 
EPO in 1999. The German survey asked 15 detailed motives including all of the above 
motives plus the motives related to securing regional markets and firm values. Then they 
grouped them into 5 categories according to factor analysis. We only ranked the motives 
listed in the above table and skipped those not listed here by aggregating them into 
higher-ranked motive in the same cluster. Also, Blind et al. regard defensive blocking as 
a concept covering both preventing inventing-around and preventing legal suits to 
guarantee room for technological maneuvering.  
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2.2.3. Market for Technology 
 
The presence of a market for technology facilitates technology transfer and enhances the 
division of innovation labor. Most empirical literature on the market for technology 
examines the determinants of (cross-) licensing or determinants of particular features of 
licensing agreements (e.g., exclusivity or involvement of knowledge transfer). Below, we 
give a brief review of the empirical studies on the determinants of licensing. A detail 
review on each study is provided in Appendix Table A. 1. 
 
The effective protection of intellectual property rights are reported as an important 
mechanism to promote licensing. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2006) found that projects 
resulting in patent, especially granted patent, are more likely to reach to licensing 
agreements. Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) found that patent-mediated cross-licensing deals 
are more likely to occur in Japanese firm than deals involving only know-how transfer. 
Patent effectiveness as being measured as either a perceived strength (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006) or industry-level patent propensity (Kim and Vonortas, 2006) is also 
reported as a strong driver of licensing.  
 
There is robust industry heterogeneity in licensing propensity. Analyzing 1,612 licensing 
contracts in the early 1990s, Anand and Khanna (2000) found that chemical, computer, 
and electronics industries are prominent in licensing. They pointed out heterogeneity of 
appropriability regime as a source of industry heterogeneity. Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella (Arora, 1997; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2002; Fosfuri, 2004) 
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attempted to explain industry heterogeneity in a more stylized way. After conducting a 
detailed historical case study of the chemical industry, they concluded that industry 
structures (such as emergence of specialized engineering firms, market share of licensors, 
and degree of product differentiation) had affected the licensing propensity. They pointed 
out two fundamental factors driving this phenomenon: revenue earned from licensing and 
rent dissipation caused by licensing. According to their arguments, the development of a 
market for technology depends on the strategic behavior of industry participants as well 
as on evolutionary paths of the industry 
 
Various firm capabilities also influence licensing propensity. They include prior 
experience (Kim and Vonortas, 2006), the size of the firm (Gambardella, Giuri, and 
Luzzi, 2007; Nagaoka and Kwon, 2006), and the presence of alternative 
commercialization channels, such as marketing and sales (Kollmer and Dowling, 2004) 
or complementary assets (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). One common finding is that firms 
lacking some assets required for commercialization (e.g., small firms, start-ups, or 
partially integrated or non-integrated firms) are more likely to license.   
 
 
2.3. Schumpeterian Legacy on Innovation 
 
A firm is an important social entity that transforms ideas into innovation. This section 
reviews a portion of the literature dealing with questions about two important aspects 
relating innovation. First, who innovates? This question has drawn continuous academic 
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attention ever since Schumpeter’s emphasis on entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1939, 
1942). The research frontier of this theme recently shifted from the simple small-large 
dichotomy in firm size to a more complex characterization. These characteristics involve, 
among others, the competitive environment to which a firm belongs, presence and 
effectiveness of a market for innovative knowledge, technology and knowledge stock 
available to the firm, and strategic intentions of the firm. Under the rational behavioral 
assumption of a firm, the firm will respond differently to the innovation needs it has 
determined depending on these factors. Hence, to better understand who innovates, we 
have to understand why firms innovate. This comprises the second question of this 
section. A natural question that may well follow those about who innovates and why 
would be how do they innovate. The literature dealing with this question will be reviewed 
in the next section of innovation processes. 
 
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter emphasizes the role of 
monopolization in innovation. A monopoly, more loosely defined as a large firm, has a 
discriminating role in both the preconditions and aftermath of innovation. As a 
precondition, Schumpeter points out the relative advantage of a large firm in “the sphere 
of influence of the better [good]” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 101) and good financial 
standings. As a result of innovation, a firm will enjoy a transient monopoly state caused 
by imitation lag. Therefore, in this Schumpeterian world, “perfect competition is and 
always has been suspended whenever anything new is being introduced” (p. 105). This 
Schumpeterian hypothesis urged researchers to look at the relationship between market 
structure (depending on firm size) and technological progress.  
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The Schumpeterian hypothesis was extensively tested during the 1960s through the 1980s. 
As neatly summarized by Cohen and Klepper (1996b), these studies consistently found 
that R&D investments increase with firm size, although not disproportionately, but that 
innovation output, mostly measured using patent counts, decreases disproportionately as 
the level of R&D or firm size increases. The arguments underlying the assumption that a 
large firm innovates more than a smaller one consider aspects of both demand and supply. 
First, a larger firm has a smaller unit cost of R&D (“cost-spreading effect”) than its 
smaller counterpart (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b). On the supply side, a larger firm 
will have more lump-sum funds to invest in R&D. More R&D will diversify the research 
portfolio and spread R&D risks into several parallel projects to raise the odds of success. 
A larger investment in R&D constitutes a larger R&D team, which is composed of 
supposedly better specialized personnel or which better divides the R&D labor force. As 
a consequence of this scale economy of R&D investment, a firm investing more in R&D 
will have advantages in its research portfolio, R&D risk-spreading, efficiency of R&D 
teams, and absorptive capacity. Besides R&D diversity/specialization, a larger firm 
enjoys an operational advantage through better vertical integration and specialization 
(Teece, 1986). However, although the above arguments explain the increasing R&D 
expenditure as the firm size grows, it does not explain why it grows disproportionately. 
 
 25
Table 2.3 Literature about R&D expenditure, innovation, and firm size 
Category Relationship with 
firm size 
Studies Remark 
Proportional (Scherer, 1965) up to a certain 
level  
 
Fortune 500 firms 
Disproportionately 
more 
(Soete, 1979) in some 
industries in the U.S. 
Firms with >25k 
R&D 
expenditure 
Disproportionately 
less 
(Mansfield, 1964) except for 
chemicals 
 
negative (Mansfield, 1964) 
innovation/R&D 
 
negative (Link and Rees, 1990) Total 
Factor Productivity 
Major user 
industry of univ 
research 
R&D 
productivity 
U-type (Tsai, 2005; Tsai and Wang, 
2005) TFP 
Taiwanese firms 
Innovation mixed (Acs and Audretsch, 1987) 
depending on industries 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Literature on firm size and performance, governance mode and the nature 
of innovation 
Author Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Variables of 
interests 
Variable Examined Effect 
(Veugelers 
and 
Cassiman, 
1999) 
Manufact-
uring 
(Belgium) 
Cross 
section: 
logit 
A firm does 
innovation (=1) 
Small firms (<50 
employees) 
Large firms (>500 
employees) 
-*** 
 
+*** 
(Veugelers 
and 
Cassiman, 
1999) 
Manufact-
uring 
(Belgium) 
Cross 
section: 
multi-
nomial 
logit 
make only, 
buy only, 
make and buy 
(of upstream 
innovation 
resources) 
Small firms (<50 
employees) 
 
 
Large firms (>500 
employees) 
+** 
+*** 
-** 
 
-** 
- 
+** 
(Tushman 
and 
Anderson, 
1986) 
Cement, 
airlines,  
and mini-
computers 
Cross 
section/ 
Fisher’s 
exact test 
Competence-
enhancing 
Competence-
destroying 
New firms < Existing 
firms 
New firms > Existing 
firms 
* 
 
* 
Note: the signs denote the direction of effects of “variables examined” on the “variables 
of interests.” Asterisks denote statistical significance of the effects (* denotes a 10% 
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significance level, ** denotes a 5% significance level, *** denotes a 1% significance 
level). 
 
 
 
The Schumpeterian hypothesis, which was not articulated by Schumpeter himself but 
named by his disciples, actually refers to two closely linked but different factors: firm 
size and market structure. Schumpeter(1942, p. 101) explicitly claimed that the “mere 
size [of a firm] is neither necessary nor sufficient.” Although he mentioned a supply 
condition—advantageous financial standings of a larger firm—he seemed to “have 
almost certainly appropriability mechanisms in mind” (Nelson and Winter, 1982), in 
which oligopolistic market conditions play a key role. Empirical studies on the market 
concentration and the rate of innovation followed. In British manufacturing firms 
between 1972 and 1982, Blundell et al. (1999) found that a less concentrated industry 
generated a higher level of aggregate innovation as measured with the direct count of 
innovations. At the firm level, they found that high-market-share firms were more likely 
to commercialize innovations within industries. Using the sample composed of firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange, Aghion et al. (2005) also found similar results. In 
their analysis, market competition as measured in the price-cost margin averaged by 
industry was significantly associated with citation-weighted patent counts and revealed 
an inverted-U relationship. What they argued as the underlying force driving this 
phenomenon was the balance between the incentives for incremental profit generation 
through innovation under competition and the disincentives for laggards to conduct 
innovative research when there is severe competition. 
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2.4.  Teecian Arguments on the Profitability of Innovation 
 
The huge volume of literature that has tested the Schumpeterian hypotheses does not 
converge on any undisputable conclusion. One reason for this inconclusiveness might be 
that aggregate units, such as the firm or industry, could not effectively capture the 
complex and heterogeneous activities of innovations carried out across firms and 
industries. Firm size alone, for example, cannot appropriately capture the heterogeneous 
innovation activities performed by two different firms of the same size. Moreover, 
innovative capability and activities of contemporary firms are not necessarily bounded by 
firm or industry boundary but are linked to outer capabilities by research collaboration, 
strategic alliances, or technology licensing. Therefore, we need to unpack what is going 
on within firms in order to better understand innovation.  
 
Teece (1986), among others, developed a quite useful framework to analyze the 
mechanisms by which firms commercialize their inventions. In order to explain why 
many innovators fail to make a profit from innovation, he presents a simple model 
composed of three actors—innovator, follower/imitator, and owners of co-specialized 
assets5—and two alternative strategies of the innovator: integrate or contract out.6 In this 
zero-sum type of game, he then argues that a choice of strategy conditioned on three key 
factors should determine to whom (innovator or follower) the profit from innovation 
                                                 
5 He stated that “[i]f there are innovators who lose there must be followers/imitators who win” (Teece, 1986, 
p. 286). 
6 In a later revision (Teece, 2006), Teece partially addressed an intermediate strategy: strategic alliances. 
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accrues. The three conditioning factors are the dominant design paradigm of technology, 
regimes of appropriability, and complementary assets. The latter two building blocks are 
especially applied to lots of business strategy and innovation research and have proved 
their explanatory power to some extent. The Teecian framework is especially relevant to 
this work in that it directly attempts to explain the reasons why the innovator selects a 
particular strategy between two alternatives—internal and external commercialization. 
The Teecian framework was further refined by Gans and Stern (2003) and applied to the 
context of new technology-based entrepreneurs. In this section, we briefly introduce the 
three building blocks and decision frameworks and discuss their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
2.4.1. Dominant Design Paradigm 
 
Seemingly affected by Kuhn’s explanation of scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1970) and 
incorporating evolutionary explanations of technological progress (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982), Teece argued that the strategy of a firm facing a 
technological innovation should differ by the degree of dominance of the technology in 
the market. In the pre-paradigmatic stage, the strategic priority of an innovator is set to 
aligning the new technology with the market needs and surviving through “considerable 
trial and error in the marketplace” (p. 288). As the market selects a dominant design, 
uncertainty in the validity of technology is removed, and competition shifts from product 
innovation to process innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Therefore, strategic 
importance shifts to the “scale and learning” by which a firm can build lower-unit-cost 
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production and distribution capabilities. Complementary assets play a critical role in this 
stage. In Teece’s original article, the design paradigm is recognized as exogenous, but in 
a later article (Teece, 2006), Teece points out some endogenous elements contributing to 
setting a standard as indicated by research about industry standards (Arthur, 1990; David, 
1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1994). The Teecian framework does not intend to explain 
technological evolution nor how an emerging technology becomes a dominant design. 
Teece’s contribution is in linking managerial choices to a configuration of the regime of 
appropriability and relative positions in complementary assets, given a paradigmatic 
technology. He also argues that his framework gives an implication about the timing of 
market entry depending on those two conditions (Teece, 2006). However, as shown in an 
extensive review on the relevant literature by Murmann and Frenken (2006), dominant 
design concept is not only valid and widely adopted, but also affects the nature of 
competition and the innovative behavior of firms. 
 
2.4.2. The Regime of Appropriability 
 
According to Teece (1986), a regime of appropriability “refers to the environmental 
factors, excluding firm and market structure, that govern an innovator’s ability to capture 
the profits generated by an innovation” (p. 287). In Teecian terms, these factors are 
related to the degree of ease with which an innovation can be imitated by the competitors. 
What Teece points out as factors affecting the imitability of an innovation are the nature 
of technology (especially the degree of tacit knowledge) and legal environment (such as 
effectiveness of intellectual property protection) surrounding the technology. As 
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summarized here, the Teecian appropriability condition is exogenous by definition. By 
separating out environmental conditions from firm and market factors, Teece shows why 
and how the ownership of, and a relative position in, complementary assets matters in 
appropriating innovation. However, as increasingly observed, firms in some industries 
take on appropriability conditions by exerting deliberate IP strategies.7 Therefore, 
appropriability regime might be determined endogenously in some industries. In the later 
part of this paper we will argue that, in some complex product industries where 
technological components composing a final product are highly interdependent, a certain 
coordinated patent strategy of a group of key technology players may change the 
appropriability conditions of the industry. 
 
2.4.3. Complementary Assets 
 
Probably the most important contribution of Teece’s 1986 paper is to put the concept of 
complementary assets, then a novel construct, out on the table of innovation discussions. 
Complementary assets are “other capabilities or assets” that a “core technological know-
how in innovation” requires for its successful commercialization (p. 288). They include 
various services, such as manufacturing, distribution channels, complementary 
technologies, and so on. Teece classified complementary assets according to their 
relationship with innovation. Generic assets have small mutual dependence with an 
innovation. Some assets are specialized to an innovation with either unilateral or bilateral 
                                                 
7 See two examples discussed by Pisano (2006) in which strong downstream complementary asset owners, 
one in pharmaceuticals and the other in computer hardware, took strategic actions toward loosening the 
upstream appropriability regime by putting human gene sequence data in the public domain and by 
supporting open source software, respectively. 
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dependence between them. What matters in commercialization decisions of a firm is 
either specialized (unilateral dependence between assets and innovation) or co-
specialized complementary assets, because the owners of the latter type of assets may 
behave opportunistically and hold up the innovator to appropriate more from the 
commercialization of innovation. 
 
2.4.4. Channel Strategy: Integration vs. Contract 
 
Given the configuration of three elements (i.e., the status of the invented technology in 
the technology-market space, the regime of appropriability, and the structure of 
complementary assets), the Teecian innovator chooses the more profitable strategy 
between two organizational alternatives: internalize or contract.8 The basic decision rule 
is, “if in doubt, outsource” (Teece, 2006, p. 1140). Under this decision rule, given a tight 
appropriate regime, the Teecian innovator does not have any reason to integrate 
complementary assets because he can reap the commercialization profit from a contract 
regardless of its relative asset positions to the owners of complementary assets. Teece’s 
decision framework sheds light on weak appropriability regimes. Simply put, the Teecian 
innovator internalizes a commercialization process only if the following conditions are 
met: 1) critical complementary assets are available in-house; 2) they are specialized; 3) 
the cash position makes it feasible to build them in-house; 4) the innovator is not 
disadvantageously positioned in commissioning complementary assets compared to 
imitators or competitors; and, finally, 5) the innovator commands a weaker market power 
                                                 
8 The later update (Teece, 2006) adds an intermediate choice, strategic alliance, in between these two 
extreme choices. 
 32
than independent owners of complementary assets. The decision flow is shown in Figure 
2.1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Teecian market entry strategies under weak appropriability regimes (Fig. 
3 in Teece, 2006) 
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2.4.5. Discussions 
 
Teece’s framework sheds light on the relationships between firm strategy and innovation 
and provides essential building blocks for its theoretical understanding. However, 
progress in the theoretical and empirical research on firms and innovation during the last 
two decades reveals some shortcomings and weaknesses of the framework. In this section 
we briefly review the empirical research relevant to the Teecian framework and then 
discuss several points for improving the framework.9  
  
Empirical research on commercialization strategy and appropriability regime 
 
One prominent mode of contracting for commercialization is licensing. Teecian decision 
framework implies that licensing propensity should be higher in a tight appropriability 
regime than in a loose one because licensing decision in a tight regime will be less 
constrained by complementary asset conditions. Grindley and Teece (1997) claimed that 
the U.S. policy shift toward strengthening IP and lifting up antitrust regulations that had 
distorted the value of IP must force firms in electronics and semiconductor industries to 
develop patentable technology or to license it. Anand and Khanna’s (2000) research on 
strategic alliances of U.S. firms showed that the propensity of licensing deals (relative to 
all the other forms of alliance agreements) is significantly different across industries 
(higher propensity and stricter exclusivity in the drug and chemical industry and vice 
versa in the computer and electronics industry). They argued that the heterogeneity of the 
                                                 
9 Some refining points are discussed by Teece himself in his recent reflection (Teece, 2006). 
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strength of IP (strong IP in drug/chemical and weak IP in computer/electronics) explains 
the heterogeneity in both propensity and features of licensing deals across industries.10 
Kim and Vonortas (2006) also found similar results using the patent intensity (the 
number of patents per R&D expenditure) of industry.  
 
Commercialization strategy also depends on a firm’s appropriation strategy. Formal grant 
of intellectual property rights increases the licensing propensity of start-up firms (Gans, 
Hsu, and Stern, 2002, 2006). Gambardella et al. (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007) 
argued that patent breadth (as measured either by the number of claims or the number of 
different technology classes) may be a proxy for the strength of patents (broader patent, 
harder to imitate) and found that both measures are positively associated with the 
likelihood of willingness to license in European firms. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) 
found from a cross-industry survey answered by 757 R&D managers of U.S. firms that 
the patent effectiveness perceived by an individual firm (as evaluated by R&D managers) 
is positively associated with the licensing propensity, but only when the firm lacks the 
complementary assets.  
 
These empirical studies cast one important point about appropriability arguments. In the 
Teecian explanation, appropriability is exogenously determined by the legal environment 
of intellectual property rights and the nature of technology relevant to inherent imitability. 
However, the licensing literature provides some evidence that appropriability strategy at 
the firm level and patent level also affects the commercialization strategy of a firm. 
                                                 
10 Note that Anand and Khanna (2000) do not compare “integrate” with “contract” but “licensing contract” 
with all the other types of identified alliances, such as joint venture, marketing agreements, or R&D 
agreements. 
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Furthermore, several large-scale industry surveys (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987; OECD, 2003) consistently show that a variety of 
appropriability mechanisms other than patents (such as lead time, secrecy, or 
complementary technology) are widely adopted among firms. Gans and Stern (2003) 
make the shrewd point that it is not the level but the type of appropriability that drives the 
commercialization strategy of start-up firms. Therefore, in order for us to better 
understand the commercialization of innovation, a simplified view of appropriability 
regime as submitted by Teece needs to be revised to address a sub-regime variety and 
different types of appropriability strategy exploited by firms. We will discuss this issue 
below. 
 
Empirical research on commercialization strategy and complementary assets 
 
Two broad research streams—strategic alliances literature and licensing literature—test 
the empirical validity of complementary assets in explaining a firm’s commercialization 
strategy. 
 
In conclusion, although the Teecian framework opens up a new avenue to research about 
innovation and commercialization, it is far from comprehensive. Also, considering the 
significant progress made in the discussions of the commercialization of innovation, the 
patenting behavior of firms, and firm boundaries since 1986, efforts to integrate these 
novel theoretical and empirical perspectives into the Teecian framework will further our 
understanding of this matter as well as enrich the framework itself. We will discuss three 
points of improvement. 
 36
 
First, appropriability concept should address endogeneity of appropriability (Jacobides 
and Winter, 2005; Pisano, 2006) and diverse appropriability mechanisms widely adopted 
among contemporary firms. When this expanded conceptualization of appropriability 
successfully fits into the Teecian framework, it will provide a useful starting point for us 
to explain strategic non-use of patents. We approach this issue by synthesizing the 
cumulative research results in transaction cost economics into the Teecian framework. 
 
Secondly, the Teecian argument about complementary assets is based on two elements: 
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the owner of a specialized asset (the “hold-
up” problem) and the relative advantage of the innovator in commissioning 
complementary assets. The former is a main point of TCE. The latter, albeit not 
rigorously articulated in Teece’s framework, can be enriched through knowledge-based 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata, 
2000) or capability-based (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) 
views of firms in which internal synergy is an important factor determining market or 
hierarchy. 
 
Thirdly, knowledge networks and open innovation perspectives should be integrated with 
Teecian arguments. The knowledge network literature claims that contemporary 
innovation activities dispense with the networked relationships with various external 
entities (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Also, the strategic alliance literature 
observes that experiential relationships between firms importantly affect the forms and 
types of alliances. We will argue that knowledge-flows and collaboration networks 
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during the invention process should affect the commercialization strategy of the resultant 
invention. 
 
Finally, in some complex technologies, complementary technology works as a crucial 
bottleneck (or enabler) for a firm to successfully introduce its innovation to the market. 
Even an incremental innovation in the related technology area may become a life-and-
death matter for a firm in some complex technology or network goods industry (Kash and 
Kingston, 2001) and, thus, an innovator’s strategy to enable timely sourcing of those 
bottleneck technologies is critical. As technologies become more interdependent and 
systemic, the importance of complementary technologies in the success of innovation 
also increases (Somaya and Teece, 2001; Teece, 2006). Teece (2006) later admits that, in 
his 1986 article, this important aspect was considered as a part of complementary assets 
and relatively overlooked by focusing on the enterprise level value chains (p. 1,139). We 
argue that the owner or innovator of complementary technology deserves to be the fourth 
actor on the innovation commercialization playing field. By explicitly considering the 
roles and strategies of innovators to deal with complementary technologies, we expect 
that we can explain some important aspects of strategic uses of patents. 
 
 
2.5. Economics of a Firm’s Make-Buy Decision 
 
Although Teece did not cite any research from transaction cost economics in his 1986 
article, his arguments resemble the discussions in economics of contracts, especially 
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transaction cost economics and property rights theory. Both transaction cost economics 
(henceforth “TCE”) and property rights theory (henceforth “PRT”) have their roots in 
Ronald Coase’s conceptualization of transaction costs in his article The Nature of the 
Firm, published in 1937. TCE and PRT both hinge on contractual incompleteness and 
appropriable ex post quasi rents stemming from relation-specific investments. However, 
as Williamson pointed out (Williamson, 1985, 2002), while the former focuses on the 
opportunistic behavior that may occur in the implementation stage of a contract, the latter 
focuses on ex ante incentive alignments. Although both TCE and PRT have evolved from 
common antecedents, this difference makes sometimes divergent empirical predictions 
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Whinston, 2003). In this section, we will briefly review the 
skeleton of each theory, bearing in mind how they can enrich or modify Teece’s 
framework. Note that theoretical development and empirical tests for both theories have 
been conducted mostly in the backward integration context11—e.g., cases such as when a 
manufacturer decides whether to integrate supplier capacity (Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007)—while the main focus of this study is the decision situation where the owner of 
upstream assets (i.e. R&D and invention) decides whether to integrate necessary 
downstream assets, such as manufacturing or marketing capacity. The applications of 
TCE to the forward integration cases have been recently conducted by researchers 
looking at the market for technology.  
 
                                                 
11 One branch of the economics of contracts looking at forward integration is Agency theory, which centers 
around incentive matching between a principal and an agent and the moral hazard of the agent. Although 
this stream of research may shed light on this study, we will not give much attention to this theory because 
we do not have any empirical instruments to test the agent’s relation-specific behavior. 
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In the original conceptualization by Ronald Coase, transaction cost is defined as “a cost 
using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937, p. 390). While this definition implies that 
transaction costs arise from market transactions, some recent transaction-cost economists 
such as Oliver Williamson use transaction costs broadly to refer to the governance costs 
that arise either within firms or across markets. Kenneth Arrow views transaction costs as 
costs “attached to any market and indeed to any mode of resource allocation” (emphasis 
added; Arrow, 1969). Similarly, Williamson analogizes transaction costs to friction in the 
physical world and regards them as the “costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures” (emphasis added; Williamson, 1981, 
pp. 552-553).  
 
TCE assumes the bounded rationality of human beings and the impossibility of writing a 
complete contract ex ante. In this incomplete world of contracts, contracting parties (e.g., 
manufacturer and supplier) have incentives to behave opportunistically to appropriate 
more of the quasi-rents generated from the contract relationship but not fully specified ex 
ante in the contract. A typical form of this ex post opportunistic behavior is “hold-up” as 
emphasized in the TCE literature. Therefore, in the situation where the manufacturer 
expects high chances of hold-up by suppliers, it would choose to integrate supplier 
capacity under its authoritative control, which reduces opportunistic behavior and saves 
transaction costs if production costs of alternative organizational forms are equal. TCE 
literature contends that asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity should be closely 
related with the ex post opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; 
Williamson, 1991). Asset specificity refers to “the degree to which an asset can be 
 40
redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive 
value” (Williamson, 1991, p. 281). Williamson identifies six types of asset specificity: 1) 
site specificity, which refers to the advantage of two or more assets jointly located to each 
other; 2) physical asset specificity, which refers to physical equipment customized to 
each other; 3) human asset specificity, which refers to training and learning by doing; 4) 
brand name capital; 5) dedicated assets, which are “discrete investments in general 
purpose plant that are made at the behest of a particular customer”; and 6) temporal 
specificity. 
 
Empirical tests of TCE gravitated around the relationship between asset specificity and 
the tendency of vertical integration in sourcing intermediate product markets. A recent 
survey of the empirical literature by Lafontaine and Slade (2007) shows that the 
propensity of vertical integration is indeed positively associated with various types of 
asset specificity as predicted by TCE. In addition to the asset specificity, their survey 
shows that complexity and uncertainty, which hinder contractors from writing a complete 
contract ex ante, are also positively associated with the propensity of vertical integration.  
 
In the innovation context, while a huge volume of literature in the strategic alliance tests 
the impact of transaction costs on the governance structure of alliance agreements, only a 
few studies examine how TCE predictions affect vertical integration of innovation 
outputs. The licensing research examines the rate of licensing, a less hierarchical mode of 
innovation commercialization, in relation with transaction cost variables such as the 
strength of patents or the ownership of complementary assets. However, it does not 
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directly test the market versus hierarchy because the counterpart of licensing tested in the 
literature usually include non-licensed inventions, which may include non-used ones as 
well as internally commercialized ones. Key studies are summarized in the following 
tables. As predicted by TCE, as asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity increase, 
more hierarchical governance structure is chosen in alliance, R&D procurement, or 
invention commercialization. In the innovation context, many studies test the effect of the 
strength of appropriability regime on the governance structure instead of separately 
testing the effect of elements comprising appropriability hazards. Aside from Oxley’s test 
of geographic uncertainty, Veugelers and Cassiman’s test based on the Belgian 
Community Innovation Survey show the opposite direction as predicted by TCE—i.e., 
the lower uncertainty or lower appropriability hazard is related to a more hierarchical 
structure (“make” rather than “buy”). This observation is better explained using property 
rights theory. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Literature about effects of asset specificity on the choice of governance 
structure 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Governance 
structure tested 
Variable 
Examined 
Effect 
on HI 
Pisano 
(1990) 
Pharmaceutical 
firms 
Cross 
section: 
Probit 
R&D contract vs. 
backward 
integration (=1) 
The number of 
R&D suppliers 
-* 
Gulati 
and 
Singh 
(1998) 
Biopharma, 
new materials, 
and automobile 
Pooled 
cross 
section: 
logit 
Alliances 
(contractual -> 
minority equity 
investments -> 
joint ventures) 
Types of 
organizational 
interdependence 
+* 
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Table 2.6 Literature about effects of complexity on the choice of hierarchical 
governance structure 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Governance 
structure tested 
Variable 
Examined 
Effect 
on HI 
Gulati 
and 
Singh 
(1998) 
biopharmaceu
tical, 
new materials, 
and 
automobile 
Pooled 
cross 
section: 
logit 
Alliances 
(contractual -> 
minority equity 
investments -> 
joint ventures) 
R&D alliances 
(vs. non-R&D) 
+* 
Oxley 
(1997) 
General Cross 
section: 
Ordered 
probit 
Alliances 
(unilateral-> 
bilateral -> 
equity-based) 
Design activities 
Mixed activities 
Multiple products 
or technologies 
+* 
+* 
+* 
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Table 2.7 Literature about effect of uncertainty or appropriability regime on the 
choice of hierarchical governance structure 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Governance structure 
tested 
Variable 
Examined 
Effect 
on HI 
Oxley 
(1997) 
General Cross 
section: 
Ordered 
probit 
Alliances (unilateral-
> bilateral -> equity-
based) 
Wider 
geographic area 
The number of 
firms 
-* 
+* 
 
Gulati and 
Singh 
(1998) 
Biopharma-
ceuticals, 
new materials, 
and automobile 
Pooled 
cross 
section: 
logit 
Alliances 
(contractual -> 
equity investments -
> joint ventures) 
Weaker appr. 
Regime (new 
materials and 
automobile) 
+* 
Oxley 
(1999) 
General Cross 
section: 
logit 
Alliances 
(contractual -> 
equity joint 
ventures ) 
National 
appropriability 
regime of the 
host country 
-*** 
Veugelers 
and 
Cassiman 
(1999) 
Manufacturing Cross 
section: 
multi-
nomial logit 
Of upstream 
innovation resources,  
make only 
buy only 
make and buy 
Beliefs of the 
firm about any 
protective 
mechanism 
(legal, secrecy, 
lead time, etc.) 
 
 
 
+ 
-*** 
+ 
Anand 
and 
Khanna 
(2000) 
General Cross 
section: ML 
Licensing partners 
(unrelated -> related) 
Weaker appr. 
Regime 
(computer/ 
electronics vs. 
bio) 
+* 
Gans, 
Hsu, and 
Stern 
(2002) 
General (SBIR 
funded start-up) 
Cross 
section: 
probit/ logit 
Coop (cooperation -> 
self comm.=0) 
# of patents 
(binary) 
-* 
Fontana, 
Geuna, 
and Matt 
(2006) 
Food and 
beverage, 
Chemicals (w/o 
pharma), radio, 
television and 
communication 
equipment and 
apparatus, 
Telecommunica
tion 
services, 
Computer and 
related 
activities 
Cross 
section/ 
neg. 
binomial 
Propensity to 
participate in R&D 
collaboration with 
universities or PROs 
Use patents to 
protect 
innovation 
 
+** 
 
 
 
 44
 
2.6. Resources, Capabilities, and Complementary Assets 
 
Teece’s arguments about complementary assets hinge on two dimensions of 
complementary assets. The first dimension is whether an invented technology requires 
complementary assets and, if so, how specialized they are. The implication for the choice 
of governance structure stemming from this dimension is similar to the asset specificity 
arguments in TCE. The second dimension is the competitive position of the inventor in 
sourcing the complementary assets compared with, first, its competitor, and second, the 
independent owner of the assets. Teece argued that an inventor who is weakly positioned 
in commissioning (contracting) the complementary assets compared to an imitator (the 
asset owner) should prefer integration to contract. About this dimension, TCE gives a 
partial prediction consistent with Teece’s prediction. A weak position of the inventor in 
commissioning the complementary assets will increase contractual uncertainty and, thus, 
increase the transaction costs. Although the latter may be better explained in the incentive 
theory, considering the way that different marginal returns on the investment affect the 
choice of governance structure, Teece’s arguments are largely parallel to TCE arguments.  
 
However, both arguments overlook one critical aspect. While both theories focus on 
whether there will be positive transaction costs as a key element of decision-making, they 
largely ignore the effects of potential synergy that may be additionally produced by 
integration. As an example, think about tight internal collaboration between a technology 
development group and a manufacturing division. Among others, assume that this 
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relationship bears a higher degree of human asset specificity. A general prediction of 
TCE is that internal procurement is preferred for the assets having a higher degree of 
human asset specificity because authoritative control and internal monitoring are more 
effective than a contractual relationship. Assuming zero internal transaction costs, the 
innovator will choose integration when he forecasts positive transaction costs across 
markets. But this is only a partial view. There is a case in which an innovator chooses 
integration even under the zero transaction costs across markets and, thus, betrays a basic 
assumption of Teece’s decision rule: “if in doubt, then outsource.” The preparation of 
complementary assets required for commercializing an invention and collaboration 
among internal organizational units are usually accompanied with employee training and 
learning effects, which can lead to enhanced absorptive capacity of a firm. Therefore, 
when an inventor expects such internal synergistic effects, he will integrate the 
complementary assets even if market transaction costs are minimal. This point is the core 
idea of a knowledge-based view of a firm (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). 
 
Based on the surveys of innovating firms in Sweden, Kogut and Zander (2003) found that 
as the complexity of knowledge increases, the likelihood to integrate such knowledge 
also increased. In the pharmaceutical industry, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) found that the 
innovative performance of firms (as measured by sales ratios of innovative products) is 
positively associated with firms’ technology capabilities (as measured by patent stocks) 
in the same technology area but not with technology capabilities of distant areas (Table A. 
2). 
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2.7. Knowledge Flows, Networks, and Open Innovation 
 
In the previous sections, we discussed two theoretical approaches relevant to the make-
or-buy decision of commercializing innovation. While TCE focuses on comparisons of 
the management cost with the contractual hazards in a dyadic relationship, KBV 
emphasizes synergistic effects that would not be produced by contractual relationships 
but would be possible by integrating complementary activities internally. The innovation 
network and organizational learning perspectives agree with KBV in that consideration of 
the transaction costs should be only a partial explanation of the choice of governance 
structure in commercializing an innovation and that some complementary combinations 
not attainable through market relationships should be an important dimension in 
determining the choice of governance structure. A critical difference from KBV, however, 
is found in the stretch of the boundary within which such synergistic effects happen. 
While KBV confines the boundary of complementary combination within a firm, the 
innovation network perspectives extend it over the networks of firms. Both TCE and the 
network perspectives focus on the relationships with external entities. However, while 
TCE focuses on how the attributes of the relationship work as a potential risk, the 
network perspectives focus on how the relationship can generate some positive benefits 
otherwise impossible. In this sense, we basically agree with Jacobides and Winter’s 
contention that “TCE focuses on the conditions of exchange, to the neglect of the 
conditions of production” (Jacobides and Winter, 2005, p. 398). However, there is a more 
fundamental argument about the roles of the networks in innovation and economic 
behavior beyond the problem of avoidance of negatives or production of positives.  
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2.7.1. Embeddedness and network forms of organizations 
 
The attacks were initiated by sociologists whose main concerns are placed in how social 
relations affect individual behavior. Mark Granovetter (1985) criticizes economic 
arguments for ignoring the social context and history of interpersonal relationships 
outside of which human actions cannot be formed. As a consequence, he contends that 
economic arguments, whether they are neoclassical or new institutional, are either over-
socialized or under-socialized. In his view, networks are omnipresent (they exist even in 
hierarchy as well as in markets) and human actions are “embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations” (p. 487).  
 
Powell (1990) basically agrees with Granovetter on the importance of social structural 
embeddedness in determining economic exchanges and on the limitation of arraying 
economic exchanges on the market-hierarchy continuum. Nevertheless, he argues that 
“certain forms of exchanges are more social” (p. 300) and submits that there is empirical 
merit to distinguish the network form as a distinct governance structure from either 
market or hierarchy. Powell identifies several key distinct characteristics of each of three 
governance forms. The network structure is dominated by a norm of reciprocity and 
reputational concerns, while hierarchy (market) is dominated by administrative fiat or 
supervision (haggling or court enforcement). Also, information communicated over 
networks is richer than information obtained in the market and “freer” than that circulated 
in a hierarchy. Therefore, Powell contends that “[n]etworks, then, are especially useful 
for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured” (p. 304). 
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According to this line of argument, a network form of organization is defined as “any 
collection of actors (N ≥ 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one 
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and 
resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59). 
This definition includes joint ventures, strategic alliances, franchises, research consortia, 
relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements. 
 
Powell further argues that know-how, the demand for speed, and trust are critical to 
forming networks. The exchange of know-how, which, according to Powell, is 
characterized by tacitness and embodied in a highly mobile skilled labor force, is more 
suitable for network forms because of the lateral structure of communication and mutual 
obligation of networks. Dynamic adaptability of network structure, which is mostly based 
on the ability to disseminate and interpret information, is more suitable for the 
competition based on fast innovation capability. Finally, the common backgrounds that 
may stimulate trust among actors contribute to forming networks. In addition to these 
factors, needs for legitimacy and status that may be derived from network affiliation are 
listed as a factor affecting network formation (Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 1999). The key testable implications of embeddedness, therefore, are that 
network forms of organizations are preferred when the above-listed factors are prominent 
ceteris paribus and, consequently, that network forms of organizations result in unique 
opportunities and constraints not predicted by standard economic explanations (Uzzi, 
1996). A review of empirical research testing these implications is given below. 
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Williamson (1991) also attempts to explain the network forms of organization (“hybrid 
governance structure,” in his terminology) within the TCE framework. A 
phenomenological basis of Williamson’s hybrid organizations seems to be linked to long-
term contracts in which “bilateral dependency conditions are supported by a variety of 
specialized governance features (hostages, arbitration, take-or-pay procurement clauses, 
tied sales, reciprocity, regulation, etc.)” (p. 269). What is common between Williamson’s 
hybrid organization and Powell’s networks is mutual dependency, although Powell’s 
networks are not necessarily bilateral as Williamson’s hybrids are. Williamson, then, 
suggests five dimensions (i.e., incentive intensity, administrative controls, market 
adaptation, cooperative adaptation, and contract law features) that discriminate 
organizational forms and locates the hybrid organization around the middle of all five 
dimensions between two polar forms: market and hierarchy. A fundamental difference is 
found between Powell and Williamson. While network forms of organization are 
something independent from either market or hierarchy in Powell’s view, hybrids are 
something intermediate and transient between market and hierarchy in Williamson’s view. 
Therefore, while Powell views that network forms are suitable for fast-changing, 
uncertain situations based on non-price competition, Williamson claims that hybrids are 
not to be chosen for highly uncertain situations. In Williamson’s view, equilibrium under 
high uncertainty can be attained through either market or hierarchy.   
 
Empirical literature  
In the section above, we show that empirical tests of embeddedness have two different 
focuses: 1) relationship between network forms of organizations and their outcomes and 
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2) effects of learning, characteristics of knowledge required for a product, the speed of 
demand, environmental factors for trust-building, and needs for legitimacy and status on 
the formation of network forms of organization. In this sense the innovation network 
perspectives argue that the synergistic effects should be produced over the inter-
organizational knowledge networks as well as within the boundary of a firm. Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) claim that in high-tech industries, where knowledge is 
critical for a competitive advantage but broadly distributed, knowledge creation occurs 
not in a tightly bound and static organizational form but in a fluid and evolving 
community of knowledge. They state that “[a] network serves as a locus of innovation 
because it provides timely access to knowledge and resources that are otherwise 
unavailable, while also testing internal expertise and learning capabilities” (Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996, p. 119).  
 
The locus of innovation, however, is not always found over the network. They cautiously 
confine the conditions to such industries in which knowledge is important for a 
competitive advantage and broadly distributed. The prominent example that satisfies 
these conditions is the biopharmaceutical industry; therefore, strategic alliances of the 
biopharmaceutical industry have been intensely studied recently.   
 
Uzzi’s study (1996) reveals interesting performance implications of network structure. 
While the strong ties (embedded ties rather than arm’s-length ties) in the first-order 
network coupling have positive effects on firm survival, mixed ties in the second-order 
network coupling are associated with a higher survival rate. This implies the important 
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roles of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and bridges or structural holes in network 
performance. 
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Table 2.8 Literature about effects of networks on outcomes/performance 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measure of 
outcomes 
Variable Examined Effect 
(Uzzi, 
1996) 
Apparel Cross 
section/ 
Logit 
Firm 
(contractor) 
failure 
Intensities of embedded 
ties 
Business group 
affiliation (social capital) 
Intensities of embedded 
ties of partners 
-*** 
 
-** 
 
U** 
(Powell, 
Koput, and 
Smith-
Doerr, 
1996) 
Biotech Longitudinal/ 
panel 
regression 
Firm growth 
 
 
 
Going public 
Degree centrality 
Non-R&D network 
experiences 
 
Degree centrality 
Non-R&D network 
experiences 
Collaborative R&D 
experience 
+** 
+** 
 
 
+** 
+** 
 
+** 
(Stuart, 
Hoang, and 
Hybels, 
1999) 
Biotech Longitudinal/ 
hazard 
regression 
and selection 
OLS  
The rate of 
and valuation 
at IPO 
Technologically 
prominent exchange 
partners 
Commercially prominent 
exchange partners 
 
(Afuah, 
2000) 
Micro-
processor 
(RISC) 
Cross 
section/ OLS 
Log(Dollar 
market share) 
Supplier of a new 
technology (RISC) was a 
supplier of old 
technology (CISC ) 
(supplier capabilities 
obsolescence) 
 
Customer capabilities 
obsolescence (new OS) 
 
Backward vertical 
integration 
-*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-*** 
 
 
-*** 
(Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 
2000) 
Automobile 
(Toyota) 
Qualitative Firm success 
Knowledge 
generation, 
transfer, and 
sharing 
Supplier network NA 
(Gulati and 
Higgins, 
2003) 
Biotech Pooled cross 
section/ 
Heckman 
selection 
IPO success VC partner 
Underwriter prestige 
Prominent downstream 
strategic alliances 
+** 
+*** 
n.s. 
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Table 2.8 (continued)    
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measure of 
outcomes 
Variable Examined Effect 
(Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 
2004) 
Biotech Pooled cross 
section/ 
structural 
equation 
New products 
in 
development 
 
Products on 
market 
Alliances for R&D 
 
 
 
Alliances for comer-
cialization 
+** 
 
 
 
+** 
(Gulati and 
Sytch, 
2007) 
Automobile Cross 
section/ 
3SLS 
Index of 
manufacturer’s 
performance 
in the 
procurement  
Joint dependence 
Manufacturer’s 
dependence advantage 
Supplier’s dependence 
advantage 
The degree of supplier’s 
involvement of 
cooperation 
Quality of information 
exchange 
+* 
- 
 
+ 
 
+** 
 
+*** 
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Table 2.9 Literature about factors affecting networks formation 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measures 
of 
networks 
Variable Examined Effect 
(Uzzi, 
1996) 
Apparel Ethnography  Third-party referral 
networks 
Previous personal ties 
 
(Gulati, 
1999) 
new 
materials, 
industrial 
automation, 
and 
automotive 
products 
Panel/ 
random-
effects panel 
probit 
Alliance 
formation 
Centrality: the number of 
cliques to which a firm 
belongs 
Centrality: how closely 
connected a firm is to the 
rest of the firms in the 
interfirm network, both 
directly and indirectly 
The number of past 
alliance 
+** 
 
 
+** 
 
 
 
 
+** 
(Gulati and 
Sytch, 
2007) 
Automobile Cross 
section/ 
3SLS 
Joint 
dependence 
Technological complexity 
Performance in the 
procurement 
+*** 
+** 
(Rothaermel 
and Boeker, 
2008) 
Bio and 
pharma 
Cross 
section/ 
logit and 
negative 
binomial 
regression 
Alliance 
formation 
Alliance 
intensity 
Complementarity: the sum 
of the centered ratios of the 
biotech firm’s drugs in 
development and the 
pharmaceutical firm’s 
SM&A expenses 
 
Similarities 1: patent cross-
citations 
Similarities 2: patent 
common citations 
Similarities 3: proximity of 
patenting propensity 
+** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+* 
 
-* 
 
+* 
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Table 2.10 Literature about explorative and exploitative learning effects on 
networks formation 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measures of  
exploitative 
networks 
Variable 
Examined 
Effect 
Powell, 
Koput, and 
Smith-
Doerr 
(1996) 
Biotech Longitudinal/ 
panel 
regression 
Non-R&D ties R&D ties +** 
Rothaermel 
and Deeds 
(2004) 
Biotech Pooled cross 
section/ 
structural 
equation 
Alliances for 
commercialization 
Alliances for 
R&D 
+** 
 
 
 
2.7.2. Open innovations and the external sources of knowledge  
Open innovation arguments (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 1988) emphasize the 
importance of external ideas and external paths to market innovation. This “new breed of 
innovation” (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007, p. 57) depends on various sources of 
knowledge, including universities, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. In the 
open innovation era, a firm puts more weight on knowledge brokerage than knowledge 
creation (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Also, due to the risk as well as 
opportunity involved in open innovation strategy, the roles of intellectual property rights 
have increased. 
 
Empirical studies in this stream of research are clustered into three groups. The first 
group examines the factors affecting external sourcing of knowledge. This group includes 
broad literature about university-industry collaboration. The second group examines how 
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the depth and breadth of external knowledge during the innovation process affects 
performance. The third group examines the factors affecting external paths to market. 
Licensing literature, for example, falls into this group. A summary of the relevant 
literature is presented in Table A. 3 and Table A. 4 of the Appendix. 
 
Based on the Carnegie Mellon Survey, Cohen et al. (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2002) 
found that start-up firms, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, and larger firms are 
more likely to utilize external knowledge from public organizations in their R&D projects. 
The higher propensity of start-up firms and biopharmaceutical firms using university 
knowledge is consistently reported in other studies (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002; 
Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). This finding shows that the use of external knowledge 
depends on firm and industry characteristics. 
 
Indeed, external public knowledge seems to have positive impacts on firms’ innovative 
performance. A study based on a Yale survey (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990) reports 
that the more important the university knowledge, the higher the R&D intensity of firms. 
Cohen and Levinthal interpret this as the importance of absorptive capacity of internal 
R&D. Another study also reports that using external scientific knowledge increases the 
innovative performance of firms as measured by the fraction of sales attributable to 
innovative products (Caloghirou, Kastelli, and Tsakanikas, 2004). Besides the particular 
source of knowledge, the breadth and depth of external knowledge have an inverted-U 
relationship with a firm’s innovative performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). 
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There are only a few studies on the relationship between the sources of external 
knowledge and the governance choice of upstream or downstream innovative activities. 
However, external public knowledge seems to drive external downstream innovative 
activities, such as collaboration with public organizations (Fontana, Geuna, and Matt, 
2006) or licensing (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). As for upstream innovation 
resources, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) found that in Belgian firms the likelihood of 
external sourcing increased when information from competitors was important. 
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PART I. COMMERCIALIZATION OF PATENTED INVENTIONS 
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CHAPTER 3. Commercialization: Theoretical Motivation 
 
 
 
Technological innovation is, by definition, a new technology (or a new combination of 
existing technologies) put into (commercial) use (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988; 
Schumpeter, 1942). The efforts required for generating new ideas or combining existing 
technologies in a new way (or “inventions”) is often so distinct from the efforts required 
for transforming those new ideas or technologies into commercial use (Roberts, 1988; 
Teece, 1986) that, as Schumpeter (1942) asserted, the former “does not necessarily 
induce innovation, but produces of itself … no economically relevant effect at all.” 
Commercialization is an important issue both in practice and in theory. The 
competitiveness crisis of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s was not a crisis in 
generating new scientific and technological ideas but a crisis in transforming them into 
commercial applications. Inventions of no or little commercial use can be beneficial to 
the inventor or a society but not as much as the inventions successfully commercialized. 
Also, in this era of an exploding number of patent filings (Kortum and Lerner, 1999), 
nonused patents are not only costly for the owner to maintain (Rivette and Kline, 2000) 
but also detrimental to the competitiveness and technological progress of a society 
(Shapiro, 2000). 
 
While the importance of commercialization in innovation has been recognized for a long 
time, it has not been reflected in empirical studies in innovation literature. Most empirical 
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literature has focused on the inventive part of innovation and, thus, severely overlooked 
the commercialization part. Moreover, many studies regard inventions as a proxy for 
innovation, which is, indeed, distinct from invention. A probable contributor to this 
research trend is a wider and easier availability of data measuring the efforts and 
outcomes of the inventive part of innovation than similar data measuring 
commercialization. Patent data is one of the most widely used data sources for this 
purpose. 
 
Patents are one of the most important sources of innovation studies for numerous reasons. 
First, patentability requires novelty, non-obviousness, and commercial applicability that 
conforms to the definition of innovation, especially the inventive part of innovation. 
Second, by law in most countries, patentability is rigorously scrutinized by professional 
examiners, and the results are published for public access. Third, patent publications are 
well-maintained, regularly updated and corrected, and accessible easily at small cost. In 
summary, patent databases are the largest databases for innovative ideas. Patent data also 
have several weaknesses. First of all, patented inventions do not cover all inventive 
activities. Lots of inventions are kept secret (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). However, 
some recent trends such as the increasing propensity to patent (Hall, 2004; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and the growth of patentable inventions 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999) mitigate this problem. Secondly, they can reveal only a partial 
picture of innovation because they do not provide information about whether or how the 
innovative activities are commercialized. To complement this weakness, some direct 
measures of innovation, such as expert assessment of new products and processes (see, 
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for example, Acs, 2002; Pavitt, Robson, and Townsend, 1987), are suggested. However, 
this method requires enormous effort collecting and validating the data.  
 
This study takes advantage of direct and indirect measures of innovative activities by 
constructing a comprehensive data set from multiple information sources, including 
patent bibliometrics and a large-scale inventor survey. Based on this novel data set, we 
aim to answer an important policy and management question about how and what 
patented inventions are transformed into innovation. In particular, this study examines 
what determines the commercial uses of patents. Pioneering studies by Teece (1986, 
2006) suggest that the profit from innovation is not necessarily appropriated by the 
innovator but may accrue to the imitator or the owner of complementary assets depending 
on the maturity of technology, regimes of appropriability, and the characteristics and 
position of complementary assets. Recent literature about licensing endorses a part of 
Teece’s arguments by empirically showing that the strength of patents (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2006; 
Kim and Vonortas, 2006) and the ownership of complementary assets (Gambardella, 
Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007) are important predictors for licensing propensity.  
 
We regard a patented invention as commercialized when it is used for any of the 
following purposes: integration into products or processes, licensing and cross-licensing, 
and establishing a new company to exploit the invention. Patented inventions that are not 
commercialized are those that are simply not used (i.e., “sleeping patents”) or are not 
used but indeed strategically exploited (i.e., “strategic nonuse patents”). Naturally, 
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patents of higher technological or economic significance will have higher chances of 
commercialization. Other factors at the organizational and invention levels should also 
predict the propensity to commercialize a patented invention. This part examines the 
effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and firm assets on the 
commercial uses of patented inventions. We theorize the relationships of particular types 
of use and the factors at organizational and invention levels in the later part of this study. 
Most factors affecting the mode of use, in particular different modes of 
commercialization, we theorize, have offsetting effects on commercialization. Two 
factors examined in this part, we contend, have a larger unilateral effect on 
commercialization than the offsetting effects and are, therefore, empirically identifiable. 
Also, while evolutionary explanation of technological development has been widely 
accepted, empirical evidence on it in the innovation context is scarce. Although some 
studies point out firm assets as a driver of non-practicing strategic patents, their impact 
on commercialization is not well-known. Considering that strategic nonuse accounts for a 
large share of nonuse patents (38% in our sample), studying the effects of firm assets on 
commercialization may look like almost a mirror of the study that examines its effects on 
strategic nonuse. However, there is a subtle difference in interpretation and more explicit 
difference in policy implications. The above reasons motivate us to examine the effects of 
two factors on commercialization. 
 
We argue that the patented inventions in mature technology are more likely to find a path 
to commercial applications because of the incremental nature of innovation and the lower 
degree of uncertainty. Also, we argue that the patented inventions from capital-intensive 
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firms are less likely to be commercialized because of the resistance to cannibalizing the 
existing competitive advantage, progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size, 
and a larger protective value than the commercialization value of patents.  
 
 
3.1. Maturity of Technology and Emergence of Dominant Design 
 
Similar to Kuhnian notions of scientific progress (Kuhn, 1970), technological 
development is known to take a staged trajectory. A new technology, by definition, 
implies a radical departure from past practice (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Therefore, in 
its early stages of development, the economic prospects and utility of a new technology 
are not fully revealed to the industry players. Before a dominant design appears, 
investment in the manufacturing process is suppressed because of uncertainty and risk in 
commercialization, and firms compete for design and industry standards. Once a 
dominant design emerges, the field of technology is populated with a myriad of 
incremental innovations that address small technical problems. In this stage, competition 
shifts from design to manufacturing efficiency. This picture is repeatedly supported by 
the advocates of technology evolution (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). A common 
prediction from this lineage of theoretical explanations is that, as a dominant design 
appears in a technology field, technological uncertainty decreases, the field is populated 
with many incremental innovations, utility and demands for the technology are widely 
recognized among firms, and manufacturing processes and facilities are standardized.  
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We argue that the overall characteristics of technologies in their post-dominant design era 
constitute a selection environment in which the odds of commercializing a particular 
technology are higher. Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed four elements that affect the 
selection environment of technological advancement: 1) the nature of the benefits and 
costs that are weighed by the organizations that will decide to adopt or not to adopt a new 
innovation; 2) consumer preferences and institutional environments that affect 
profitability from innovation; 3) prospects of profit growth; and 4) the difficulty of 
imitation and learning effects. These elements should vary, more or less, by industry 
sectors and individual firm characteristics. However, apart from sectoral heterogeneity, 
increased levels of familiarity with technology and well-established demands and 
supplies of complementary technologies, which are a defining characteristic of the post-
dominant design stage of technology evolution, would constitute a favorable selection 
environment for a member technology. This argument is particularly related to the first 
and the last element of Nelson and Winter’s selection environment. First, if there is a 
well-populated group of users or developers for a technology, an innovator in that 
technology area benefits from monitoring others about which innovations perform well or 
poorly (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The learning effects occur both at technological 
(Wade, 1995) and organizational dimensions (Abrahamson, 1991; Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). Second, a large population of components in a technology will reduce the costs of 
implementing a similar technology. If adoption of a technology goes beyond a certain 
point, complementary factors required for adopting it will be readily available to the 
innovator. The complementary factors include organizational routines, skills, 
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complementary technologies, manufacturing processes, and others. Third, the well-
populated technology area will have positive impacts on the innovators’ aspirations for 
the benefits. Albeit too simplistic, we argue that at least an established level of demands 
will favor adopting a technology.12 In his recent reflection on the original 1986 article, 
“Profiting from technological innovation,” Teece (2006) provides a refined view of the 
relationship of the emergence of dominant design with the profitability and 
commercialization of innovation. Teece’s remedy for profiting from innovation in 
technologies where a dominant design has not emerged is to wait until a dominant design 
emerges, unless the innovator has the capability to promote one. Our argument elaborates 
on Teece’s framework. 
 
Besides the macroevolutionary aspects of technological development, emergence of a 
dominant design (or mature technology) influences the propensity to commercialize in a 
more nuanced way. According to transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981), market 
transaction of technology will be suppressed when it involves more technological 
uncertainty (Arrow, 1969; Oxley, 1997). When market transactions are either risky or 
costly, the innovator will face two options available for his existing patented inventions: 
1) to integrate them into his own commercial applications or 2) if the first option is not 
appropriate, then to seek another option which includes just putting them on the shelf or 
using them for strategic purposes such as bargaining chips in cross-licensing negotiations 
or blocking competitors (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The first 
option is a choice between two different modes of commercialization (or “within- 
                                                 
12 However, this argument is incomplete unless the following aspects regarding firm-specific and invention-
specific factors are not considered together: competitive environment, the amount of the benefits from 
innovation, and the uncertainty/risk involved in realizing the benefits. 
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effects”), which, resultantly, would not affect the overall propensity to commercialize. 
The second option is a choice between commercialization and non-commercialization (or 
“between-effects”). In a regime where technological uncertainty is high, the propensity to 
commercialize will decrease because of the between-effects. The between-effects are 
composed of, among others, plain nonuse (or “sleeping”) patents and strategic nonuse 
patents. All else equal, we postulate that otherwise commercializable (or licensable) 
patents are strategically exploited rather than put on the shelf. This is consistent with 
Merges’ views (1994) that technological uncertainty induces bargaining failure and 
results in blocking patents. The arguments developed here are first explored in this part 
and further examined with particular focus on strategic nonuse in Part III.  
 
Some technology-based products are built on complex integration of technology 
components, while some other products are built on a relatively simple composition of 
technologies. Semiconductor or electronics goods typically integrate several hundreds to 
several thousands of technological components, many of which are complementary and 
cumulative. On the other hand, pharmaceuticals or agricultural goods are built on a 
relatively small number of technological components (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). 
In complex industry, utility and commercialization of a new technological component is 
determined in the relationship with other technological components and fitness with the 
final system. Introduction of a new technology cannot be instantly integrated into a 
commercial product because developing and optimizing with interfacing and 
complementary technologies will require a certain level of familiarity with that 
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technology. Therefore, familiarity with a technological component among the system 
builders will be more influential on commercialization in complex industry.  
 
 
3.2. Capital Intensity 
 
One superior technology does not ensure commercial success. Successful commercial 
transformation of an invention generally requires investment in downstream 
complementary assets such as manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, or 
marketing capabilities. Indeed, surveys of R&D managers of U.S. firms showed that 
appropriability of innovation depended crucially on non-technological firm capabilities 
such as lead-time advantage, complementary assets, or scale economy of manufacturing 
processes (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). While firms already 
equipped with such capabilities are advantageous in product market competition probably 
due to faster time to market and a learning curve advantage, they tend to be resistant to 
incorporating new technologies into the existing facilities for the following two reasons: 
First, innovation requires adaptation of existing complementary assets. A firm will 
upgrade or replace the existing facilities to accommodate new technologies if it believes 
that the investment is financially justified (i.e., when benefits from integrating the new 
technologies surpass the investment). The costs for changing existing plants and facilities 
to integrate a new technology will be generally larger for a large plant or facility. Hence, 
in more capital-intensive firms, even the same invention would incur more costs of 
integration and be subject to stricter cost justification. The higher switching costs in 
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capital-intensive firms, therefore, will have effects to suppress integrating new 
incremental technologies. However, the switching costs effects do not necessarily lower 
the probability of commercialization because the owner of technologies will have another 
commercialization option: external commercialization (e.g., licensing). Therefore, we 
need to take a closer look at the mode of commercialization. This will be the topic of Part 
II.    
 
Second, capital-intensive firms have alternative means of appropriability that can exceed 
the benefits from commercializing an invention. In other words, capital-intensive firms 
would worry that new technologies would cannibalize the existing competitive 
advantage.13 To illustrate the arguments, let us take an example of liquid crystal display 
(or LCD) manufacturers. In the LCD industry, production efficiency crucially depends on 
how big the manufacturers can make a glass substrate (from which LCD panels are cut) 
and, therefore, LCD manufacturers race for technology development to enlarge the size 
of the glass substrates. In 2003 Samsung Electronics, then the world’s largest provider of 
TFT-LCD display panels, announced that it would skip the sixth generation and move 
directly to the seventh generation (Business Wire, 2003). It also announced an additional 
investment in the existing fifth-generation production line. Definitely, Samsung had a 
sufficient level of technology to build a sixth-generation production line, but it did not 
because the huge investment in the sixth generation would not be justified given the 
competitive advantage in the existing fifth generation and more efficiency gains from the 
                                                 
13 A study on 192 business units in three highly competitive and turbulent industries shows that the 
willingness to cannibalize is indeed negatively associated with specialized investments (Chandy and Tellis, 
1998). In this study, we assume that high capital intensity would involve a high level of specialized 
investment. 
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seventh generation. The arguments made here are in line with Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction” concept (Schumpeter, 1942) and also with Christensen’s reasoning on why 
the incumbent often fails in radical innovation (Christensen, 2003). The “cannibalization” 
effects will suppress the external mode of commercialization as well as internal 
commercialization because either one will weaken the already-existing competitive 
advantage stemming from the assets. The cannibalization effects of the capital assts on 
commercialization will be first examined in this part and then in more detail using a 
direct measure (i.e., whether or not an invention is competence-destroying) in Part II. 
 
In addition, when a firm has expensive and crucial capital assets based on technologies, 
they would file for patents on some peripheral technologies not directly transformed into 
commercialization but related to protecting the assets (Ceccagnoli, 2009). In other words, 
capital-intensive firms will be more attracted to having preemptive patents. The larger 
incentives to protect at a firm with high capital intensity will also suppress licensing. The 
risk for dissipation of capital advantage will increase through a competitor’s access to the 
key technology and potential leakage of knowledge used for building the firm’s 
production facility. Turning again to the Samsung case: While Samsung did not build the 
sixth-generation lines, they kept patenting for technologies used for the sixth generation. 
Some of these patents would have been filed for in the prospect of jumping into the sixth 
generation before the decision to skip it, and then filed for strategic reasons such as 
avoiding potential litigation and blocking or slowing down competitors’ technology 
development. From the interviews with managers in the semiconductor industry, Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) found that firms that had sunk large costs into manufacturing facilities 
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had large incentives to use patents for a safeguard against the threat of costly litigation as 
well as “bargaining chips” in licensing negotiation. In summary, patented inventions 
from capital-intensive firms will be less likely to commercialize because the patents may 
have a larger value in preemption. This argument will be examined in more detail in Part 
III.  
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CHAPTER 4. Data and Measures 
 
 
 
4.1. Data 
In order to address the research questions and hypotheses in this study, we need detailed 
information about both the outcome of an invention (i.e., its value and use) and the 
invention activities, including the resources invested, the sources of knowledge, and 
others. The estimation was based on a novel data set constructed from multiple sources: 
an inventor survey, the United States Patent and Trademark Office online database, the 
EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (henceforth, PATSTAT) provided by the 
European Patent Office, and COMPUSTAT for firm financial information. A key 
element is the inventor survey (GT/RIETI Survey 2007) that was administered by a 
research team at Georgia Tech in cooperation with the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry of Japan (RIETI) between June and November 2007.  
 
The GT/RIETI Survey is sampled from the granted U.S. patents filed between 2000 and 
2003 (in terms of the first priority application date) and included in the OECD’s Triadic 
Patent Families (TPF) (OECD, 2006). The TPF includes only those patents whose 
applications are filed with both the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the European Patent 
Office (EPO) and granted in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
We used TPF as a sampling basis for several reasons. First, the inventor survey was part 
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of the project for the U.S.-Japan comparative studies. TPF has an advantage in reducing 
home-country bias that might stem from a single patent office (Criscuolo, 2006). Second, 
we could identify inventor addresses easily from multiple patent databases, especially 
from matching patents filed with EPO. Third, the value of patents is known to be highly 
skewed. By using TPF we focus on important inventions. One caveat here is that this 
characteristic of TPF may favor large and multinational firms and also commercializable 
inventions because the additional costs for filing and maintaining patents in multiple 
jurisdictions may work as a threshold for low-valued (ex ante) or less-promising patents. 
 
We randomly sampled 28% (or 9,060) of patents stratified by NBER (National Bureau of 
Economic Research) technology class (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Then, for the 
first U.S. inventor of each patent, we collected U.S. street addresses mostly from the EPO 
database and from other supplementary sources such as the USPTO application database 
or phone directories. If no address was available, we took the next U.S. inventor. After 
removing 18 patents that were either withdrawn or for which we could not find any U.S. 
inventor address we had 9,042 patents for mailing out. Taking the first available U.S. 
inventor as a representative inventor of each patent, we had 7,933 unique inventors. We 
took the strategy of not sending multiple surveys to the same inventor, believing this 
strategy would increase the response rate. In order to select one patent per inventor, we 
randomly drew one patent out of multiple patents belonging to the same inventor. Then 
the number of patents belonging to each unique inventor was recorded to use as a weight. 
Inventor weights range from 1 to 7 as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Number of patents per inventor 
# Patents per inventor (weight) Frequency Percent 
1 7124 89.8 
2 624 7.9 
3 115 1.4 
4 43 0.5 
5 13 0.2 
6 10 0.1 
7 4 0.1 
Total 7933 100.0 
 
 
 
The first round of the survey questionnaires was mailed to 7,933 unique U.S. inventors in 
June 2008 and the second round to almost 5,000 inventors in July 2008. Between the two 
rounds, we sent a reminder/thank note to all inventors in the sample. We had received 
1,919 surveys via mail and web with a response rate of 24.2% (when adjusted for the 
undeliverable addresses and the deceased, the response rate increased to 31.9%). Then we 
tested response bias, mail vs. web bias, and good vs. bad address bias using the patent 
indicators for all patents in the sample. The test results did not show significant 
differences between any two groups compared. In particular, there were no significant 
differences in average values of patent indicators between two compared groups. This 
also indicates that the sample is not significantly biased due to inventor attrition (indeed, 
we received 20 or so responses from a family member of the deceased or seriously ill 
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inventors). Because our survey was directed toward the inventors rather than managers of 
firms, the sample should not be seriously affected by firm attrition.14 
 
In our survey, 1,806 responses are from inventors affiliated with firms (either public or 
private).15 We identified firm patents from the survey but also from assignees of patents 
for those responses missing on the survey question. In the survey, inventions from large 
firms (employees > 500) account for 81.1% of all inventions affiliated with firms, mid-
sized firms for 7.7%, and very small firms (employees < 100) for 11.2%.16 The figures go 
a little bit upward for large firms and downward for small and medium firms when they 
are weighted (see the rightmost bar of Figure 4.1). In order to draw a comparative picture 
of the distribution by firm size of the survey, we compared it with the distribution of the 
total sales amount of firms in 2002 by their sizes17 (i.e., “very small” if the number of 
employees is less than 100; “large” if the number of employees is greater than or equal to 
500; “medium” for firms with the number of employees in between). The baseline 
benchmark is the 2002 U.S. economic census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). 
Compared with the leftmost bar of Figure 4.1, which is directly calculated from the 
census data, our survey seems to overrepresent large firms (61.9% v. 82.5% weighted for 
large firms)  and underrepresent small and medium firms (26.5% v. 10.5% weighted for 
                                                 
14 However, attrition of firms may have affected some questions in the survey. For example, "no 
commercialization" or "don't know" answers in patent use questions may have been inflated from 
inventions assigned to a firm that went out of business because of the following reasons: First, they might 
have been disadvantageously positioned in commercialization; second, their use might not be properly 
tracked by inventors. Nevertheless, this may not be a serious source of bias because the legal status of an 
inventor of a patent is not tempered by a change of assignee firm.    
15 This figure does not count independent inventors.  
16 Note that the number of employees asked in the survey is not for a single establishment but for a group of 
related firms. When the firm is a subsidiary of a larger organization, the survey question asks the 
respondent to report the number of total employees of its parent firm and other subsidiaries. 
17 The distribution of the total number of employees by firm size is also similar with the sales distribution. 
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very small firms). However, note that the survey counts the number of patents while the 
census calculates sales amount. Because innovativeness and patent propensity are known 
to differ by firm size, we calculated two adjusted distributions. The second bar of Figure 
4.1 reflects the different innovativeness between large and small firms. Using the 
innovation data from the Small Business Administration, Acs and Audretsch (1988) 
found that, in highly innovative sectors, large firms generated, on average, 1.272 times 
more innovative products than small firms. The second distribution is calculated by 
multiplying large firm sales by 1.272. The gap between the distribution of this and our 
survey now becomes closer than the non-weighted one. However, this figure is still not 
about patent distribution and may not be directly comparable with the patent distribution 
of our survey. The third bar shows the distribution of sales amount by firm size adjusted 
for the patent propensity.18 Our survey results show a slightly lower proportion for large 
firms and slightly higher proportion for very small firms but more or less show similar 
distribution with the “innovative sales” calculated from the census and the patent 
propensity provided in the literature. In summary, our sample distribution is consistent 
with the overall distribution of innovative firms as the patent data would be but not with 
the distribution of all firms.  
 
                                                 
18 To calculate the patent propensity, we first calculated deflated R&D expenditure by firm size. We 
applied a uniform R&D intensity of 2.9% as provided by the Carnegie Mellon survey. We also tested other 
values of R&D intensity to find no notable changes in the overall pattern. Then we calculated “innovative 
sales” by applying the probability function of firms’ having non-zero patent conditional on the R&D 
expenditure (or simply call it patent propensity function). We used Scherer’s (1983) Weibull distribution 
with the estimated deflated R&D expenditure tapped in. Based on the descriptive statistics provided by 
Scherer we corrected small R&D part as follows: Pr(# patent>0) =
647.0&*0104.01 DRe-- for large firms and 
126.01
647.0&*0104.0 +- - DRe  for small and medium firms. Caveat: The estimation here is only a rough 
benchmark because it is based on the old data and because industry heterogeneity is not fully considered. 
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The proportion of start-up firms is much higher for very small firms (26.2%) than for 
large firms (2.6%) and statistically significant at 0.01 level (Pearson Chi-square =187.7; 
Pr = 0.000).  
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of sales and patents by firm size 
Data sources: (Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2006) 
 
 
 
Among these, 107 responses did not provide any information about how they used 
patents, which is our dependent variable. Further, 460 observations have missing or 
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unreliable values on one of our independent or control variables.19 After a listwise 
deletion of observations having a missing value on any variable, we have 1,239 complete 
cases. Because this drop is huge, we examined whether this listwise deletion of missing 
values causes bias. For the most of our patent-level variables (e.g., commercialization, 
technology class, firm size, number of inventors, and others) there is no statistically 
significant difference in means between the complete cases sample and the full sample. 
Significant biases are caused by the variable of technological value of patents. Therefore, 
we test our models both with and without this variable. Furthermore, we test the self-
selection effects of the respondents’ opting-out from answering this question on our 
model specification using the Heckman selection model. Further details will be discussed 
in analysis.  
  
4.2. Variables and Measures 
4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
The GT/RIETI survey asks respondents whether the patented invention was 
commercially used and, if not, why it was not. The modes of commercial use asked 
include 1) commercialized in a product/process/service by the applicant/owner, 2) 
“licensed by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent party,” 3) if the patent is 
licensed whether it is a part of a cross-license, and 4) whether the patent was 
commercially exploited by the respondent or any of respondent’s co-inventors for starting 
a new company. First, we constructed a variable “any use” by coding it 1 for the patented 
                                                 
19 For example, the sum of all types of R&D efforts should be 100%. We removed those observation whose 
sum of R&D efforts are not either 99% or 100%. 
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invention falling in any of these three categories. We coded 0 for those observations who 
explicitly reported that the patented invention was not used for all three commercial 
modes. Some answered to only some of these three questions. This affects identifying 
nonuse. In the survey, then, we asked for the reasons a patent was not used. Thus, we 
regard those observations who answered to the reasons for nonuse but only partially 
reported nonuse in the three use questions as nonuse. Out of 1,239 complete cases, 657 
(53.0%) patents are reported to be used. There will be some gap between the time when 
an invention was completed and the time when it was put into actual use. Also that gap 
may vary by industry- or technology-specific factors. All patents in the sample were first 
filed20 between 2000 and 2003 inclusive, but the granted date spans from 2000 to 2006. 
Therefore, we tested whether the rate of actual use of patents differs by the year filed or 
issued. Unequal variance t-test shows that there are no significant differences between the 
two groups in terms of issue year and filed year.21  
 
4.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
We operationalize technological maturity using the familiarity index of technological 
components devised by Fleming (2001). The component familiarity captures the degree 
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his 
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of 
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology 
                                                 
20 Indeed, the first priority patent in the triadic family. 
21 The chi-square test results show significant differences in issue year by used2 (chi-sq statistic=11.84 with 
d.f.=5, prob=.0371). However, the trends are not clearly monotonic, although year 2001 had the highest 
ratio (67.44%) and 2006 the lowest (48.21%). The second highest ratio of commercialization was shown in 
year 2005 (56.41%). Therefore, we could not confirm that commercialization should be right truncated in 
the sample. 
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become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming, 
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes as the 
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the 
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component 
familiarity had an inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as 
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.  
 
In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from 
1976 to 1999 in each technology class.  
 
Component familiarity for patent i =  
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Where iC = { } ipatent  toassigned subclasspatent  , 
  jc = patent subclass identifier, 
 
iC
N = number of different patent subclasses assigned to patent i. 
 
And knowledge attenuation factor, konkattenuati = 
)
loss knowledge ofconstant  time
kpatent  of distance temporalexp( , 
Where temporal distance of patent k= 
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999 
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994 
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989 
Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 following Fleming (2001). We rescaled 
component familiarity by dividing it by 1,000. 
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Complex technology areas are identified using the survey. The GT/RIETI survey asks the 
inventors “how many domestic patents are jointly used in the commercial application of 
the invention.” It provided eight categories: 1, 2 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to 
500, 501 to 1,000, and more than 1,000 patents. We averaged the median values over 30 
subgroups of technologies and constructed a variable, “technological complexity.” Then, 
a dichotomous variable, complexity of product technology, is coded 1 if the technological 
complexity of the subclass to which the focal patent belonged was higher than the median 
value of technology complexity. The complex technologies classified in this way include 
information technology, semiconductors, telecommunication, electronics, biotechnology, 
and chemical engineering. The non-complex (or discrete) technologies include textile, 
pharmaceuticals, agriculture and food, construction, and transportation. This 
classification is consistent with the previous literature (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; 
Kusunoki, Nonaka, and Nagata, 1998; Reitzig, 2004) but, we believe, more evidence-
based.  
 
Following Hall & Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004), we measure capital intensity 
using the deflated book value (constant U.S. dollars in 2000) of property, plant, and 
equipment divided by number of employees. In order to mitigate yearly fluctuation and 
reduce missing values, we use a three-year running average centered on the filed year of a 
focal patent. Main data sources are COMPUSTAT North America–Fundamentals Annual 
and COMPUSTAT Global–Fundamentals Annual.22 For a few firms, we directly found 
                                                 
22 We use consolidated financial reports. Therefore, many subsidiaries in our sample are regarded as a 
parent company whose financial information is available. 
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the data from their web sites. In the sample, about a quarter of the firms are either private 
or foreign whose financial information is not available in either the COMPUSTAT or 
alternative sources mentioned above. They are coded as a dummy variable named 
“dummy for missing capital intensity.” 
 
4.2.3. Controls 
We control the area of technology, the technological value of the focal patent, the nature 
of invention (product vs. process), initial purpose of the research that led to the patented 
invention, the proportion of R&D efforts devoted to the basic research, technological 
breadth of patents as measured by the number of different technological classes 
belonging to the focal patent, number of inventors registered in the patent document, the 
number of independent claims contained in the patent documents, and the logarithm of 
age of the invention at the time of survey as measured by the incipient date of completed 
survey subtracted by the filed date of the patent in the months. 
 
 
Technological assets 
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is 
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal 
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal 
patent filed in year t is: 
 
  PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d) 
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where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge, which is set to 15% following 
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).  
 
Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated 
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated 
into the merger. We use the PATSTAT database (April 2008 version) compiled by the 
EPO. There are two advantages using the PATSTAT for this purpose. First, the 
PATSTAT provides relational tables and an SQL interface for the bibliometric 
information of the U.S. patents, which make data extraction much easier than other 
available data sources. Second, PATSTAT provides standard ID numbers of assignees, 
which corrected many small differences in spellings. We further cleaned the data by 
manually searching and correcting the list of assignees in our sample. 
 
External knowledge flows 
The GT/RIETI survey asks how important the various knowledge sources were in either 
suggesting or completing the research that led to the patented invention. The measure is a 
six-point Likert scale with 0 for “did not use,” 1 for “not important,” and 5 for “very 
important.” The sources listed are scientific and technical literature, patent literature, fair 
or exhibition, technical conferences and workshops, standard documents, universities, 
government research organizations, customers or product users, suppliers, competitors, 
and others. Responses in the others category include consultant, education, or experience. 
Then we identified six items (patent literature, fair or exhibition, standard documents, 
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customers or product users, suppliers, and competitors) as “industrial knowledge” and the 
remaining four items (scientific literature, technical conferences and workshops, 
universities, and government research organization) as “public knowledge.”  
 
External collaboration 
It is well known that networks affect the outcomes of innovation (Afuah, 2000; Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994). The 
network literature consistently finds that firm performance is positively associated with 
R&D collaboration (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004), networking with suppliers (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Sytch, 2007), or 
quality of networks (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 1996). The GT/RIETI 
Survey asks whether the focal patent was developed with inventors who belong to 
various external organizations and whether the focal patent was developed through 
formal or informal collaboration with external organizations. The survey presents 8 
distinct categories for external organizations including suppliers, customers and product 
users, competitors, non-competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities, 
government research organizations, hospitals, and other. We construct a collaboration 
dummy variable by coding 1 for the inventions with any external collaborators. 
 
Inventor in manufacturing unit  
In Teecian arguments, the complementary assets interfere with mode choice of 
innovation in three different points. If the invention does not require complementary 
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assets, it is immediately commercialized by the inventor. When the invention requires 
complementary assets for commercialization, the degree of specialization and the 
ownership of those assets play a role. Empirically, it is hard to assess whether a particular 
invention requires complementary assets for its commercialization and how specialized 
those assets should be. Therefore, we assume that every invention requires a certain type 
of downstream assets, such as manufacturing facility, and that those assets are somewhat 
co-specialized. An invention from a manufacturing unit is already, or ready to be, 
coupled with downstream co-specialized assets. The GT/RIETI survey asks which 
organizational unit the inventor belongs to. A variable “Inventor in manufacturing unit” 
is coded 1 if the inventor belongs to the manufacturing unit and 0 for the R&D unit 
(either independent or sub-unit attached to non-R&D function), software development, 
sales and marketing, and others. 
 
R&D for base technology 
This variable discriminates the business needs of the invention. Using our survey, we 
code 1 for this variable if the reported purpose of research is “enhancing the technology 
base of the firm or the long-term cultivation of technology seeds.”   
 
Proportion of basic R&D 
This variable is a proxy measuring the position of the invention on a basic-applied 
spectrum. In the survey, we asked the inventor how much effort (in percentage) he put 
into basic research. The other categories presented are “applied research,” “design and/or 
development,” and “technical services.” 
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Technological value of patents 
In our survey, we ask the inventor to assess the technical significance of the invention 
relative to other technical developments in the field during the year the focal patent was 
applied for. We code 4 for the top 10%, 3 for the top 25% (but not top 10%), 2 for the top 
50% (but not top 25%), and 1 for the bottom half. 
 
Number of inventors 
We control the number of inventors as registered in the U.S. patent publication. 
 
Type of innovation 
Product innovation is observed to differ in some aspects from process innovation (Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Therefore, we controlled for the type of innovation. A variable 
“product innovation” is constructed from the survey. The reference category is composed 
of process innovation or mixed innovation in which product and process innovation are 
mixed. 
 
Number of claims 
We control the scope of patent by including the number of independent claims. Each 
claim may be regarded as an independent patent (Tong and Frame, 1994)23 and, thus, the 
number of claims is known to measure the breadth of utility or applicability of the patent. 
In U.S. patent law, there are two types of claims: independent and dependent or multiple 
                                                 
23 In judging patent infringement in the U.S., infringing any single claim in a patent is regarded as 
infringement on the patent. 
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dependent. While an independent claim stands alone, a dependent claim refers to a claim 
previously set forth and specifies a particular embodiment or limitation of the invention 
(35 U.S.C. 112). Because of this distinction, counting dependent claims may not (or in a 
fractional way) properly reflect the technological scope of inventions. Therefore, we 
count only the independent claims. We regard any claim that contains a reference to 
another claim as a dependent claim and subtract them from the total number of claims. 
We take a natural logarithm of it, assuming marginally decreasing nonlinear effects. 
 
Age of invention 
The mode of use may vary by the length for which an invention has come out and been 
publicized. The variable “age of invention” measures how many months have elapsed at 
the time of the survey since the invention was filed.  
 
Industry dummies 
We distinguish six different industries using OST/INPI/ISI nomenclature24 based on 
International Patent Class. 
 
 
                                                 
24 This is a widely used nomenclature, especially among European researchers, focusing on industry 
characteristics. This system was developed and updated by three European research institutes: the 
Observatoire Science et Technology, the INPI (Institute Nationale Proprieté Industrielle), and Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems of Innovation Research. 
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Table 4.2 Variables and descriptions (N=1239) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data source 
Any commercialization 0.530 0.499 0 1 Survey 
Explanatory variables           
Component familiarity (/1000) 0.087 0.159 0 2.489 USPTO 
Capital intensity (M$/employee) 0.073 0.118 0 1.086 COMPUSTAT 
Dummy for missing capital 
intensity 0.262 0.440 0 1 COMPUSTAT 
Controls           
Large firm (employees > 500) 0.859 0.348 0 1 Survey & Patent 
Ln(patent stock) 5.466 2.753 0 9.865 PATSTAT 
Inventor in manufacturing unit 0.084 0.277 0 1 Survey 
Industrial knowledge 0.268 0.189 0 1 Survey 
Public knowledge 0.266 0.208 0 1 Survey 
Dummy for collaboration 0.293 0.455 0 1 Survey & Patent 
Technological value 2.211 1.069 1 4 Survey 
No immediate demand 0.224 0.417 0 1 Survey 
% Basic R&D (/100) 0.082 0.176 0 1 Survey 
Product invention 0.513 0.500 0 1 Survey 
Man-month (normalized) 0.182 0.229 0 1 Survey 
Number of inventors 2.796 1.911 1 16 Patent 
Complexity of technology (# 
USPC) 4.431 3.535 1 30 Patent 
Number of claims 22.826 15.689 1 181 Patent 
Age of invention (months) 68.873 12.029 37 92 Patent 
Electrical engineering 0.256 0.437 0 1 Patent 
Instruments 0.209 0.407 0 1 Patent 
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals 0.237 0.426 0 1 Patent 
Process eng., special equipment 0.136 0.343 0 1 Patent 
Mechanical eng., machinery 0.134 0.341 0 1 Patent 
Consumer goods & Construction 0.027 0.163 0 1 Patent 
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CHAPTER 5.  Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
5.1. Sample Characteristics 
In the sample, 53.0% of patents are commercialized in any of the following three modes: 
internal, licensing out or cross-licensing, or using for establishing a new firm. 
Surprisingly, despite the recent surge of patent filing in the United States, the rate of 
commercialization is quite similar to that of about a half century ago. One study 
conducted during the late 1950s reports that the rate of use of the U.S. patents issued in 
1938, 1948, and 1952 was 49.3% at the time of the survey25 (Sanders, Rossman, and 
Harris, 1958). However, this rate is much lower than that of European patents. The 
PatVal-EU reports that about 63.9% of European patents filed between 1993 and 1997 
inclusive are used by the time of survey, 2002 to 2003 (Giuri et al., 2007). When 
restricted to the corporate patents only, this rate will go up further because the reported 
rate of use for the non-corporate patents is a little bit lower than corporate patents. 
However, it is worth reminding readers here that these two references are not directly 
comparable to our survey for two reasons. First, the GT/RIETI survey asks about more 
recent patents than the Sanders, Rossman, and Harris survey and the PatVal-EU survey 
did. Assuming that there should be a time premium of actual use of patents, the rate of 
use reported in our survey may be underestimated compared to both surveys mentioned. 
                                                 
25 The rate including expected use during the full lifetime of patents calculated by Sanders, Rossman, and 
Harris is about 57.2%. 
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The second reason, on the other hand, contributes to overestimating actual use. 
Considering that sampled patents of our survey are triadic patents, we can speculate that 
the overall rate of use for the patents filed with the USPTO may be lower. The further 
comparative discussion of the rate of use goes beyond the scope of this study. The 
dominant mode of commercialization is internal, which accounts for 39.1% of total 
patents. Licensing and “using for establishing a new firm” account for 9.9% and 5.3%, 
respectively. 
 
In our sample, 1,064 patents (or 85.9%) are affiliated with large firms. In order to figure 
out whether our sample overrepresents large firms, we compare it with the PatVal-EU 
inventor survey (Giuri et al., 2007). The PatVal-EU survey defines a large firm as having 
more than 250 employees and a small firm less than 100 employees. For comparability, 
we use the same categories. Certainly, the proportion of large firms in the U.S. patents 
may not be necessarily similar to that in European patents. However, given that we do not 
have the statistics of the United States, we use European data for one reference. We may 
have a slight upward bias for large firms. However, remember that our sampling frame is 
the triadic patent families, which means that patents should have been filed with at least 
three offices: USPTO, EPO, and JPO. Additional filing and maintenance costs involved 
in triadic patent families may have imposed a threshold to hinder a marginal firm from 
filing in all the three national/regional offices and, consequently, resulting in a higher 
proportion of large firms than the set of patents filed in a single jurisdiction. 
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Table 5.1 Proportion of inventions from large firms: comparison with PatVal-EU 
 PatVal-EU GT/RIETI 
(unweighted) 
GT/RIETI 
(weighted)* 
Large firm (> 250 employees) 75.8% 84.7% 85.4% 
* We weight by the number of patents assigned to the same inventor in our sample. Note 
that we did not send multiple surveys to those inventors having more than one patent in 
the sample. Also note that the number used in this table is different from the estimation 
sample. In the estimation, we supplemented the firm size information from the GT/RIETI 
survey with the secondary sources of data. 
 
 
 
The rate of commercialization also varies by technology areas. Table 5.2 shows the cross-
tabulation of the actual commercialization by the OST/INPI/ISI technology classes. The 
general trends are the higher commercialization rate for discrete type of technologies, 
such as mechanical engineering or consumer goods, and the lower rate of 
commercialization for the complex type of technologies, such as electronics and 
chemicals. The difference of the rate of commercialization is statistically significant by 
30 leaf level of technology areas (P=0.006) and by 6 aggregate level also (p=0.053). The 
correlation matrix of the variables is reported in Appendix A, with the asterisk denoting 
the conventional level of significance at alpha < 0.05. 
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Table 5.2 Commercialization by technology area 
OST/INPI/ISI technology area 
Not 
exploited 
commercial 
use Total 
% commercial 
use 
MedicalTechn 49 47 96 49.0% 
Telecom 48 43 91 47.3% 
Electr/Energy 32 51 83 61.4% 
Optical 49 30 79 38.0% 
Analysis/Measurement/ ControlTechn 30 47 77 61.0% 
IT 31 41 72 56.9% 
Handl/Printing 30 38 68 55.9% 
Polymers 32 34 66 51.5% 
OrganicChem 39 25 64 39.1% 
Motors 26 27 53 50.9% 
Matprocessing/Textiles/Paper 20 27 47 57.4% 
Semiconductors 23 19 42 45.2% 
ChemEngineering 23 19 42 45.2% 
SurfaceTechn 22 18 40 45.0% 
Materials 13 26 39 66.7% 
MechElements 14 25 39 64.1% 
Audiovisual 22 16 38 42.1% 
Transportation 19 17 36 47.2% 
Pharmaceuticals/Cosmetics 18 16 34 47.1% 
MachineTools 13 20 33 60.6% 
PetrolChem/materialsChem 19 11 30 36.7% 
ConsGoods 7 16 23 69.6% 
Biotechnology 5 7 12 58.3% 
Environment 5 7 12 58.3% 
Agric&Foods 2 8 10 80.0% 
ConstrTechn   ; 1 9 10 90.0% 
Others* 7 13 20 65.0% 
Total 599 657 1256 52.3% 
* Aggregated “Agric&FoodProcess-Machines,” “NuclearTechn,” “ThermProcesses,” 
and “SpaceTech/Weapons” 
 
 
 
5.2. Probit Regression Results 
Column 1 of Table 5.3 presents the main results of probit regressions in the full sample. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the results of probit regressions in the complex technologies 
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sample and in the discrete technologies sample, respectively. All models are statistically 
significant and robust against several outliers.26 To test multicollinearity, we calculated 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) from OLS regression of the full model. We found no 
serious multicollinearity as indicated by small VIFs (Cohen et al., 2003). For robustness 
checks, we also estimated the model with the complete cases for the variable capital 
intensity (column 4, N=914) and the Heckman selection model with a non-missing 
dummy as a dependent variable of selection equation (column 5 and 6, N=1795). We 
found no notable discrepancy between the main results and either the restricted sample 
model or Heckman selection model.27  
 
                                                 
26 We identified outliers using Cook’s D and Leverage. There is no significant difference in the result when 
we ran the regressions after removing some identified outliers.  
27 Heckman probit selection model (Dubin and Rivers, 1989; Heckman, 1979) corrects self-selection bias 
by using the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated by the selection equation in the outcome equation. The selection 
equation is composed of a non-missing dummy (coded 1 if an observation has full information on all the 
variables and 0 otherwise) as a dependent variable and three independent variables: 1) normalized rank 
order of the number of citations received, 2) a dummy indicating collaboration, and 3) a dummy indicating 
whether the invention is related to an immediate demand. We included forward citations count as a proxy 
of technology value because we suspect that large missing values on the variable of technological value 
may be systematic. For example, the inventor having low-valued patents may have hidden an honest 
assessment behind “don’t know.” The latter two variables are included because means of them between the 
full sample and the non-missing subset are significantly different. The outcome equation is a binary probit 
model with “any commercial use” regressed on the covariates and the Inverse Mills ratio calculated from 
the selection equation. We used Heckman probit function of STATA 10. In the selection equations of 
Heckman probit estimations, the coefficients on collaboration (positive) and dummy for no immediate 
demands (negative) are significant. This tells us that, in our survey, the respondents are more likely to give 
us fuller information when their patents had been developed in a more collaborative way and their initial 
purpose of R&D project for the patented inventions had been more commercially oriented. However, 
potential bias that may stem from the self-selection of item non-responses should not affect the overall 
relationships of our interests. The correlations between error terms (Heckman’s rho) are statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that self selection effects would not result in biased estimates. We also ran 
probit regressions for the fully constrained sample and the sample having a dummy-adjusted technology 
value variable, respectively. The regression coefficients of both models are strikingly similar with each 
other and with the Heckman selection model. There is no change in sign and significance of the coefficients 
on our independent variables. As for control variables, no change in sign is observed. 
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Table 5.3 Results of regressions (DV=any commercial use) 
  Robustness checks 
 Main results (probit)  Heckman probit 
Variables 
(1)  
Full 
(2) 
complex 
technology 
(3) 
discrete 
technology 
(4) 
Removed 
missing 
capint 
(5) Main 
eq. (any 
commercial 
use) 
(6) 
Selection 
eq. (not 
missing) 
0.395* 0.595** -0.786 0.435* 0.395*  Component familiarity 
(/1000) (0.227) (0.270) (0.753) (0.257) (0.227)  
-1.027*** -1.721** -0.472 -0.871** -1.027***  Capital intensity 
(M$/employee) (0.382) (0.706) (0.447) (0.387) (0.383)  
0.051 -0.130 0.194  0.051  Dummy for missing 
capital intensity (0.125) (0.180) (0.183)  (0.125)  
0.093 0.085 -0.015 0.317 0.093  Large firm (employees > 
500) (0.142) (0.194) (0.221) (0.282) (0.142)  
-0.054*** -0.048* -0.063* -0.081*** -0.054***  Ln(patent stock) 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.020)  
0.337** 0.436** 0.232 0.135 0.337**  Inventor in manufacturing 
unit (0.145) (0.205) (0.209) (0.183) (0.145)  
0.997*** 0.838*** 1.148*** 1.206*** 0.997***  Industrial knowledge 
(0.233) (0.307) (0.365) (0.274) (0.239)  
-1.077*** -1.117*** -0.946*** -1.114*** -1.077***  Public knowledge 
(0.219) (0.284) (0.362) (0.261) (0.225)  
0.194** 0.225* 0.137 0.094 0.198 0.281*** Dummy for collaboration 
(0.087) (0.117) (0.135) (0.106) (0.378) (0.072) 
0.288*** 0.291*** 0.302*** 0.319*** 0.288***  Technological value 
(0.038) (0.050) (0.059) (0.046) (0.038)  
-0.248*** -0.227* -0.306** -0.288*** -0.251 -0.192*** No immediate demand 
(0.091) (0.119) (0.149) (0.107) (0.278) (0.071) 
-0.581** -0.667** -0.414 -0.669** -0.581**  % Basic R&D (/100) 
(0.235) (0.300) (0.402) (0.277) (0.237)  
0.093 0.150 0.039 0.080 0.093  Product invention 
(0.077) (0.101) (0.127) (0.091) (0.077)  
0.118 0.116 0.228 0.342 0.118  Man-month (normalized) 
(0.180) (0.237) (0.290) (0.208) (0.180)  
0.045** 0.054* 0.044 0.043* 0.045**  Number of inventors 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.034) (0.025) (0.021)  
-0.013 -0.024 -0.011 -0.020 -0.013  Complexity of technology 
(# USPC) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011)  
-0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002  Number of claims 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007** 0.005  Age of invention (months) 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)  
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Table 5.3 (continued)       
0.194* 0.131  0.256** 0.194*  Electrical engineering 
(0.111) (0.126)  (0.127) (0.111)  
0.055 -0.131 0.200 -0.042 0.055  Chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals (0.121) (0.213) (0.174) (0.144) (0.122)  
0.087 0.034 0.278 0.208 0.087  Process eng, special 
equipment (0.135) (0.167) (0.229) (0.156) (0.136)  
0.103 0.120 0.263 0.204 0.103  Mechanical eng, 
machinery (0.133) (0.246) (0.186) (0.153) (0.133)  
0.259 0.072 0.919 0.374 0.259  Consumer goods & 
Construction (0.270) (0.320) (0.592) (0.378) (0.269)  
     0.057* Normalized rank order of 
forward citations count      (0.032) 
-0.764** -0.612 -0.973** -1.053** -0.778 0.358*** Constant 
(0.316) (0.428) (0.491) (0.411) (1.468) (0.076) 
    0.026  Heckman’s Rho (Arctanh-
transformed)     (2.712)  
Observations (censored) 1239 722 517 914 1795 (556) 
Log Likelihood -761.19 -445.17 -307.34 -558.10 -1859.26 
Wald chi2 180.27 98.56 91.28 140.42 162.12 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.110 0.136 0.119 . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
As expected, the patents of higher technological value are more likely to be commercially 
exploited. The coefficients on technological value in all models are statistically 
significant at 1% level and positive. As the R&D project leading to the invention had 
focused more on basic research or the initial purpose of R&D project was long-term 
cultivation of base technology rather than current business purpose (“No immediate 
demand”), the resultant patents are less likely to be commercialized even after controlling 
for the age of invention. This result implies that commercializing the outcome from basic 
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R&D is not just a matter of time but there should be a fundamental discrepancy in 
commercialization between basic R&D and applied R&D.   
 
As the number of inventors increase, the probability of commercialization increases, but 
resources invested in the invention project as measured by man-month is not significantly 
associated with the propensity to commercialize. The number of inventors may represent 
both the amount of resources invested in the invention and, to some extent, the degree of 
complexity of the invention project. The probability of commercialization is not 
significantly associated with other patent strength measures (number of claims and 
number of different technology classes). 
 
Patents from firms with large patent stock are less likely to commercialize. As patent 
stock increases by 1 percent around its mean, the probability of commercialization 
decreases by 2.1 percentage points, holding others at their means or modes. After 
controlling for the size of patent stock, firm size does not affect the propensity to 
commercialize. 
 
A patent developed by an inventor belonging to the manufacturing unit is more likely to 
be commercialized. The coefficient of the variable “inventor in manufacturing unit” is 
statistically significant and positive. Holding other variables at their means or modes, the 
probability of commercialization for a patent from manufacturing units is lower by 0.141 
than a counterpart patent from specialized R&D units or other non-manufacturing units, 
such as sales and marketing departments.  
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The probability of commercialization is likely to be higher for collaborative inventions 
than non-collaborative inventions, holding others constant. The coefficients for 
knowledge sources are also highly significant. However, the impact of external 
knowledge on the propensity to commercialize diverges depending on the characteristics 
of sources. While the industrial sources of knowledge that originated from customers, 
suppliers, competitors, fair or exhibition, standard documents, or patent literature are 
likely to increase the propensity to commercialize, the public sources of knowledge, such 
as published scientific literature, conferences, universities, or government research 
organizations, are likely to reduce the propensity of commercialization. These effects are 
statistically significant at 0.01 level and hold even after controlling for collaborations. 
 
Turning to the variables of our interests, adding component familiarity marginally 
improves the fit and explanatory power of the model compared to the base model with 
only controls (not reported). The coefficient is also marginally significant at 10% level 
but the sign is positive as expected. This estimation suggests that patents in familiar 
technology areas (one standard deviation around its mean) will be commercialized more 
by 2.5 percentage points, even after controlling for value of technology, demands, and 
others.28 The impact of component familiarity is stronger in complex technologies 
(columns 2 and 3). In fact, to our surprise, the regression coefficient on component 
familiarity in discrete technologies (column 3) not only loses significance but also 
                                                 
28 We tested whether there is a curvilinear relationship between the propensity to commercialize and 
component familiarity by adding a square term in the regression. We found no evidence of that. 
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changes its sign to negative. This finding indicates that technology evolution may have a 
different impact on innovation depending on the nature of underlying technology.  
 
In discrete technology, utility and commercial potential of a new technology may be 
relatively easily foreseeable and work independently from the overall development stage 
of the field. When nylon was invented, its usage was instantly recognized. Then, to 
protect profits from nylon, Du Pont scrutinized the possibility of substitutable 
petrochemical synthesis methods that can be used to make an equivalent of nylon and 
patented those substitutable technologies. On the other hand, competitors who may have 
developed substitutable technologies would not want to commercialize them unless their 
technologies were proved safe from infringement and would result in better performance 
to compensate the late start. The field was populated with fence patents to prevent rivals’ 
inventing-around the core technology. 
 
The coefficients on capital intensity are significant and negative as expected. The 
estimation (full model in column 1) suggests that patented inventions from capital-
intensive firms ($500,000 per employee above average firm) will commercialize the 
invention less by 19 percentage points, holding others constant at their means or modes. 
Also, the impact is stronger for complex technologies. The regression coefficient is -
1.721 and significant at 0.05 level for complex technologies but -0.472 and not 
significant in discrete technologies. Disappearance of significance in discrete 
technologies may be caused by the small sample size. We cannot explain the reasons 
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underlying this discrepancy because we do not know exactly how capital assets are 
differently utilized between complex and discrete technologies. 
 
 
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
We examined the effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and firm 
capabilities on the commercial uses of patented inventions. We found supporting 
evidence on the arguments that the patented inventions in mature technology are more 
likely to find a path to commercial applications because of a favorable selection 
environment of technology and lower uncertainty linked to the general characteristics of 
mature technology. Our analysis is consistent with the evolutionary explanation of 
technology development as claimed by many scholars of innovation studies (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Utterback, 1994). However, the effects of the selection environment are not clearly 
delineated from the effects of uncertainty on a choice between the external use and 
nonuse as predicted by transaction cost economics. This is because we deal with 
commercialization as a homogeneous category. Resultantly, we cannot see clearly the 
different mechanisms working on different modes of use (and nonuse) in this analysis. In 
the following parts, this study breaks down the use and nonuse into a more detailed 
category and addresses this issue again. Regardless of the internal mechanisms, this 
finding implies that thickets of nonuse patents may reach a natural equilibrium as the 
field of technology becomes more populated with component technologies. Of course, 
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whether patents are commercialized or not may not affect the costs of innovation for non-
patent holders and the entry conditions into the technology markets or product markets 
based on the technology. Nevertheless, from a social point of view, thickets composed of 
used patents may be better than the thickets composed of nonuse patents. 
 
Regime of appropriability is not exogenous. In addition, the study shows that the impact 
of component familiarity on commercialization is stronger for complex technologies. 
 
We also argued that the patented inventions from capital-intensive firms are less likely to 
commercialize because of the presence of alternative competitive advantage, 
progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value of 
patents than the benefits from commercialization. Our empirical results drawn from a U.S. 
inventor survey support these hypotheses. However, this result should be cautiously 
interpreted because we cannot clearly see just from this analysis whether the underlying 
mechanisms are related to switching costs, threat of cannibalization, or more filing of 
asset-protective patents. The mechanisms will be clearer in the following analyses of this 
study in which we look at the impacts of this construct on different modes of use and 
nonuse.  
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PART II. DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL PATHS OF 
COMMERCIALIZATION PROCESSES 
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CHAPTER 6. Introduction to Part II 
 
 
 
Technological innovation combines inventive processes with commercialization 
processes (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988). While they are often perceived as equivalent, 
they are, indeed, very different (Schumpeter, 1942). Numerous new elements not 
considered during the inventive processes (such as profitability, manufacturing efficiency, 
marketing strategy, and competitive environment) now emerge when the inventor thinks 
about commercialization. For example, profitability, manufacturing efficiency, ease of 
integration with exisiting facilities and skills, marketing strategy, and competitive 
environment become probably more important than technological superiority itself in the 
commercialization stage. To complete innovation, commercialization is essential. The 
innovator can choose different commercialization strategies. One of them is to decide 
whether to integrate downstream commercialization processes into internal capabilities or 
to seek alternative paths across firm boundaries. The most prominent external 
commercialization path is to license inventions and collect royalties. In this era of patent 
explosion and increasing importance of technology for firms’ competitiveness, the 
external paths of commercialization have important implications for firms’ 
competitiveness and economy as a whole. Also, studying factors affecting the choice 
between organizational paths has implications on the profitability of innovation and the 
technology strategy of firms.  
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Teece (1986) suggested that the profit from innovation was not necessarily appropriated 
by the innovator but may accrue to the imitator or the owner of complementary assets 
depending on the maturity of technology, regimes of appropriability, and the need, 
ownership, and characteristics of complementary assets. Recent literature about licensing 
endorses a part of Teece’s arguments by empirically showing that the strength of patents 
(Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 
2006; Kim and Vonortas, 2006) and the ownership of complementary assets 
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007) are important predictors for licensing propensity. 
The above-mentioned empirical studies (especially licensing studies) heavily depend on  
TCE and partly build on the resource-based (or dynamic capabilities) view of a firm. In 
this study, we build on and further these two theories in the context of innovation 
commercialization. In addition, we attempt to illuminate different organizational 
trajectories of commercializing patented inventions through the theoretical lens of the 
knowledge network and open innovation. 
 
In the context of firm innovation, TCE argues that firms tend to internalize innovation 
rather than externalize it through the market mechanism when the appropriability hazard 
(Oxley, 1997, 1999) of market transaction increases. One key policy instrument to reduce 
the appropriability hazard in transacting patented inventions is to strengthen the patent 
protection. The strength of patent protection is usually regarded as working at the 
national or industry level but also arguably can be used at the patent (Gambardella, Giuri, 
and Luzzi, 2007) or firm (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) level. Teece (1986) argues that 
the rent from innovation accrues to the holder of complementary assets such as 
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manufacturing, sales, and/or distribution capability when an invention requires such 
assets for commercialization. Therefore, this argument predicts that if a firm is already 
equipped with complementary assets, the firm prefers internal to external exploitation of 
the invention. This study re-examines these arguments using multi-level and detailed data. 
 
In the KBV of a firm (Barney, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993), when the firm rather than the market can provide the more valuable 
and “opportunism-independent knowledge,” firms should prefer to produce knowledge 
internally rather than procure it in the market independent of transaction costs. This study 
tests this argument in the context of innovation commercialization. Particularly we argue 
that as an invention fits more tightly with the firm’s existing technological strength, the 
invention is exploited either internally or for pure defense rather than licensed.  
 
Finally, this study attempts to test theoretical implications from the open innovation and 
innovation network perspectives against commercialization decision. Particularly, we 
argue that the sources and strength of knowledge during the invention process predicts its 
use. Building on network embeddedness arguments (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 
1996; Uzzi, 1997) and the exploration-exploitation arguments (March, 1991; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004), we develop hypotheses linking the knowledge and collaboration 
during the invention process to the use of its outputs. 
 
Previous innovation surveys such as the Yale survey of 1983 (Levin, 1988; Levin, Cohen, 
and Mowery, 1985; Levin et al., 1987), the Carnegie Mellon survey of 1994 (Cohen et al., 
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2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000, 2002), the recent PatVal-EU survey in Europe 
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007), and the Community Innovation 
surveys in Europe have provided lots of valuable insights on the innovation. We plan to 
use our inventor survey to expand on this tradition.  
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CHAPTER 7. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 
 
The main research question of this study is to examine how and why patented inventions 
are put into different uses. There is very little research that comprehensively examines the 
different modes of use of patented inventions. Most innovation research regards the 
patents themselves as the proxy for the innovation. The licensing literature (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Kim and Vonortas, 2006) 
focuses on the rate and propensity of licensing without considering the other modes of 
use. The limited literature about the strategic uses of patents either heavily depends on a 
single-industry perspective (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004) or provides a 
limited explanation about the mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 
2000). 
 
In this study, we depart from Teecian framework on innovation strategy of firms but 
enrich and articulate it with the recent development of innovation studies. In particular, 
we attempt to incorporate TCE, knowledge-based view, open innovation, and network 
perspectives into a coherent and comprehensive theory on commercializing patented 
inventions. 
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7.1. Schumpeter and Teece 
 
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter emphasized the role of 
monopolization in the innovation. A monopoly (or a large firm in more loosely defined 
terms) in the world of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy has a discriminating role in 
both precondition and aftermath of innovation. As a precondition, he pointed out as the 
relative advantage of a large firm “the sphere of influence of the better [good]” 
(Schumpeter, 1942, p. 101) and good financial standings. As a result of innovation, a firm 
will enjoy a transient monopoly state caused by imitation lag. Therefore, in this 
Schumpeterian world, “perfect competition is and always has been suspended whenever 
anything new is being introduced” (p. 105). Of course, these capability and 
appropriability advantages of large firms in innovation can be offset by organizational 
rigidity stemming from bureaucratic control structures (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Schumpeter, 1942). Indeed, in his earlier work, The Theory of Economic Development, 
Schumpeter himself argued that innovation was driven by entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 
1934). Some scholars call this early emphasis of Schumpeter on small firms as 
Schumpeter Mark I and the later emphasis on large firms (or monopoly) as Schumpeter 
Mark II (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The Schumpeterian hypotheses urged lots of researchers to look at the relationship 
between market structure (or firm size) and technological progress (see the following 
reviews and references therein: Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
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The Schumpeterian hypothesis had been extensively tested during the 1960s through the 
1980s. As neatly summarized by Cohen and Klepper (1996b), the consistent findings in 
these early studies support that R&D investment increases with firm size, although not 
disproportionately, but innovation output, mostly measured using patent counts, 
decreases disproportionately as the level of R&D or firm size increases. The underlying 
arguments that a large firm does more innovation consider both demand and supply 
aspects. To summarize these arguments, first, a larger firm, which is defined as a firm 
producing a larger amount of output, has less unit cost of R&D (“cost-spreading effect”) 
than a smaller counterpart (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b). On the supply side, a 
larger firm will have more lump-sum funds to invest in R&D. More R&D will diversify 
the research portfolio and spread R&D risks into several parallel projects to raise the odds 
of success. A larger investment in R&D constitutes a larger R&D team that is composed 
of supposedly better specialized personnel or better divides the R&D labor force to raise 
its capability. As a consequence of this scale economy of R&D investment, a firm 
investing more in R&D will have an advantage in research portfolio, R&D risk spreading, 
efficiency of R&D teams, and absorptive capacity. Besides R&D diversity/specialization,  
a larger firm enjoys an operational advantage through better vertical integration and 
specialization (Teece, 1986). 
 
A huge volume of literature that has tested the Schumpeterian hypotheses does not 
converge to an undisputable conclusion. One reason for this inconclusiveness is probably 
because aggregate units such as firm or industry could not effectively capture the 
complex and heterogeneous activities of innovations carried out under and across firms 
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and industries. Firm size alone, for example, cannot appropriately capture the 
heterogeneous innovation activities performed by two different firms of the same size. 
Moreover, innovative capability and activities of the contemporary firms are not 
necessarily bounded by firm or industry boundary, but interlinked to outer capabilities by 
research collaboration, strategic alliances, or technology licensing. Therefore, we need to 
unpack what is going on under firms in order to better understand innovation.  
 
Teece (1986), among others, developed a quite useful framework to analyze the 
mechanisms by which firms commercialize their inventions. In order to explain why 
many innovators fail to make a profit from innovation, he presents a simple model 
composed of three actors (innovator, follower/imitator, and the owners of co-specialized 
assets29) and two alternative strategies of the innovator (integrate or contract out30). In 
this zero-sum type game, he then argued that a choice of strategy (integrate or contract 
out) should determine to whom between innovator and follower the profit from 
innovation accrues. A choice of strategy is conditioned on three key factors: dominant 
design paradigm of technology, regimes of appropriability, and complementary assets. 
The latter two factors have been examined recently in lots of business strategy and 
innovation studies that show that they are indeed valid constructs affecting outcomes and 
processes of innovation. Teecian framework is especially relevant to this work in that it 
directly attempts to explain the reasons the innovator selects a particular strategy between 
two alternatives: internal and external commercialization. Teecian framework was further 
                                                 
29 He stated that “[i]f there are innovators who lose there must be followers/imitators who win” (Teece, 
1986, p. 286). 
30 In a later revision (Teece, 2006), Teece partially addressed an intermediate strategy: strategic alliances. 
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refined by Gans and Stern (2003) and applied to the context of new technology-based 
entrepreneurs. 
 
 
7.2. Technology Uncertainty and the Costs of Market Transactions of Technology 
 
TCE assumes a bounded rationality of economic agents and the impossibility of writing a 
complete contract ex ante. In this incomplete world of contracts, it is almost impossible to 
fully specify, ex ante, all the activities of the contracting parties that can affect the 
distribution or level of outcomes. Therefore, the contracting parties (e.g., manufacturer 
and supplier) will have incentives to behave opportunistically to take a larger share of the 
quasi-rents resulting from the contract. A typical form of opportunistic behavior is “hold-
up,” as emphasized in the TCE literature. TCE suggests that, in the situation where the 
manufacturer expects high chances of hold-up by suppliers, it would choose to integrate 
supplier capacity under its authoritative control because the authoritative control reduces 
opportunistic behavior and saves transaction costs if production costs of alternative 
organizational forms are equal. TCE literature contends that asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and complexity should be closely related with the ex post opportunistic behavior (Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). When manufacturing assets are 
specific to a certain firm, the alternative uses of those assets are limited and the impacts 
of hold-up will increase. Other than asset specificity, two attributes regarding an asset or 
a contract affect the risk of opportunistic behavior. When an asset or a contract includes 
more uncertain or complex components, there will be more chances that a contracting 
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party exploits this uncertainty or complexity for his own benefits (Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). TCE predicts that the contracting hazards stemming 
from uncertainty or complexity would suppress the transaction and promote more 
authoritative control. The elevated contracting hazards can be avoided in two ways: 1) ex 
ante by stipulating the contract for every possible contingency or 2) ex post by increasing 
the level of vigilance in monitoring contract misbehavior. However, because of bounded 
rationality and asymmetric information, both measures increase the transaction costs 
(Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1979).  Furthermore, uncertainty or complexity makes it 
harder for contracting parties to reach an agreement in negotiation. Therefore, a firm 
would need more authoritative controls and choose to integrate rather than contract when 
a contract involves a higher degree of uncertainty or complexity. Empirical studies 
consistently support TCE prediction in that the higher level of asset specificity, 
complexity, or uncertainty the more authoritative a governance structure would be (see a 
review by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 and references therein).  
 
In the innovation context, while a huge volume of literature about the strategic alliance 
tests the impact of transaction costs on the governance structure of alliance agreements, 
only a few studies examine how TCE predictions affect vertical integration of innovation 
outputs. The licensing research examines the rate of licensing, a less hierarchical mode of 
innovation commercialization, in relation with transaction cost variables such as the 
strength of patents or the ownership of complementary assets. However, it does not 
directly test the market versus hierarchy because the counterpart of licensing tested in the 
literature usually includes non-licensed inventions that may include nonused ones as well 
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as internally commercialized ones. As predicted by TCE, as asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and complexity increase, more hierarchical governance structure is chosen in alliance, 
R&D procurement, or invention commercialization. In the innovation context, many 
studies test the effect of the strength of appropriability regime on the governance 
structure instead of separately testing the effect of elements comprising appropriability 
hazards. Aside from Oxley’s test of geographic uncertainty, Veugelers and Cassiman’s 
test based on the Belgian Community Innovation Survey shows the opposite direction as 
predicted by TCE, i.e., the lower uncertainty or lower appropriability hazard is related 
with more hierarchical structure (“make” rather than “buy”). 
 
In the context of commercializing patented inventions, asset uncertainty and contractual 
complexity come from several different sources. We will discuss two of them: 
characteristics of technology and the strength of intellectual property rights.31 The 
existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the effectiveness of patent protection 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fontana, Geuna, and Matt, 
2006; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002, 2006; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Nagaoka and Kwon, 
2006; Oxley, 1999; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). The literature argues that strong 
patent protection should reduce a buyer’s post-contract haggling and lower the chances of 
a seller’s unexpected losses from the market contracts. Therefore, there will be a higher 
chance of market transaction of technology when patent protection is stronger. Gans, Hsu, 
                                                 
31 Another source of contractual uncertainty and complexity will be related to the relative positions of firms 
in the product market or industry structure. Also, the history of dyadic relationship (including trust) 
between the contracting parties will affect the level of the contracting hazard. We recognize that these 
factors may be important in determining the contracting hazard. However, we do not consider them in this 
study because they are much more complex to analyze and require a data set of very different nature from 
what is available to us.     
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and Stern (2006) found that licensing propensity significantly increases with the granting 
of formal intellectual property rights. In cross-licensing agreements among Japanese 
firms, Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) found that licensing agreements for transferring 
patented inventions are more likely to occur than licensing agreements for transferring 
only know-how. Some other studies use a strong protection regime at the national level 
(Oxley, 1999), the industry level (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Gulati and Singh, 1998), or 
at the firm level (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). All of 
these studies consistently found that weaker protection regimes were associated with 
more authoritative control of either upstream or downstream assets.  
 
At last, we reach our main arguments: What are the meanings of technological 
uncertainty and complexity and how they are related with contracting hazards in the 
context of commercializing patented inventions? Technological uncertainty refers to the 
variability of its applicability and utility. Analogizing technological progress to Kuhnian 
explanation of scientific progress, Dosi (1982) argues that, once a technological paradigm 
is established, most technological progress will take a similar pattern, or, according to his  
words, follow a prescribed trajectory set by the paradigm. Therefore, technological 
change in a paradigmatic (or “normal”) stage in the technology development cycle will 
be incremental and, hence, less uncertain. Despite some differences in nuance and 
language, linkage between the evolutionary path of technology and uncertainty is firmly 
established in the literature (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). Fleming (2001) and Fleming and 
Sorenson (2001) empirically show that variability of utility of technologies indeed 
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decreases (to a certain degree in Fleming (2001)) with the size of recombinant search 
space of technological components. When applicability or utility of a technology is not 
clearly known to the potential buyer of that technology, he would worry about 
overpaying for that technology. On the other hand, the owner of the technology would 
worry about the underestimation of the value of technology. Either underestimation or 
overestimation would make it harder for contracting parties to reach an agreement. 
Certainly, contracting parties can reduce this uncertainty if they can appraise the future 
value of technology correctly. However, the appraisal process itself will also incur 
additional costs of information processing or in building a proper level of capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Combining TCE with the evolutionary explanation of 
technology, we finally reach the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis M1. As technological components become more familiar, the propensity to 
externally commercialize a patented invention will increase. 
 
 
7.3. Strong Internal Position for Complementary Assets and the Prospect of 
Internal Synergy 
 
Teece (1986) asserts that specific assets complementing core technological know-how 
(e.g., patented inventions) are a critical element determining profitability of innovation. 
In particular, he argues that, in a weak appropriability regime, profit from an innovation 
accrues to the innovator, imitator, or holder of complementary assets depending on two 
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conditions: 1) the level of specialization of complementary assets that is required for 
commercialization, given the first condition, and 2) how strong each player holds a 
position in the complementary assets relative to each other. Simply put, the Teecian 
innovator would internalize downstream assets for commercialization (rather than 
procure them in market) in the following cases: 1) where the critical complementary 
assets are available in-house; 2) if they are not available in-house and the complementary 
assets are specialized, where a) cash position is OK for building them in-house and b) the 
innovator is disadvantageously positioned in commissioning complementary assets 
compared to imitators or competitors. Therefore, if we assume that most inventions 
would require a certain degree of specialized complementary assets (including 
manufacturing, service, distribution, or complementary technology) for 
commercialization (Roberts, 1988), a strong position of the innovator for the 
complementary assets would predict in-house integration of these assets (Case 1). The 
second case addresses such inventions where the innovator has a weak internal position 
of the complementary assets. Inventions in this case will be either vertically integrated or 
contracted out for their necessary downstream assets for commercialization depending on 
financing capability and the assets position of the innovator relative to imitators or 
competitors. This case is not a main focus of the current study. 
 
Teece’s prediction about strong internal complementary assets position and vertical 
integration is supported also by TCE and KBV. In TCE, when the downstream assets are 
difficult to redeploy to other uses or other users, the provider of such assets will be easily 
attracted to using this tight bonding toward his own benefits by, for example, holding-up 
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or threatening the manufacturer (Williamson, 1991). According to TCE, the manufacturer 
would respond to this potential loss by increasing authoritative control over the assets and, 
therefore, would choose vertical integration rather than market contract. In KBV, the 
focus is placed on internal synergy between activities. If a firm expects more synergistic 
effects by combining activities internally, then it will integrate those activities. KBV 
argues that fitness among different activities, complexity, tacitness, and learning effects 
increase internal synergy (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 2003). 
This is similar with a resource-based view in that it regards organizational routine, which 
contains most elements mentioned above, as one of valuable, non-imitable, and rare 
resources (Barney, 1991).  
 
To clarify this point in the context of technological invention and its commercialization, 
consider the following examples. When an invention is an improvement on the existing 
products or processes, it would be more likely than an invention for new products or 
processes to link to the existing manufacturing facility, skills, or the site of factory. In 
TCE terms, the improvement invention will contain more site specificity, physical 
specificity, and human-asset specificity (Williamson, 1981, 1991) and, therefore, will be 
more likely to be internally commercialized. Similarly, in KBV terms, a firm would 
expect more internal synergy by integrating its downstream commercialization efforts for 
the improvement invention because of the fitness of this invention with the existing skills 
and facilities. Tushman and Anderson (1986) dichotomize types of innovation by the 
degree to which an innovation makes the existing competences obsolete. When an 
innovation creates a new product or process, such innovation will require a new set of 
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skills, processes, and assets. On the other hand, when a technological invention results in 
improvement in the existing product or process, firms may be able to use existing 
competence (or complementary assets required to commercialize that invention). Thus 
they define technological discontinuities (or innovations) that create or substitute for an 
existing product or process as “competence-destroying” and technological discontinuities 
that improve an existing product or process a “competence-enhancing” innovation. 
Indeed, they found that competence-enhancing innovations were made more in the 
existing firms. Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2002) found that about a third of all 
chemical licensing was made by specialized chemical engineering firms that lacked 
manufacturing facilities. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) also found that firms lacking 
specialized complementary assets were more likely to license their invention and less 
likely to internally commercialize it. 
 
For another example, consider the inventions made by manufacturing units. On the same 
line of argument as the previous example, this kind of invention would be more tightly 
coupled with asset specificity and the prospect of internal synergy. Hence, we predict that 
the inventions made by manufacturing units will be more likely than, for example, 
inventions made by independent R&D units, to internally commercialize. The argument 
presented here is summarized into the following hypothesis. 
 
 
Hypothesis M2. A patented invention having a strong internal complementary assets 
position will be more likely to be internally commercialized. 
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7.4. Collaboration, network embeddedness, and technological opportunity 
 
In the previous sections, we discussed two theoretical approaches relevant to the make-
or-buy decision of commercializing patented inventions. While TCE focuses on 
comparisons of the management costs with the contractual hazards in a dyadic 
relationship, KBV emphasizes synergistic effects that would not be produced by 
contractual relationships but would be possible by integrating complementary activities 
internally. The innovation network and organizational learning perspectives agree with 
KBV in that the transaction costs should be only a partial explanation of the choice of 
governance structure and that some complementary combinations not attainable through 
market relationships should be an important dimension to determine the choice of 
governance structure. A critical difference from KBV, however, is found in the stretch of 
organizational boundary over which such synergistic effects happen. While KBV 
confines the boundary of complementary combination within a firm, the innovation 
network perspectives extend it over the networks of firms. Both TCE and the network 
perspectives focus on the relationships with external entities. However, while TCE 
focuses on how the attributes of the relationship work as a potential risk, the network 
perspectives focus on how the relationship can generate some positive benefits otherwise 
impossible. In this sense, we basically agree with Jacobides and Winter’s contention that 
“TCE focuses on the conditions of exchange, to the neglect of the conditions of 
production” (Jacobides and Winter, 2005, p. 398). However, there is a more fundamental 
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aspect about the roles of the networks in innovation and economic behavior beyond the 
problem of avoidance of negatives or production of positives.  
 
The attacks were initiated by sociologists whose main concerns are placed in 
understanding how social relations affect individual behavior. Granovetter (1985) 
criticizes that economic arguments ignore the social context and the history of 
interpersonal relationships outside of which human actions cannot be formed. As a 
consequence, he contends that economic arguments, whether they are neoclassical or new 
institutional, are either over-socialized or under-socialized. In his view, networks are 
omnipresent (they exist even in hierarchy as well as in markets) and human actions are 
“embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (p.487).  
 
Powell (1990) basically agrees with Granovetter on the importance of social structural 
embeddedness in determining economic exchanges and on the limitation of arraying 
economic exchanges on the market-hierarchy continuum. Nevertheless, he argues that 
“certain forms of exchanges are more social” (p.300) and submits that there is an 
empirical merit to distinguish the network form as a distinct governance structure from 
either market or hierarchy. Powell identifies several key distinct characteristics of each of 
three governance forms. The network structure is dominated by a norm of reciprocity and 
reputational concerns while hierarchy (market) is dominated by administrative fiat or 
supervision (haggling or court enforcement). Also, information communicated over 
networks is richer than information obtained in the market and “freer” than information 
circulated in a hierarchy. Therefore, Powell contends that “[n]etworks, then, are 
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especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured” 
(p.304). On this line of argument, a network form of organization is defined as “any 
collection of actors (N ≥ 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one 
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and 
resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59). 
This definition includes formalized relations such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
franchises, research consortia, relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements, but also 
research collaborations, informal information exchange (von Hippel, 1994), repeated 
supplier-customer transactions, and other non-codified forms of regularized interactions 
with external organizations. 
 
Powell further argues that know-how, the demand for speed, and trust are critical to 
forming networks. The exchange of know-how, which, according to Powell, is 
characterized by tacitness and embodied in a highly mobile skilled labor force, is more 
suitable for network forms because of the lateral structure of communication and mutual 
obligation of networks. Dynamic adaptability of a network structure that is mostly based 
on the ability of information dissemination and interpretation is more suitable for the 
competition based on fast innovation capability. Finally, the common backgrounds that 
may stimulate trust among actors contribute to forming networks. In addition to these 
factors, needs for legitimacy and status that may be derived from network affiliation is 
listed as a factor affecting network formation (Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 1999). The key testable implications of embeddedness, therefore, are that 
network forms of organizations are more preferred when the above-listed factors are 
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prominent ceteris paribus and, consequently, that network forms of organizations result in 
unique opportunities and constraints not predicted by standard economic explanations 
(Uzzi, 1996). 
 
It is well known in the literature that networks affect the outcomes of innovation (Afuah, 
2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan, 
Walker, and Kogut, 1994). Furthering these arguments, here we discuss how the types of 
networks formed during the explorative stage of innovation (i.e., invention stage) affect 
the organizational trajectory of the later stage of innovation (i.e., commercialization 
stage).  
 
Network forms are known to be conducive to exchange of commodities of uncertain 
value or know-how that is tacit and embodied in a mobile labor force (Powell, 1990). As 
discussed below for external sources of knowledge, networks established during the 
invention process would provide more technological opportunities that can be 
commercially exploited. This technological advantage from networks, therefore, would 
raise a chance for commercial exploitation, either internally or externally of the invention. 
Additionally, networks would benefit firms by providing more market opportunities. For 
example, a participant joining the network relationships can either be a potential buyer of 
the invented technology or signal the competency of the technology to the markets 
(Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). Also, a possible trust 
relationship formed through earlier explorative ties may be maintained through the ties in 
 121
the later stage of commercialization. Empirical studies on alliance and organizational 
learning found that networks formed during the explorative stage of innovation would 
indeed induce the exploitative networks (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  
 
Then we give attention to qualitative differences among the collaborations according to 
different characteristics of partner types. Below, we extensively discuss the 
characteristics of external knowledge by its sources and its impact on commercialization.  
Similar to this discussion, collaboration with industrial partners would favor the internal 
commercialization path if only knowledge and technological aspects are considered. 
However, we claimed above that demand opportunity in markets for technology and 
embeddedness structure should affect the commercialization path. To clarify this effect, 
we divide industrial collaboration into two types based on the relationship of partner 
firms with the focal firm. The vertical collaboration includes partners in vertical 
relationships, such as suppliers or customers. The horizontal collaboration includes 
partners in horizontal relationships with the focal firm, such as competitors, a firm in the 
same industry, or an unrelated firm in other industry.  
 
Partner firms in vertical relationship are assumed to be mutually dependent on the focal 
firm and have a relatively clearer division of labor. Several studies, indeed, report that 
collaboration with suppliers, competitors, or customers is critical in the success of 
innovation (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Rothwell et al., 1974; von 
Hippel, 1988). The same arguments we made for external industrial knowledge can be 
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applied to this type of collaboration. Additionally, mutual gains in learning and 
technological fitness achieved through inventive collaboration will be better exploited 
through internal commercialization. In other words, the closely aligned capabilities 
extended over dependent firms would not be properly evaluated nor transferred in the 
market for technology. This argument leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis M3a. A patented invention developed through collaboration with firms in 
vertical relationships will be more likely to take internal commercialization paths. 
 
On the other hand, firms in horizontal relationships are assumed to have competing, but 
possibly complementary, technologies. Collaboration among these firms will bring forth 
higher chances of demands for the technology in the markets for technology. Also, as the 
network embeddedness arguments say, firms will receive mutual benefit by maintaining 
ongoing trust relationships that can be attained through, in our case, licensing the 
invention. In addition, because know-how flows in both directions over the collaboration 
network, the collaborating partner, who may be a potential competitor in the product 
market, would have achieved a similar level of technological knowledge. Therefore, 
attempts to block such potential competitors from accessing the technology would not be 
effective. This effect will be particularly prominent in cross-licensing but also in 
unidirectional licensing. As Arora and Fosfuri (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora, Fosfuri, 
and Gambardella, 2002) argued, while the rent dissipation effects will be minimal in this 
case because knowledge transfer would have already occurred during the inventive 
collaboration, the revenue effects would be totally lost unless the patent is provided for 
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(cross-)licensing. In summary, based on all these reasons, we predict that horizontal 
collaboration will incentivize a firm to take an external commercialization path. 
 
Hypothesis M3b. A patented invention developed through collaboration with firms in 
horizontal relationships will be more likely to take external commercialization paths. 
 
Furthermore, network embeddedness arguments suggest that social relations can mitigate 
high transaction costs. For example, a collaboration network during the invention process 
encourages the network members to exchange formal and informal knowledge and, 
moreover, provides them opportunities to develop trust in each other through repeated 
interaction. When technology is highly uncertain, better understanding of the technology 
through knowledge exchange will lower the uncertainty. Furthermore, trust relationships 
will ameliorate the opportunistic behavior problem. This suggests a testable hypothesis: 
that transaction cost problems should have less of an impact in the presence of relational 
contracting or networks. In combination with the previous arguments about impacts of 
horizontal collaboration on external commercialization paths, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis M3c. The effect of horizontal collaboration on the propensity to take external 
paths of commercialization will be stronger for the inventions whose technological 
uncertainty is higher. 
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7.5. Nature of External Knowledge 
 
Open innovation arguments (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 1988) emphasize the 
importance of external ideas and external paths to market in innovation. This “new breed 
of innovation” (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007, p. 57) depends on various sources of 
knowledge including universities, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. In the open 
innovation era, a firm puts more weight on knowledge brokerage than knowledge 
creation (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Also, due to the risk as well as 
the opportunity involved in open innovation strategy, the roles of intellectual property 
rights have increased, although the use of intellectual property in these cases may be less 
about exclusive in-house use and more as a means of exploiting external opportunities 
and of facilitating the (compensated) dissemination of the technology to others (including 
potential competitors). 
 
The ability to evaluate and assimilate external knowledge is a critical component of 
innovative capabilities of contemporary firms (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989, 1990; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rigby and Zook, 2002; von Hippel, 1988). Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989, 1990) argue that extra-industry knowledge provides technological 
opportunities that a firm can absorb and transform into commercial ends by investing in 
internal R&D. Organizational learning literature claims that exploiting external 
knowledge (or distant search or explorative search) would lead to better innovative 
performance because it provides a larger pool of recombinant technology components 
and the possibility of larger variations (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; 
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March, 1991). Katila and Ahuja (2002) and Laursen and Salter (2006) empirically show 
that the scope of external search, either measured by the ratio of new citation in firm 
patents (Katila and Ahuja) or the number of external knowledge channels exploited by a 
firm (Laursen and Salter), predicts better innovation performance of firms. 
 
According to Katila and Ahuja (2002), external channels of knowledge may enlarge the 
pool of technological knowledge by adding new distinctive variations (or “variation 
effects”). As the pool of knowledge gets more diverse, the chances to solve existing 
technological problems increase (up to a certain point, though). On the other hand, 
external knowledge will simply add technological elements that can be exploited in the 
recombinant search process (or “size effects”) (Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
Either variation effect or the size effect, however, would have a saturation point (beyond 
which the quality of outcomes of innovative activities would decrease) because an 
economic agent would have a limited information processing ability. Fleming and 
Sorenson (2001) provide empirical evidence that the performance of an invention (as 
measured by the forward citation counts) increases at a decreasing rate and then 
decreases at an increasing rate as the number of technological components (as measured 
by the number of technology sub-classes) increases.  
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) argue that the amount of effort for a firm to exert to 
absorb external knowledge should be ordered by the degree to which the knowledge is 
“targeted.” According to them, absorbing less targeted knowledge, which is typically 
associated with a university or a government, would require more internal R&D than 
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targeted knowledge, which is typically associated with industry partners, such as 
suppliers. Here we focus on the difference of nature between two types of external 
knowledge: 1) knowledge originating from suppliers or, more broadly, industrial sources, 
including users and competitors and 2) knowledge originating from public domains. As 
Cohen and Levinthal assumed, industrial knowledge is not only targeted to commercial 
application but also likely to have more local, contextual, or industry-specific elements, 
such as organizational routines, informal know-how, or product ideas (von Hippel, 1988). 
Here we define industrial knowledge more broadly including knowledge from 
competitors and users as well as suppliers. On the other hand, public sources of 
knowledge are closer to basic science in nature, characteristics of which are more global, 
general, or broadly applicable. They will be less targeted to a particular commercial 
application and tend to be detached from a particular industry practice. As a consequence, 
public sources of knowledge will take longer or require absorptive capacity (which can 
be built by an additional investment on top of the ordinary product development process) 
to absorb and transform into commercial application. An empirical study of the robotics 
industry by Katila (2002) shows that extra-industry knowledge sources (such as 
universities, government labs, or different industry) takes more time to be transformed 
into new product development than intra-industry knowledge sources. Fleming and 
Sorenson (2001) find that the higher the level of interdependency of technological 
components included in a patent, the more people use the patent as measured by the 
forward citations count.32  
 
                                                 
32 Indeed, they find that the level of technological interdependency is in inverted-U relationship with the 
forward citations count. 
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In summary, external industrial knowledge would have different attributes from external 
public knowledge and, therefore, their impacts on commercialization would diverge. An 
invention that has exploited more external industrial knowledge would be more suitable 
for internal commercialization strategy for the following reasons: First, knowledge 
required for the downstream commercializing process after developing core inventions 
would fit better with industrial sources of knowledge. A new product development 
process incorporates lots of problem-solving efforts localized around a specific problem 
and, in most cases, routinized through the past trial-and-error experience (Carlile, 2002). 
For example, developing peripheral technologies, modifying existing facilities to 
accommodate a new invention, and training workers for new skills to run the modified 
facilities/process follow the invention process. The characteristics of industrial sources of 
knowledge, as described above, fit better with this process and, therefore, save the 
innovator efforts for downstream commercialization. In addition, on a similar line of 
arguments we made for the complementary assets and asset specificity, a firm that has 
already internalized these valuable and hardly imitable capabilities for commercialization 
during the invention process would benefit more by taking an internal path to 
commercialization. 
 
Second, while internal gains from learning will be greater for industrial sources, the 
losses that may accompany an external commercialization strategy will be smaller for 
public sources. This will incentivize a firm to choose an internal commercialization path 
for an invention depending more on industrial sources and an external path for an 
invention depending more on public sources. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) found that gains 
 128
in inter-organizational learning increase when there are similarities in the knowledge base, 
governance structure, and dominant logic among teaching and learning organizations. In 
Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) studies, additional exploitation of knowledge from 
suppliers actually results in a lower level of internal R&D. Based on their findings, we 
postulate that a firm would have gained more in learning from industrial partners because 
of a greater level of similarity between them. This argument reinforces the first argument. 
This characteristic also makes it more difficult and more expensive for the gained 
knowledge to be transferred to others, which makes an external path to 
commercialization harder to adopt.  
 
Third, an invention depending more on public sources will take an external 
commercialization path. Knowledge from public domains tends to carry less immediate 
commercial value and be generally disclosed to a wider community and less embedded in 
a particular practice than industrial knowledge (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Owen-Smith, 
2003). This characteristic reduces transaction costs of trading the technology in the 
markets. Also, the negative impacts of spillovers on the other technologies owned by a 
firm that might be caused by market transactions of the technology will be lower than 
transferring a technology based on only internal knowledge. Therefore, more dependence 
on external public knowledge will lower the barrier and risk for an external 
commercialization path. In other cases in which knowledge has been transferred directly 
from a governmental organization, often the government organization forces the recipient 
firm to license the patented technology to other parties in need of the technology. This 
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practice will also increase the chances of inventions dependent more on public 
knowledge taking an external commercialization path. 
 
Finally, similar to the first two arguments but in more prospective nuance, we argue that 
an invention dependent more on external industrial knowledge would be prone to take an 
internal path to commercialization because of the prospect for a greater level of internal 
synergy. This argument builds on and extends the KBV of a firm. KBV identifies a firm 
as having a “knowledge creation function” (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, Toyama, 
and Nagata, 2000) and claims that a firm decides to internalize technology development 
when the technology is assessed to create internal synergy, regardless of the level of the 
appropriability hazard (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Then which type of knowledge 
would generate, as a firm expects, more internal synergy? As we described above, 
industrial knowledge generally contains more contextual and industry-specific elements. 
Also, it would be well-aligned to the firm’s existing practice but still include novel 
elements to the firm (otherwise the firm would not need to use external knowledge). A 
firm would expect internal synergy by integrating this knowledge further into 
downstream assets (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Conner and Prahalad (1996) point out 
knowledge-substitution effects. Simply put, when there is a need for combining 
knowledge sufficiently complex and tacit, authoritative control by several experts will be 
much more efficient than negotiation and voluntary coordination among less-informed 
agents. Thus, a firm would receive more gains in efficiency by integrating complex and 
tacit knowledge, which is characteristic of industrial knowledge.  
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Hypothesis M4a. The higher the contribution of external industrial knowledge to an 
invention, the higher will be the propensity to internally commercialize the invention. 
 
Hypothesis M4b. The higher the contribution of external public knowledge to an 
invention, the higher will be the propensity to externally commercialize the invention. 
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CHAPTER 8. Data and Measures 
 
 
 
8.1. Data 
The estimation sample is based on the GT/RIETI survey and supplementary data sources 
including the PATSTAT, USPTO database, and COMPUSTAT as described in 
CHAPTER 5. Out of 1,919 valid responses, 1,807 cases are from firms. After deleting 
listwisely the cases that have missing values on our covariates, we have 1,226 complete 
cases for estimation.  
 
8.2. Variables and Measures 
8.2.1. Dependent Variables 
The GT/RIETI survey asks inventors how they are commercially using their patented 
inventions and, if not used, the reasons why they do not use them. We identify a patented 
invention as commercially exploited (“any use”) if it is 1) commercialized in a 
product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the patent, 2) licensed out or put in a 
cross-license deal by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent party, or 3) 
commercially exploited by the respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company. 
First, we construct a variable “any use” by coding 1 for the patented inventions falling in 
any of these three categories. We coded 0 for those observations who explicitly reported 
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that the patented invention was not used for all three commercial modes. Some answered 
to only some of these three questions. This affects identifying nonuse. In survey, then, we 
asked the reasons why a patent was not used. We regard those cases that provided valid 
answer to the reasons for nonuse question but only partially reported nonuse in three use 
questions as nonuse. Out of 1226 complete cases, 651 (53.1%) patents are reported to be 
used (Table 8.1).  
 
Internal and external commercialization 
The variable “internal commercialization” is coded 1 for those observations reporting that 
a patent is “commercialized in a product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the 
patent” but not licensed (including cross-license) nor commercially exploited by the 
respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company.33 Among the used patents, 
74% were purely internally used. The rest of used patents are regarded as “external 
commercialization.”34  
                                                 
33 We excluded start-ups from university, hospitals, private and government research organizations, and 
individual inventors by limiting our sample to the inventor belonging to firms at the time of invention. 
34 Out of 172 patents thus identified as “external,” 113 patents were also used internally. We classified 
them into “external” for the following reasons. First, although our question framing for internal use 
explicitly stated whether a patent had been used by “the applicant/owner,” this may have been broadly 
interpreted by the respondents as including external uses. So, we guess that the proportion of actual dual 
use patents should be less than two-thirds. Second, even if some dual-use patents are included in external 
use, this will give us conservative estimates for our independent variables. So to speak, considering that we 
hypothesized opposite effects of our independent variables on the mode choice, if we had excluded those 
dual-use patents from external use, we would have had even stronger effects of these variables on external 
use. Finally, we may have overestimated the effects on “internal use” by excluding dual-use. However, this 
may not cause a problem because we hypothesized indeed for purely internal use. 
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Table 8.1 Modes of commercial use and nonuse (N=1226) 
Mode Cases percent 
Any use 651 53.1 
 Internal commercialization 482 39.3 
 External commercialization 169 13.8 
 - Licensed 122 10.0 
 o cross-license 30 2.4 
 - New firm 63 5.1 
 o license & new firm 16 1.3 
 
 
 
8.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
Measures for complementary assets 
We capture complementary assets position using two survey measures: 1) whether an 
inventor belongs to manufacturing unit and 2) whether the type of the invention is 
competence-enhancing rather than competence-destroying. 
 
Dummy for manufacturing unit 
In Teecian arguments, the complementary assets interfere with mode choice of 
innovation in three different points. If the invention does not require complementary 
assets, it is immediately commercialized by the inventor. When the invention requires 
complementary assets for commercialization, the degree of specialization and the 
ownership of those assets play a role. Empirically, it is hard to assess whether a particular 
invention requires complementary assets for its commercialization and how specialized 
those assets should be. Therefore, we assume that every invention requires a certain type 
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of downstream assets such as manufacturing facility and that those assets are somewhat 
co-specialized. An invention from a manufacturing unit is already or ready-to-be coupled 
with downstream co-specialized assets. The GT/RIETI Survey asks which organizational 
unit the inventor belongs to. Unit-manu is marked 1 if the inventor belongs to 
manufacturing unit and 0 for R&D unit (either independent or sub-unit attached to non-
R&D function), software development, sales & marketing, and others. 
 
Competence-destroying invention 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) characterize competence-enhancing innovation as “order-
of-magnitude improvements in price/performance that build on existing know-how 
within a product-class” and competence-destroying innovation as such innovation that 
“either creates a new product class … or substitutes for an existing product” (p.442). In 
survey, we asked a similar question whether the type of innovation was to create a new 
process or product or to improve an existing process or product. Using this survey 
question we create “competence-destroying invention” dummy variable by coding the 
former 1 and the latter 0. This measure does not exactly correspond to Tushman & 
Anderson’s characterization. For example, if some new products or processes actually 
may build on existing competence, then the invention linked to this sort of products or 
processes cannot be competence-destroying. However, without further information by 
which we can assess whether and to what extent a particular invention substantially 
recycles existing skills, processes, or assets, this measure is the best proxy of 
competence-enhancing invention available to us. We guess that a part of competence-
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enhancing invention might have been falsely classified into competence-destroying 
invention. 
 
Measures for technology uncertainty 
We operationalize technological uncertainty using the familiarity index of technological 
components following Fleming (2001).35 The component familiarity captures the degree 
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his 
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of 
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology 
become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming, 
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes of the 
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the 
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component 
familiarity had inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as 
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.  
 
In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from 
1976 to 1999 in each technology class.  
                                                 
35 In this study, we focus on uncertainty and complexity stemming from the nature of technology. Whereas 
the strength of patents has been widely used, it is often vague in both concepts and measurement. Moreover, 
crucial elements that make patent protection effective are, we argue, inherited from the nature of 
encapsulated technology. In one sense, strong patents may refer to those patents linked to a technology in 
large demands. However, if such technology can be easily invented around (or there exists a viable 
alternative technology), then the effectiveness of patents in protecting inventor’s interests should be 
weakened. Also, crucial parts of most cases of patent appeals or infringement law suits are related to the 
aspects of encapsulated technologies. Therefore, we conclude that patent effectiveness is crucially 
dependent on the uncertainty and complexity of encapsulated technology and that the latter is more 
fundamental and suitable for measuring contracting hazards in market for technology than measuring the 
perceived effectiveness of patent protection at aggregated levels. 
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Knowledge attenuation factor is calculated as follows,  
konkattenuati = )loss knowledge ofconstant  time
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where temporal distance of patent k= 
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999 
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994 
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989 
 
Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 years following Fleming (2001). We rescaled 
component familiarity by dividing it by 1000. 
 
Knowledge flow measures 
The GT/RIETI survey asks how importantly the various knowledge sources have 
contributed to the invention in 1) suggesting stage and 2) completing stage. The measure 
is 6-point Likert scale with 0 for “did not use,” 1 for “not important,” and 5 for “very 
important”. We asked about 11 knowledge sources: scientific and technical literature, 
patent literature, fair or exhibition, technical conferences and workshops, standard 
documents, your firm (excluding co-inventors), universities, government research 
organizations, customers or product users, suppliers, and competitors. We take a 
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maximum value of answers from suggestion and completion questions and construct the 
following four variables. 
 
Industry and public knowledge 
We summed up importance scores of 4 external knowledge sources: scientific literature, 
technical conferences, universities, and government research organizations. Then, we 
divide the sum by 20 and construct the variable industrial knowledge which ranges from 
0 for not using any external public knowledge and to 1 for fully using external public 
knowledge (Cronbach’s alpha=0.69). The variable industrial knowledge is similarly 
constructed from the rest of external knowledge sources: patent literature, fair or 
exhibition, standard documents, customers and product users, suppliers, and competitors 
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.66). In order to verify the structure of these two common factors we 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. The results of the analysis confirms the 
hypothesized latent structure as indicated by the most of the goodness of fit statistics (e.g. 
Chi-square pr.> 0.1511; NFI=0.9914; GFI=0.9965). A detailed description of factor 
analysis is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Collaboration measures 
The GT/RIETI Survey asks whether the focal patent was developed with inventors who 
belong to various external organizations and whether the focal patent was developed 
through formal or informal collaboration with external organizations. The survey presents 
8 distinct categories for external organizations including suppliers, customers and product 
users, competitors, non-competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities, 
 138
government research organizations, hospitals, and other. In order to test hypothesis 4a 
and 4b, we classified the type of collaboration into three groups according to the nature 
and relationship of the collaboration partners with the focal firm. They are collaboration 
with 1) public organizations, 2) firms in vertical relationship, and 3) firms in horizontal 
relationship. Based on this classification, then, we construct three collaboration dummies. 
The variable “collaboration –public” is coded 1 if all reported collaboration partners fall 
in any type of public organizations including universities, government research 
organizations, and hospitals. The variable “vertical collaboration” is coded 1 if the 
inventor organization had co-invented or collaborated with either suppliers or customers. 
The variable “horizontal collaboration” is coded 1 if the inventor organization had co-
invented or collaborated with competitors or other firms (i.e. non-supplier, non-customer, 
and non-competitor).36 
 
8.2.3. Controls 
Firm size 
Size of firms is known be an important factor determining firms’ propensity to license 
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). The variable, “Large firm,” is coded 1 if the 
inventor belonged to a large firm (defined as having more than 500 employees) at the 
time of invention. We used the survey responses for those observations having valid 
                                                 
36 This categorization is theory-driven but also conforms to the latent factor structure. We conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis using tetrachoric correlations. We obtained a three-factor solution with similar 
structure as we described above except for one small difference. According to the factor analysis, it seems 
that “other firms” may better be classified into public collaboration rather than horizontal collaboration. 
However, this does not conform to our theoretical explanation so that we keep “other firms” in horizontal 
collaboration. The reliability coefficients, Cronbach’s alpha, for each group range from 0.39 to 0.51, which 
are below the conventional cut-off, 0.7. However, this does not tell our grouping is bad because we have 
only two or three items in each group and, in our survey, collaboration with multiple partners are only in a 
rare occasion (less than 10% of cases) which result in low correlations among variables.  
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responses (1739 cases). For the remaining 108 cases on which there were no responses 
from the survey, we assessed whether an assignee firm is large or not using 
complementary data sources such as COMPUSTAT firm database, Patent Fee 
Maintenance Database of the USPTO, and company websites. 
 
Technological capabilities of firms 
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is 
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal 
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal 
patent filed in year t is: 
 
  PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d) 
 
where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge which is set to 15% following 
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).  
 
Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated 
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated 
into the merger. We use the PATSTAT database (April 2008 version) compiled by the 
European Patent Office. There are two advantages using the PATSTAT for this purpose. 
First, the PATSTAT provides relational tables and SQL interface for the bibliometric 
information of the U.S. patents which make data extraction much easier than other 
available data sources. Second, PATSTAT provides standard ID numbers of assignees 
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which corrected many small differences of spells. We further cleaned the data by 
manually searching and correcting the list of assignees in our sample. 
 
R&D for base technology 
This variable discriminates the business needs of the invention. Using our survey, we 
code 1 for this variable if the reported purpose of research is “enhancing the technology 
base of the firm or the long-term cultivation of technology seeds.”   
 
Proportion of basic R&D 
This variable is a proxy measuring the position of the invention on basic-applied 
spectrum. In the survey, we asked the inventor how much effort (in percentage) he put in 
basic research. The other categories presented are “applied research,” “design and/or 
development,” and “technical services.” 
 
Technological value of patents 
In our survey, we ask the inventor assess technical significance of her invention relative 
to other technical developments in her field during the year the focal patent was applied 
for. We code 4 for top 10%, 3 for top 25% (but not top 10%), 2 for top 50% (but not top 
25%), and 1 for bottom half. 
 
Man-month and number of inventors 
We control the resources invested in the invention using two different measures. The 
variable “man-month” is an ordinal variable constructed from the survey question asking 
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“[a]pproximately how many man-months did the research leading to the focal patent 
require”. The answer categories are 9 levels from “less than one man-month” to “more 
than 97 man-months.” We take median values of each category and divide it by the 
maximum value to make it ranged between 0 and 1. In addition, we control the number of 
inventors as registered in the U.S. patent publication. 
 
Type of innovation 
Product innovation is observed to differ in some aspects from process innovation (Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). We identified product innovation using our survey.  which 
referenced to process innovation or mixed innovation whether or not an invention is for 
product innovation. 
 
Strength of patents 
We control two measures of patent strength: the number of different technology 
subclasses, and the number of claims. These variables are used in the previous studies as 
a measure of patent strength (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). 
 
The number of different technology classes are regarded as strength of patents 
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007), complexity of technology, or scope of invention 
(Nerkar and Shane, 2007). Nerkar and Shane found a positive association of this variable 
with the propensity to commercialize academic inventions. The U.S. patent office assigns 
each issued patent to at least one relevant technology class which comprises 
approximately 100,000 subclasses. It periodically reorganizes the classes and updates all 
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the issued U.S. patents accordingly. This classification reflects a cognitive boundary by 
which patent administrators and possibly technology developers recognize and delineate 
contemporary technologies. For example, when a new technology emerges, it may not be 
classified into a single class in the current classification that exactly matches with its 
technological characteristics. Also, any new combination of existing technology may well 
be consisted of multiple technology classes. Therefore, a patent referring to multiple 
technology subclasses may well impose additional difficulty in understanding the 
underlying technology and be technologically more complex. We control the number of 
different technology subclasses assigned to the patent under the U.S. Patent Classification 
system.37  
 
We control the scope of patent by including the number of claims. Each claim may be 
regarded as an independent patent (Tong and Frame, 1994)38 and, thus, the number of 
claims is known to measure the breadth of utility or applicability of the patent.39 Number 
of claims are more and more used as a standard control for patent strength in the literature 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). 
 
                                                 
37 We use the U.S. patent class (USPC) instead of International Patent Class (IPC) for the proxy of 
technological complexity for the following reasons. In the USPTO, USPC is periodically updated and 
overwritten for the previous patents. This maintains data integrity between the current patent and the past 
patents. Moreover, this updated class reflects current, rather than past, views on the cognitive blocks of 
technology.  
38 In judging patent infringement in the U.S., infringing any single claim in a patent is regarded as 
infringement on the patent. 
39 In the United States patent law, there are two types of claims: independent and dependent or multiple 
dependent. While an independent claim stands alone, a dependent claim refers to a claim previously set 
forth and specifies a particular embodiment or limitation of the invention (35 U.S.C. 112). Because of this 
distinction, counting dependent claims may not (or in a fractional way) properly reflect the technological 
scope of inventions. Therefore, we count only the independent claims. We regard any claim that contains a 
reference to another claim as a dependent claim and subtract them from the total number of claims. We take 
a natural logarithm of it assuming marginally decreasing nonlinear effects. However, we could not find any 
notable difference between them and used number of claims in the main estimations. 
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Age of invention 
The mode of use may vary by the length for which an invention has come out and been 
publicized. The variable “age of invention” measures how many months have elapsed at 
the time of survey since the invention was filed. 
 
Technology dummies 
We distinguish 6 different technology areas using OST/INPI/ISI nomenclature40 based on 
International Patent Class. 
 
Description and summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 8.2. 
                                                 
40 This is a widely used nomenclature, especially among European researchers, focusing on industry 
characteristics. This system was developed and updated by three European research institutes: the 
Observatoire Science et Technology, the INPI (Institute Nationale Proprieté Industrielle), and Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems of Innovation Research. 
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Table 8.2 Sample statistics (restricted sample, in use only, N=651) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Data source 
Internal commercialization 0.737 0.440 0 1 Survey 
Explanatory variables      
Inventor in manufacturing unit 0.108 0.311 0 1 Survey 
Competence-destroying invention 0.573 0.495 0 1 Survey 
Component familiarity (/1000) 0.087 0.151 0.000 2.081 USPTO 
Industrial knowledge 0.293 0.196 0 1 Survey 
Public knowledge 0.255 0.209 0 0.9 Survey 
Collaboration - vertical 0.272 0.445 0 1 Survey 
Collaboration - horizontal 0.075 0.263 0 1 Survey 
Collaboration - public 0.070 0.256 0 1 Survey 
Controls      
Large firm (employees >500) 0.824 0.381 0 1 
Survey & 
Patent 
Capital intensity (M$/employee) 0.058 0.088 0 0.823 COMPUSTAT 
Dummy for missing capital 
intensity 0.321 0.467 0 1 COMPUSTAT 
Ln(patent stock) 5.014 2.800 0 9.865 PATSTAT 
Technological value 2.427 1.087 1 4 Survey 
No immediate demand 0.186 0.390 0 1 Survey 
% Basic R&D (/100) 0.067 0.153 0 1 Survey 
Product invention 0.536 0.499 0 1 Survey 
Man-month (normalized) 0.193 0.229 0.005 1 Survey 
Number of inventors 2.899 1.983 1 16 Patent 
Complexity of technology (# 
USPC) 4.310 3.305 1 23 Patent 
Number of claims 22.823 16.997 1 181 Patent 
Age of invention (months) 69.276 12.002 38 92 Patent 
Electrical engineering 0.258 0.438 0 1 Patent 
Instruments 0.198 0.399 0 1 Patent 
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals 0.220 0.414 0 1 Patent 
Process eng, special equipment 0.144 0.351 0 1 Patent 
Mechanical eng, machinery 0.142 0.349 0 1 Patent 
Consumer goods & Construction 0.038 0.192 0 1 Patent 
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CHAPTER 9. Results 
 
 
 
In this section we present the results from a series of regression analyses. We start from 
simple binary probit regressions with dichotomous dependent variables indicating one 
type of use (internal or external) regressed on the covariates in the complete-cases 
(N=1226). Here 0 of the dependent variable indicates all others including nonuse. These 
results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9.1.  
 
The remaining models are presented to contrast the differences between internal and 
external use. Columns 3 and 4 are estimated using binary probit regression in the sample 
restricted to any commercially used patents (N=651). We use the same dependent 
variable, internal commercialization path, as in column 1, but 0 indicates only the 
external commercialization path. Here we removed the nonuse patents and compare 
internal commercialization directly with external commercialization. The coefficients on 
variables in these models, thus, will clearly contrast the effects of variables on two 
polemic uses, internal v. external. Despite the advantage of this model that it can clearly 
show distinguishing effects between two modes of use, this specification may result in 
biased estimates of the coefficients if they are subject to two circumstances: 1) when the 
presence of the third alternative of outcomes (nonuse in this case) affects the choice 
between two outcomes of our interests (internal and external use in this case) or 2) when 
factors affecting the censoring procedure (in this case, by nonuse) is not independent 
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from factors affecting outcomes (“selection effects”). For robustness checks, we 
estimated the model using two alternative specifications, multinomial logistic regression 
and the Heckman probit selection model. This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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Table 9.1 Results of regression analysis 
 Main results: Binary probit Robustness checks 
 Unrestricted sample Restricted sample 
Multinomial logit 
(reference=internal) Heckman probit 
 
Internal External Internal 
Internal: 
adding 
interaction 
term Nonuse External Internal 
Selection 
(any 
commercial 
use) 
0.424*** -0.250 0.484** 0.484** -0.683*** -0.759** 0.469**  Inventor in manufacturing 
unit (0.139) (0.191) (0.213) (0.213) (0.253) (0.370) (0.210)  
-0.165** 0.166* -0.273** -0.272** 0.245* 0.380* -0.267**  Competence-destroying 
invention (0.079) (0.100) (0.119) (0.119) (0.137) (0.206) (0.117)  
0.010 0.498** -0.667* -0.658* -0.351 0.706 -0.660* 0.091 Component familiarity  
(0.240) (0.249) (0.341) (0.342) (0.446) (0.461) (0.339) (0.225) 
    -0.604      Component familiarity * 
horizontal collaboration     (2.618)      
1.145*** -0.197 0.999*** 0.998*** -1.986*** -1.385** 0.971***  Industrial knowledge 
(0.237) (0.294) (0.358) (0.358) (0.425) (0.595) (0.371)  
-1.303*** 0.415 -1.351*** -1.350*** 2.185*** 1.897*** -1.313***  Public knowledge 
(0.236) (0.278) (0.346) (0.346) (0.421) (0.568) (0.371)  
0.247** -0.034 0.223 0.224 -0.414** -0.301 0.194  Collaboration - vertical 
(0.098) (0.124) (0.148) (0.148) (0.174) (0.244) (0.157)  
-0.164 0.532*** -0.601*** -0.559** -0.082 0.930*** -0.626***  Collaboration - horizontal 
(0.161) (0.177) (0.201) (0.265) (0.300) (0.334) (0.197)  
-0.005 0.025 0.104 0.102 0.028 0.055 0.070  Collaboration - public 
(0.172) (0.189) (0.236) (0.236) (0.310) (0.383) (0.241)  
Controls         
0.492*** -0.605*** 0.781*** 0.780*** -0.475* -1.295*** 0.786***  Large firm 
(0.140) (0.157) (0.184) (0.184) (0.259) (0.314) (0.182)  
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Table 9.1 (continued)         
-0.055*** -0.020 -0.002 -0.002 0.108*** 0.022 0.002  Ln(patent stock) 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.045) (0.026)  
0.178*** 0.196*** -0.102* -0.102* -0.442*** 0.151 -0.140 0.250*** Technological value 
(0.038) (0.049) (0.058) (0.058) (0.067) (0.103) (0.088) (0.036) 
-0.134 -0.212* 0.108 0.107 0.341** -0.238 0.158 -0.333*** No immediate demand 
(0.093) (0.123) (0.151) (0.151) (0.163) (0.251) (0.176) (0.089) 
-0.531** -0.133 -0.027 -0.031 1.090** 0.419 -0.030  % Basic R&D 
(0.250) (0.313) (0.405) (0.405) (0.451) (0.689) (0.394)  
0.145* -0.048 0.091 0.091 -0.246* -0.193 0.083  Product invention 
(0.078) (0.097) (0.116) (0.116) (0.137) (0.197) (0.115)  
0.054 0.109 -0.263 -0.265 -0.178 0.103 -0.257  Man-month 
(0.179) (0.218) (0.266) (0.266) (0.319) (0.421) (0.263)  
0.048** -0.010 0.040 0.040 -0.082** -0.069 0.034 0.032 Number of inventors 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.059) (0.037) (0.020) 
-0.010 -0.010 0.014 0.014 0.023 -0.007 0.014  Complexity of technology 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.018)  
-0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.006 -0.004  Number of claims 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)  
0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 0.008 -0.006 0.005* Age of invention 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
0.180 0.067 0.024 0.024 -0.369* -0.071 0.021  Electrical engineering 
(0.114) (0.136) (0.169) (0.169) (0.199) (0.273) (0.165)  
0.029 0.000 -0.046 -0.045 -0.055 -0.026 -0.044  Chemistry, pharmaceuticals 
(0.121) (0.146) (0.179) (0.179) (0.213) (0.294) (0.174)  
0.018 0.079 -0.139 -0.140 -0.098 0.071 -0.136  Process eng, special 
equipment (0.136) (0.169) (0.202) (0.202) (0.243) (0.341) (0.197)  
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Table 9.1 (continued)         
0.249* -0.437** 0.557** 0.555** -0.316 -0.956** 0.544**  Mechanical eng, machinery 
(0.134) (0.193) (0.224) (0.224) (0.230) (0.391) (0.225)  
0.202 0.003 0.129 0.126 -0.508 -0.105 0.122  Consumer goods & 
Construction (0.245) (0.287) (0.310) (0.310) (0.483) (0.529) (0.304)  
         -1.209*** Capital intensity 
(M$/employee)          (0.400) 
         0.217** Dummy for missing capital 
intensity          (0.101) 
         0.133*** Diversity index of 
collaboration          (0.050) 
-1.052*** -1.490*** 0.770* 0.771* 1.615*** -1.131 1.100 -0.873*** Constant 
(0.299) (0.384) (0.453) (0.453) (0.520) (0.779) (0.735) (0.248) 
        -0.308  Heckman's Rho (Arctanh-
transformed)         (0.622)  
Observations (censored) 1226 1226 651 651 1226 1226 (575) 
Log Likelihood -745.54 -436.97 -318.69 -318.68 -1080.34 -1108.43 
Wald chi2 149.74 103.21 100.98 101.12 247.44 110.13 
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.111 0.145 0.145 0.115 . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level, *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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9.1. Main Results 
9.1.1. Main variables 
 
Technology uncertainty 
We hypothesized that technology uncertainty will increase the costs of technology 
transaction in markets and, resultantly, suppress the contracts for technology in markets 
such as licensing. We operationalized technological uncertainty using the familiarity 
index of technological components following Fleming (2001).41 Our interpretation is that 
the higher the technological familiarity index, the lower the technological uncertainty and, 
therefore, the higher propensity of external commercialization. Conforming to our 
hypothesis (M1), component familiarity is significant and positively associated with the 
probability of external commercialization in the main estimations (column 3 and 4) and 
Heckman probit (column 7). Note that this effect is significant after controlling for 
knowledge spillovers from public sources that include patent literature. This indicates 
that net of knowledge spillovers during the invention process, technological familiarity 
(and maturity of technology) still has some impact on the commercialization process. 
However, the significance disappears in the multinomial logit model. Therefore, we find 
only weak evidence about the association between the external path of commercialization 
and technological uncertainty. One source of the weak association is because our public 
knowledge variable mediates technology familiarity. When we ran the same regression 
without the public knowledge variable, the coefficient on component familiarity turned 
                                                 
41 Fleming (2001) found that this measure is in inverted-U relationship with the utility of the invention. In 
our estimation, curvilinear relationship was not confirmed. 
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significant. Another source of the weak association may be attributed to the characteristic 
of this measure. While Fleming interpreted component familiarity as a measure of 
potential technological variation or maturity, this may also represent the size of the 
technology supply or technological interdependency. As the size of a pool of similar 
technology with the focal invention increases, the alternative buying options for the 
potential buyer of the technology will increase. The former, technology supply effects, 
therefore, would reduce the demands for the technology in the market for technology. 
Also, as the volume of the components of similar technological nature increases, they 
may link to each other in a more complex way or, in other words, technological 
interdependency may increase. This will put additional complexity in assessing the 
prospect and value of the focal technology and therefore increase transaction costs. These 
confounding effects or measurement noises inevitably accompanying the patent 
indicators will limit the effectiveness of this measure in capturing technological 
uncertainty. 
 
Complementary assets 
The patents having a strong internal position of complementary assets are hypothesized to 
be more likely to take an internal commercialization path. We operationalized strong 
internal complementary assets using two measures: 1) whether an inventor belonged to a 
manufacturing unit at the time of invention and 2) whether an invention is linked to 
existing competences (i.e., competence-enhancing rather than destroying) (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). 
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In column 1, the coefficients on “Inventor in manufacturing unit” is highly significant 
and positive, indicating that a patent from manufacturing units is more likely than a 
patent from non-manufacturing units (e.g., dedicated R&D units) to internally 
commercialize. The effects of complementary assets on the choice of commercialization 
path are clearly shown in the bimodal comparisons (column 3 through 7). Strong position 
of internal complementary assets is likely to increase the probability of internal 
commercialization compared to either nonuse or external commercialization.  
 
An alternative measure of complementary assets also has an expected sign. When an 
invention is not targeted to improving a current product or process (“competence-
destroying invention”), it is more likely to be used externally. When the dependent 
variable is “internal commercialization,” the estimated coefficients on this variable are 
significant (at 5% level) and negative across all models, while positive for “external 
commercialization.” In the full model of the restricted sample, for a patent from a large 
firm in electrical engineering, being an inventor belonging to a manufacturing unit raises 
the probability of internal commercialization by 17.8 percentage points, holding other 
variables constant at their means or modes. In the same conditions, the competence-
destroying invention lowers the probability of internal commercialization by 5.1 
percentage points. 
 
In conclusion, we are confident that a strong position of internal complementary assets 
will increase the probability of internal commercialization and lowers the probability of 
external commercialization. 
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External knowledge 
We examine the effects of external knowledge on the organizational trajectory of 
commercialization using the variables “industrial knowledge” and “public knowledge” by 
distinguishing the sources of external knowledge. The diverging effects of these variables 
on the commercialization path are as predicted. Industrial knowledge has a highly 
significant and positive impact on the probability of internal commercialization 
supporting hypothesis M4a. On the other hand, public knowledge has a highly significant 
and positive impact on the probability of external commercialization supporting 
hypothesis M4b. Interestingly, public knowledge has a significant and negative impact on 
the probability of internal knowledge. Although we controlled for firm size, one can 
argue that large firms would not utilize external knowledge as much as small firms would. 
In order to test the robustness of the impact of external knowledge over firm size, we ran 
the same regressions with the firm size variable excluded in two split samples: large firm 
only and small firms only. Signs and significance on both external industrial knowledge 
and external public knowledge were still maintained in both of the split estimations, 
indicating that the results from the main estimation are indeed robust against firm size. 
However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger in the small firm estimation for 
both variables. This suggests that the impact of external knowledge on choice of 
organizational paths of commercialization might depend on firm capabilities42. 
 
Collaboration effects  
                                                 
42 In the sample, small firms utilize more external public knowledge than large firms when their inventions 
are commercialized, regardless of modes (N=651, small firm mean=0.287, large firm mean=0.246, Pr(|T| > 
|t|) = 0.0605). However, the differences become insignificant in each mode of commercialization. 
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Collaboration raises the probability of internal and external commercialization when the 
importance of external knowledge is not controlled.43 After controlling for external 
knowledge, the coefficient on collaboration remains significant (and positive) for external 
collaboration but not for internal collaboration. (Not reported. Available on request.) This 
finding indirectly indicates that, while internal commercialization exploits a knowledge 
advantage from collaboration, external commercialization exploits both knowledge 
advantage and network advantage from collaboration. We clarified these suspects by 
distinguishing the types of collaboration by relationship with collaboration partners. In 
hypothesis M3a, we argue that collaboration with vertical firms will bring forth 
knowledge and learning advantage, which is suitable for integrating into the downstream 
commercialization process. This seems to be supported at the first look from the full 
model estimation as indicated by a highly significant and positive coefficient on 
“Collaboration -vertical” in the full sample (column 1). However, the effects of vertical 
collaboration on organizational paths of commercialization are not confirmed as indicated 
by insignificant estimates of the coefficients in the bimodal estimations (columns 3 to 7). 
The vertical collaboration has discriminating effects on internal commercialization only 
against nonuse as indicated by significant and negative estimation of the coefficient in the 
multinomial logistic regression (column 5). In conclusion, hypothesis M3a is only 
partially supported.  
 
                                                 
43 We test two different measures of collaboration: 1) binary variable constructed from survey and patent 
documents (coded 1 for collaboration and 0 otherwise) and 2) binary variable constructed only from survey 
(coded 1 for collaboration and 0 otherwise). We had robust results for both measures. Although not 
reported, this may be estimated by comparing coefficients on the collaboration variables in models 2 and 4. 
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On the other hand, collaboration with firms in a horizontal relationship uniquely affects 
external commercialization. Having collaborated with horizontal firms raises the 
probability of external commercialization by 12.5 percentage points, holding others at 
their means or modes (column 2). Horizontal collaboration especially raises the 
probability of an external path against an internal path as indicated by a negative sign on 
the coefficient of horizontal collaboration in the restricted sample. 
 
To test hypothesis M3c, we added the interaction term (component familiarity * 
horizontal collaboration) in column 4. The coefficient on the interaction term is not 
significant in the model, but this does not tell us that there is no interaction effect. In a 
nonlinear model, interaction terms (sign, magnitude, and significance) vary with 
covariates (Ai and Norton, 2003). So we plotted z-statistic of the interaction term against 
the predicted probability using “inteff” function in STATA (Norton, Wang, and Ai, 2004). 
As Figure 9.1 shows, most significant interaction effects (|z|>1.96 at conventional 
significance level, P<0.05) have negative signs and are located on the right side of the 
graph where the internal commercialization is predicted (predicted probability>0.5). Also, 
regardless of significance, interaction terms show decreasing trends as the probability of 
internal commercialization increases. Recall that both component familiarity and 
horizontal collaboration have a negative impact on the internal collaboration in our 
estimations. The negative interaction effect, thus, indicates that the effects of horizontal 
collaboration are stronger for technologically more uncertain inventions (or a higher 
likelihood of internal commercialization). This result supports hypothesis M3c. However, 
the magnitudes of interaction effects are very small (around 0.3 percentage points). 
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Figure 9.1 Interaction effects of component familiarity and horizontal collaboration 
 
 
 
9.1.2. Other variables 
 
Technological value 
In the full sample including nonuse, technological value is significant and positively 
associated with both types of commercialization paths. Interestingly, the coefficients on 
this variable are larger for external use than for internal use (columns 1 and 2). In the 
restricted sample and multinomial logistic estimates, it is clearly shown that the higher 
technological value, the higher propensity to externally commercialize, holding all others 
constant. One possible explanation is that, to find a commercial application, 
technologically advanced inventions may require broader and more diverse technological 
capability that a single firm can hardly command. Another explanation is that 
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technologically advanced inventions are less uncertain in value and promote market 
transactions. However, given that we controlled general technological uncertainty, 
internal demands, and whether or not the invention is competence-destroying, these 
explanations are not fully satisfying. Another explanation might be found in inherent 
endogeneity involving in the assessment of the “value.” Due to technological complexity 
and cognitive limitation, it may be very hard for an inventor to assess technological 
values of certain technologies on an absolute measure. Because of this ambiguity in 
evaluating technological value, inventors may assess technological superiority of their 
inventions by watching the reaction of the community. So external commercialization is 
associated with high technology value partly because the interests from others 
accompanying the external commercialization may have affected inventors to “inflate” 
the technology value.44 This is one possible avenue for future research.  
 
Firm size 
Our estimates show strong and consistent results that patents from large firms are more 
likely to take an internal commercialization path than an external path. The coefficients 
on “large firm” are highly significant and have expected signs (positive on internal use 
and negative on external uses). This result is consistent with findings by Gambardella et 
al. for European firms (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). The firm size effects are 
substantial after controlling for complementary asset effects. Gambardella, Giuri and 
Luzzi discuss two reasons driving the lower propensity of large firms’ licensing. First, 
large firms are better positioned to integrate complementary assets than small firms. 
Second, given that large firms generally have stronger market presence, “rent dissipation 
                                                 
44 Personal communications with Diana M Hicks. 
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effects” from licensing will be greater for large firms than small firms where the revenue 
earned from licensing is invariant of firm size (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora, Fosfuri, 
and Gambardella, 2002). Our finding of strong firm size effects even after controlling for 
the internal strength of complementary assets corroborates the validity of the rent 
dissipation explanation.  
 
Unlike a finding from Kim and Vonortas (2006) for licensing propensity, our estimation 
does not show a significant relationship between the patent stock of a firm and the 
propensity to commercialize externally (which includes licensing).  
 
Strength of patents 
Our measures of patent strength (number of claims and number of technology classes) do 
not have a significant impact on commercialization paths. This is different from what 
Gambardella et al. (2007) found from the PatVal-EU survey. This is probably because of 
multiple meanings attached to the measures. As Gambardella et al. claimed, as 
technological scope and complexity increases, the possibility of inventing-around will 
decrease and, thus, the protective role of the patent will be strengthened. This is one 
interpretation. Another interpretation is that the larger scope and higher complexity will 
increase transaction costs. These multiple connotations from the same measure actually 
work in the opposite directions with regard to the organizational paths of 
commercialization. To overcome this difficulty of measurement, we estimated the model 
with additional control of industry level strength of patent appropriability constructed 
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from the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).45 The estimates of 
our independent variables are robust against additional control of this variable. However, 
this appropriability measure is also insignificant.    
 
 
9.2. Robustness Checks 
 
We created a nominal variable “mode of use” by coding 0 for nonuse, 1 for internal use, 
and 2 for external use.46 Then we ran a multinomial logit with “internal use” as a 
comparison group.47 The results are shown in columns 5 (nonuse) and 6 (external use) of 
Table 9.1. Multinomial logit assumes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
which means that the odds should not be affected by addition or omission of another 
outcome category. Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that omission of nonuse is irrelevant to the choice between internal and 
external use at 5% significance level.48 Multinomial logit model is proper based on 
empirical tests. In the textbook, multinomial logit model is said to be proper when the 
outcomes are distinct and not substitutes for one another (Long and Freese, 2006). In our 
model, the modes of uses are distinct (as shown by the results of Wald and Likelihood 
Ratio tests for combining alternatives). However, they may be substitutes for one another. 
                                                 
45 We used the mean of patent effectiveness at industry level (transformed into NAICS from International 
SIC). 
46 We did not distinguish “licensed” from “for a new firm” because of the small number of observations 
assigned to each of these two categories. 
47 Multinomial logit should not be much different from multinomial probit except in extreme values. We 
ran multinomial logit because multinomial probit is known to be not as reliable as multinomial logit (Long 
and Freese, 2006).  
48 Small-Hsiao test results are different in each run because it uses different random seeds (Long and Freese, 
2006). However, 9 out of 10 tests we have run show that we cannot reject the IIA assumption for nonuse. 
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The probability of mode choice when every patent is forced to use will be different from 
when nonuse is allowed. For example, if a bargaining failure view of strategic nonuse 
(Merges, 1994) is valid, then adding or removing a choice for strategic nonuse will affect 
more on licensing than other choices. This point is explicitly dealt with in Part III. 
Another complexity of interpretation stems from the way we classify the modes of use. 
We assign those patents in dual use (both internal and external use) to external use. 
Theoretically, those dual-use patents should have characteristics of both internal and 
external use and possibly make our interpretation more complex. However, at least 
empirically, it seems that the characteristics of dual-use patents are more bound with the 
characteristics of external use. We test the distinctiveness of dual use from purely 
external use using multinomial logit regression and cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
they are the same in relations with our covariates (Chi2(23)=26.19, P>chi2=0.292). Also, 
according to some studies, in the situation where IIA is violated, a well-specified 
multinomial logistic model is comparable in sign and significance of coefficients with 
nested or mixed logistic models (Cushing and Cushing, 2007; Train, 2003). Indeed, our 
main estimation, binary probit regression in the restricted sample, does not show a 
notable discrepancy from the multinomial logistic regression. Therefore, we conclude 
that, despite some theoretical concerns, taking the binary probit specifications in the 
restricted sample as the main results is acceptable. 
 
Our final specification, the Heckman selection model with selection of “any use” in the 
first stage, addresses the selection bias problem. In the selection equation, we regressed 
“any commercial use” on six variables: technology value of patents, collaboration, non-
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commercial purpose of R&D, number of inventors, age of invention, and component 
familiarity. The selection probability term fed into the main equation (Heckman’s rho) is, 
however, not significant. This indicates that, at least, we do not have significant bias in 
analyzing modes of use due to the propensity of any commercial use. The empirical 
validity of both the Heckman selection and multinomial logistic regression specifications, 
in turn, indicates that simple binary probit regressions in the commercialization sample 
would also be valid, and the estimates from all three specifications would be consistent to 
each other. Indeed, the estimates from all the models are quite consistent. For simplicity’s 
sake, we use binary probit regressions as our main models. 
 
Before we conclude this section, let us briefly address another possible source of bias – 
possible self-selection effects related to the missing values on some of the covariates. 
Because the number of dropped observations is substantial, we examined the possibility 
that the listwise deletion has to do with self-selection by running the Heckman probit 
selection model with a dummy for complete cases as the dependent variable in the 
selection equation. The self-selection effect is not significant as indicated by insignificant 
correlations (Heckman’s rho) between error terms in the selection equation and error 
terms in the outcome equation. Also, we ran the same models with missing values on 
“technological value” replaced with its mean (=2.19) and dummy for missing added.49 
While we have about 16% larger sample size for binary probit models (from N=1226 to 
1415) through this way of missing value handling, we found no notable differences 
                                                 
49 We also tested different imputation methods. For example, we imputed predicted value estimated from 
regression equation with “technological value” regressed on a set of value-predicting patent indicators. 
Almost all predicted values, however, narrowly distributed around the sample mean and did not make much 
difference from using simply mean. 
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between dummy-adjusted models and the original ones. We also ran the models in the 
imputed sample using bootstrap re-sampling methods. A basic idea is that, if there is a 
significant bias due to missing values, then the coefficients and standard errors estimated 
for the subsample will be different from the original one. We re-sampled 50 random 
subsamples from the imputed sample (N=1415) and calculated bootstrap coefficients and 
standard errors. The results are quite similar to the main results. Furthermore, we found 
no significant difference in the means of our dependent variables between the full set 
(N=1807) and the uncensored subset (N=1226). The only significant difference of means 
of independent variables between two groups is found for collaboration diversity. 
However, even if listwise deletions are not totally random to some extent, this does not 
indicate that we will have biased estimates for the following reasons: First, our sample is 
not censored by the characteristics of the dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Second, the signs and significance of the coefficients in binary probit models are almost 
identical with them in probit selection model (not reported). This tells us that a bias that 
may stem from omitting the selection correction term is ignorable. Therefore, using 
binary probit analysis for the complete cases is appropriate. 
 
 
9.3. Breakdown of External Commercialization 
 
External commercialization paths in our estimation indeed enclose several different uses 
of patents: licensing, cross-licensing, and using patents for starting a new firm. To further 
examine diverging effects of our key independent variables on different paths of external 
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commercialization, we estimated two additional models. First, to examine the difference 
between licensing and “new firm,” we estimated a multinomial logistic model with four 
outcome levels: nonuse, internal commercialization, licensing (including cross-licensing), 
and use for a new firm. We use internal commercialization as the reference category. 
Second, to clarify diverging effects between cross-licensing and unilateral licensing, we 
estimated probit selection model with all kinds of licensing as a selection variable and 
cross-licensing as the dependent variable in the main equation. Because of the small 
number of observations for cross-licensing (N=40), we estimated the main equation only 
with several significant variables. As indicated by strongly significant Heckman’s rho, 
independent estimation of cross-licensing propensity without conditioned on the licensing 
propensity may be biased. The results are presented in Table 9.2. Both models passed key 
specification tests and show acceptable goodness-of-fit statistics (p<0.0001 for 
multinomial logistic regressions and p<0.0005 for Heckman probit).50  
 
The estimates for licensing propensity are largely similar with the main results. The signs 
of main independent variables are maintained. However, competence-destroying 
invention and component familiarity are not significantly associated with licensing. A 
competence-destroying invention is likely to be commercialized externally but 
particularly via establishment of a new firm rather than licensing. This observation 
supports Schumpeter’s notion of “creative destruction” and is consistent with Anderson 
and Tushman’s (1986) observation on the tendency of small and new firms to conduct 
competence-destroying innovation. One possible reason for no significant impact of 
                                                 
50 Some runs of Small-Hsiao tests indicate that IIA assumption does not always hold for the multinomial 
logistic regressions. However, as we discussed in the previous section, this does not indicate that the 
estimation is significantly biased in the signs and significance of regression coefficients. 
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competence-destroying invention on the propensity to license is because it may have a 
negative impact on cross-licensing. Patents offered for cross-licensing agreement are 
generally used to obtain access to others’ technologies in complex industries (Grindley 
and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). They may not involve as much know-how 
transfer as in unilateral licensing and tend to occur between symmetric firms (Nagaoka 
and Kwon, 2006). Therefore, patents offered for cross-licensing may be related to the 
existing competences shared by similar firms. Indeed, the Heckman selection estimation 
shows a negative sign on competence-destroying invention, although not significant. 
Another reason is related to a measurement error. In the question asking whether the 
invention project targets a new or improved product or process, the survey did not 
explicitly state whether it is with regard to the firm or to the industry. If the respondent 
answered the question with regard to the industry, then the competence-destroying 
invention has no advantage for licensing or cross-licensing as well as for internal 
commercialization. 
 
Component familiarity is not significantly associated, albeit marginally so (z-
statistic=1.49), with new firm formation (column 3). However, the coefficient is positive. 
This is inconsistent with what Shane (2001) found for the propensity to license university 
patents to start-ups. He argued that start-ups based on university patents should be more 
likely to form in the nascent technologies because of no disadvantage of start-ups 
(relative to the incumbents) in market power, learning curve, scale economy of 
production, and complementary assets in new technologies. However, consider the 
following counter arguments. In mature technology, demands for the technology are 
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well-established, and there will be larger small opportunities, which can be covered by 
niche players. Large incumbents having a profit model from a large production facility 
will not properly cope with these niche areas. Also, in mature technology, innovation 
labor will be more widely distributed and, therefore, procuring complementary assets 
required for commercialization from the markets will be easier. These counter arguments 
refute Shane’s claims that immature technology is more attractive to start-ups. However, 
more importantly, there may be some fundamentally different mechanisms working 
between science-based start-ups and corporate spin-offs. In addition, as we argued in 
Hypothesis M1, lower transaction costs (both in the market for technology and in the 
financial market) in mature technology favor corporate spin-offs. Deeper analysis on this 
aspect will be an interesting topic for future research. 
 
Turning to the licensing propensity, component familiarity shows insignificant 
association with the licensing propensity (columns 2 and 5). Actually, the effects of 
component familiarity on external commercialization are concentrated on cross-licensing 
as indicated by a significant and positive coefficient in the Heckman probit estimation 
(column 4). Increase of technological familiarity is likely to increase the propensity of 
cross-licensing relative to the propensity of unilateral licensing. Component familiarity 
has indirect effects on the licensing propensity via public knowledge and collaboration 
with public organizations. When we estimated the model without these two variables, the 
significance of the coefficient on component familiarity was enhanced (but still 
marginally insignificant). In another estimation limited to the sample composed of 
commercial use, the coefficient on component familiarity is significantly and positively 
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associated with the licensing propensity. On the other hand, exploitation of public 
knowledge and collaboration with public organizations during the invention process may 
have some spurious effects related to technological uncertainty. Provided that knowledge 
exchange is reciprocal, collaboration during the invention process may have generated 
some outward spillovers. This effect will be greater for collaboration with public 
organization given that they are more dominated by open science norms. Also, 
knowledge in the public domain is generally available for anybody. Therefore, invention 
that had incorporated more public knowledge may be better understood by others and be 
less uncertain in technology prospect.   
 
One interesting finding is that public knowledge has particularly strong positive impacts 
on formation of patent-based spin-off. Note that we excluded from the sample 
independent start-ups and spin-offs/start-ups from academic or public organizations. In 
the literature, it is known that public knowledge plays an important role for academic or 
independent start-ups (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002). 
Our finding indicates that public knowledge will also be important for corporate spin-offs. 
On the other hand, whereas patents offered for unilateral licensing are likely to have 
utilized more public knowledge (as predicted in Hypothesis M4b), patents offered for 
cross-licensing are less likely to have utilized public knowledge than unilateral licensing. 
This discrepancy indicates that open innovation and institutional approach, besides 
transaction costs, are indeed importants factor affecting the innovation.  
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As we argued in Hypothesis M3b, horizontal collaboration has indeed particularly strong 
impact on cross-licensing (relative to unilateral licensing as well as an internal path of 
commercialization). Finally, we added a new variable, “complexity of product 
technology,” in the cross-licensing estimation. This measure is constructed from the 
survey question asking how many patents are combined to produce a target product. 
Consistent with the previous observation (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001), our estimate shows cross-licensing is more likely to occur in complex 
products relative to unilateral licensing. 
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Table 9.2 Results of regressions for further examination of external 
commercialization paths 
 Multinomial logit (reference=internal) Heckman probit 
  
Nonuse Licensing New firm 
cross-
licensing 
Selection 
(licensing) 
-0.694*** -1.701*** 0.510  -0.542* Inventor in 
manufacturing unit (0.254) (0.628) (0.473)  (0.289) 
0.245* 0.309 0.655* -0.157 0.103 Competence-destroying 
invention (0.137) (0.231) (0.386) (0.211) (0.108) 
-0.372 0.528 0.991 1.203** 0.279 Component familiarity 
(/1000) (0.440) (0.491) (0.666) (0.475) (0.255) 
    0.010*  Complexity of product 
technology     (0.005)  
-1.994*** -1.531** -1.050  -0.349 Industrial knowledge 
(0.425) (0.667) (0.963)  (0.301) 
2.167*** 1.423** 3.421*** -1.192** 0.077 Public knowledge 
(0.421) (0.675) (0.760) (0.595) (0.307) 
-0.415** -0.421 0.103  -0.120 Collaboration - vertical 
(0.174) (0.278) (0.408)  (0.125) 
-0.074 1.105*** -0.093 1.284*** 0.613*** Collaboration - 
horizontal (0.299) (0.351) (0.639) (0.301) (0.182) 
0.035 0.335 -1.027  0.206 Collaboration - public 
(0.309) (0.414) (0.672)  (0.190) 
-0.465* -1.145*** -1.581***  -0.414** Large firm (employees 
>500) (0.258) (0.381) (0.442)  (0.174) 
0.108*** 0.047 -0.058  -0.009 Ln(patent stock) 
(0.031) (0.053) (0.073)  (0.024) 
-0.442*** 0.111 0.260  0.153*** Technological value 
(0.067) (0.116) (0.180)  (0.051) 
0.339** -0.278 -0.072  -0.207 No immediate demand 
(0.163) (0.285) (0.403)  (0.130) 
1.105** 0.748 -1.041  0.241 % Basic R&D (/100) 
(0.452) (0.742) (1.156)  (0.305) 
-0.250* -0.383* 0.288  -0.176* Product invention 
(0.137) (0.218) (0.341)  (0.097) 
-0.167 0.364 -0.864 0.703 0.273 Man-month 
(normalized) (0.319) (0.464) (0.742) (0.447) (0.229) 
-0.083** -0.110 0.035  -0.032 Number of inventors 
(0.037) (0.068) (0.094)  (0.029) 
0.023 -0.034 0.049  -0.023 Complexity of 
technology (# USPC) (0.019) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.016) 
0.005 0.001 0.016**  0.000 Number of claims 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.003) 
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Table 9.2 (continued)      
-0.006 0.012 -0.005  0.006 Age of invention 
(months) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015)  (0.004) 
-0.363* 0.143 -0.687  0.146 Electrical engineering 
(0.199) (0.315) (0.448)  (0.145) 
-0.058 0.084 -0.255  0.037 Chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals (0.213) (0.345) (0.461)  (0.159) 
-0.100 0.186 -0.107  0.063 Process eng, special 
equipment (0.243) (0.386) (0.531)  (0.181) 
-0.311 -0.551 -2.406**  -0.196 Mechanical eng, 
machinery (0.230) (0.431) (1.070)  (0.197) 
-0.503 0.190 -0.643  -0.012 Consumer goods & 
Construction (0.484) (0.616) (0.910)  (0.298) 
1.617*** -1.403 -2.727** -2.089*** -1.501*** Constant 
(0.520) (0.906) (1.240) (0.313) (0.420) 
    1.120***  Heckman's Rho 
(Arctanh-transformed)     (0.426)  
N (censored N) 1226 1226 (1104) 
Log Likelihood -1154.73 -417.01 
Wald chi2 309.24 27.41 
Pseudo R2 0.125 . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 10. Conclusion to Part II 
 
 
 
This study examined the impacts of technological uncertainty, strong internal 
complementary assets position, characteristics of knowledge search, and collaboration on 
the organizational path of commercialization. Departing from Teece’s framework on the 
profitability of innovation, we synthesized various theories to explain why firms choose 
different organizational paths in the downstream commercialization process. We found 
that technological uncertainty suppresses external paths of commercialization. The main 
argument of this hypothesis builds on TCE but also incorporates the evolutionary 
explanation of technological development. Stage of technological development, 
technological uncertainty, and profitability of innovation are interrelated with each other. 
 
As Teece argued and many following studies showed, strong internal position for the 
complementary assets have a strong positive impact on the internal commercialization 
paths. Also, as Tushman and Anderson argued, we found that there was a strong 
organizational inertia for a firm to tend to keep doing what it had been doing. This 
implies that firms’ innovation activities would have a strong path dependency and, 
therefore, may well fall into the competence trap (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and 
March, 1988). This finding contributes to the Teecian framework of profitability of 
innovation and arguments of markets for technology by providing a direct test of the 
effects of co-specialized complementary assets on a choice of commercialization paths. 
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Also, in explaining the relationship between strong coupling with internal complementary 
assets and vertical integration of downstream commercialization processes, we enriched 
the discourse by synthesizing theoretical implications from TCE and KBV of a firm. One 
avenue of future research will be looking at how the effects of co-specialized assets on 
commercialization paths are moderated by the characteristics of technology (e.g., general 
purpose v. specialized) or by the stage of the technology development cycle. Our 
conjecture is that the impact of co-specialized assets on the choice of commercialization 
paths will be weaker for general-purpose invention or in mature technology.  
 
Further departing from Teece, we argue that openness of innovation processes and 
network relationship should affect the choice of commercialization path. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, empirical results show that external knowledge from industrial nature 
increases the propensity of internal commercialization. Industrial knowledge tends to 
focus more on specific industrial problems and require for more hands-on knowledge 
typically acquired from field experience. These characteristics of industrial knowledge 
would make coherent authoritative controls more efficient than distributed controls across 
firm boundaries. As hinted by KBV, internal synergy of this type of technology is 
expected to be higher. Detailed examination of external paths of commercialization 
revealed some interesting aspects of public knowledge. External public knowledge has a 
positive impact on licensing, particularly strong impact on formation of patent-based 
corporate spin-offs, and either weaker or even negative impact on cross-licensing. 
Furthermore, proceeding one step further from the open innovation arguments, it shows 
that the nature of external knowledge should be taken into consideration in studying 
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innovation. The previous empirical studies focused on how broadly or deeply firms 
sourced external knowledge and how they affected intermediate output of innovation 
process or firm performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). In doing 
so, they did not turn their attentions to the qualitative differences of sourced knowledge. 
Other studies examined a limited number of leading firms to show how they had 
successfully utilized some types of external knowledge for innovation (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; von Hippel, 1988). This study attempts to overcome the weaknesses of 
both studies by examining the impact of different types of external knowledge in a large-
scale, cross-industry sample. Furthermore, it reveals that not only the different nature of 
external knowledge has a different impact on innovation but also it would be bound with 
a different commercialization strategy. While external industrial knowledge is conducive 
to internal commercialization, external public knowledge spawns external 
commercialization. Or, the other way around, firms that chose an internal integration 
strategy would have sought more industrial knowledge, while firms that chose to provide 
their inventions to external parties for commercialization might have relied more on 
public knowledge. Certainly, the analysis leaves more questions to be answered. 
Although we tried to justify distinctiveness between external industrial and public 
knowledge in the context of mode of commercialization both theoretically and 
empirically, it still leaves ambiguity in concepts and measurement. First, it overlaps with 
a basic-applied distinction. We argued that they were different because external public 
sources can deliver an applied type of knowledge, and external industrial sources can 
deliver a basic type of knowledge. We also controlled for the basicness of an R&D 
project. We suggested—separate from a basic-applied nature—technological fitness, 
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learning-curve effects, and inclusion of organizational routines as some discriminating 
characteristics of this distinction. However, they need to be better articulated in the 
practical context. Second, external public knowledge is confounded with the maturity of 
the field of technology, as we discussed in Part II. This also contributes to the ambiguity. 
In summary, further research on the characteristics, drivers, and impact of the different 
types of knowledge is required.   
 
Collaboration has diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths, depending 
on the characteristics of collaborating partners. While collaboration with firms in a 
vertical relationship tends to favor internal paths, collaboration with firms in a horizontal 
relationship tends to favor external paths. In particular, horizontal collaboration is 
strongly associated with licensing (both unilateral and cross-licensing). This finding 
shows that collaborative networks, net of knowledge flows, influence the organizational 
trajectory of commercialization. Furthermore, it shows that relative position of the 
innovator in the network is indeed an important predictor of the trajectory. By the relative 
position in the network, we do not mean the structural or topological relations that many 
studies of networks focus on (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004), but the relative positions 
in a value chain or in competitive relations in the product markets. Previous studies 
argued why particular ties affect the firm or innovation performance (Afuah, 2000; Dyer 
and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). This study contributes to the 
field by arguing and showing that firms utilize different types of networks for different 
innovation strategies. As a novel contribution, it shows that perspectives on collaborative 
networks have unique explanatory powers in the region that TCE cannot address. Where 
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technological uncertainty is high, collaboration has a stronger impact on the choice of the 
organizational path of the downstream process of innovation. This finding empirically 
corroborates Granovetter and Powell’s (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990) arguments that 
economic theories alone are incomplete in explaining social behavior so that network 
perspectives can complement them.  
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PART III. STRATEGIC NONUSE OF PATENTS 
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CHAPTER 11. Introduction to Part III 
 
 
 
 
Betraying the original design goals of the patent systems, some patents add friction to 
innovation systems. For example, some patents heighten an entry barrier into a product 
market, undermine a rival’s competitiveness, or increase the transaction costs of 
technology. As technology has become more critical in the competitiveness of 
contemporary firms (Baumol, 2002; Jaffe, 2000) and the filings of patents have exploded 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Shapiro, 2000; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008), firms have been 
more attracted to using patents for these purposes (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000; Shapiro, 2000). Using patents to enhance strategic advantage in the 
competitive landscape is not a recent phenomenon at all.51 However, a wider diffusion 
and heightening stack of them during recent years has raised fundamental concerns about 
whether the current patent system is working as it was designed (Shapiro, 2000). 
Especially pertinent to these woes are patents that generate economic value by preventing 
others from using the patented technology while being neither integrated into a 
commercial application nor licensed to others. We call this class of patents “strategic 
nonuse patents.” Strategic nonuse patents are distinct from commercially exploited 
patents in that they are not used for commercial products or processes. They are also 
                                                 
51 A classic example is the “Fleming valve” patent issued in 1905, which stalemated development of radio 
communication technology (Marconi Wireless & Tel. Co. v. De Forest Radio Tel & Tel. Co., 236 F. 942 
(S.D.N.Y. 1916)). Other historical cases are nicely described in the following legal literature: (Merges, 
1994; Saunders, 2002; Turner, 1998). 
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distinct from plain nonuse patents (or sleeping patents)52 in that they generate strategic 
benefits. While this class of patents benefits an individual firm that owns them with a 
strategic advantage in the competitive landscape, it may undermine competitiveness of an 
economy as a whole and the potential for scientific and technological progress (Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998; Saunders, 2002). 
 
Strategic nonuse patents may have significant negative effects on resource allocation and 
on the innovative capabilities of a society. A patent system was put in place to “promote 
the progress of science and useful arts” (U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8), basically by two 
mechanisms: first, incentivizing investment in R&D and, second, enforcing disclosure of 
the resultant technical arts to the public. A core instrument that enables these mechanisms 
is the property rights awarded to inventions and temporary exclusivity legally allowed 
over using, making, and selling the inventions. Using these legal instruments, the 
inventors would be able to exclude others from the product market based on the patented 
technology and, resultantly, appropriate their investment on R&D and the follow-up 
commercialization. On the other hand, because of the monopoly, society may suffer, at 
least temporarily, from a suboptimal level of the supply of goods and inefficient 
allocation of resources, both in R&D and in production. A society is willing to tolerate 
the potential loss of social efficiency inevitably accompanying the temporary monopoly 
only because it expects a larger  amount of rewards (beyond just countervailing the loss) 
in the following forms: increased level of investment in R&D, introduction of innovative 
products, and spillover of useful knowledge. Strategic nonuse patents are often criticized 
                                                 
52 This class of nonuse patents is conceptually equivalent to a “sleeping patent” (Gilbert and Newbery, 
1982) or “paper patent.” 
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as causing excessive duplicate investment in R&D, blocking introduction of an 
innovative product, slowing down innovation, and incurring unnecessary costs for 
managing patents and, therefore, seem to violate the “good-will” bolstering the patent 
system (Merges, 1994; Turner, 1998). However, they are lawful (Merges, 1994; Turner, 
1998) and increasingly exploited by contemporary firms (Sheehan, Martinez, and Guellec, 
2003).53 Studying strategic nonuse patents will be of crucial importance for 
understanding innovation as well as patent system reform. 
 
A number of legal studies have investigated historic cases of strategic nonuse patents. 
Also, some economic studies have theoretically discussed social welfare aspects, anti-
competitiveness effects, and the effects of the presence of strategic nonuse patents on the 
patent system. However, there are only a limited number of empirical studies, most of 
which, except Blind et al, are at the industry or firm level (Blind et al., 2006; Ceccagnoli, 
2009; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Reitzig, 2004; Ziedonis, 2004). Using 
information from the U.S. inventors survey, this study reveals an empirical reality of the 
motives for patenting and reasons for patent nonuse at the patent level. Then it tests the 
discriminating effects of firm and technology characteristics on the propensity of 
strategic nonuse patents. In particular, this study tests how the size of upstream and 
downstream assets of a firm affects the propensity of patents being used for strategic 
                                                 
53 According to some surveys (Giuri et al., 2007; Sanders, Rossman, and Harris, 1958), about 30% to 40% 
of the issued patents are reportedly not used. Sanders et al. (1958) report 42% of  the surveyed U.S. patents 
are not used. After surveying European inventors, Giuri et al. (2007) report that about 36% of European 
patents are not used. One survey reports that about a half of nonuse patents are strategic nonuse patents 
(Giuri et al., 2007). Regardless of a patent’s being actually used or not, strategic motives of patenting have 
grown significantly recently (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2002; Harabi, 1995; Sheehan, Martinez, and 
Guellec, 2003). 
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defensive purposes. It also tests the effects of technological uncertainty and maturity on 
the strategic nonuse. 
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CHAPTER 12. Analytic Framework 
 
 
 
Patent nonuses can be broken down into two classes: strategic nonuse and other nonuse. 
Some patented inventions that are not integrated into products or sold in the market for 
technology may generate strategic rents. In discrete industry, where products are built on 
a relatively small number of technologies, development of substitutable technology by 
competitors will be a big threat to the owner of the original technology. For example, in 
the pharmaceutical or polymer industries, profits from a particular chemical material of a 
certain effect will not accrue to the original inventor if he fails to prevent alternative 
methods of synthesis that lead to a material of the same effect. In this industry, the 
original inventor often files for “fence” patents to prevent competitors from inventing-
around the technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). In complex industries, where 
a large number of technologies is integrated into a final product, such as electronics or 
semiconductors, patents are often filed to block competitors from further developing the 
downstream complementary technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Some 
patents, especially those filed by semiconductor firms, are included in a broader patent 
portfolio to ensure freedom-to-operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997) and, sometimes, used 
as a bargaining chip to enhance the position of negotiation in cross-licensing deals (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001). Either fence or blocking would not generate financial benefits 
directly from the patented technology but generate strategic benefits in the form of 
stronger protection of core technologies or raising competitors’ innovation costs. Some 
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blocking patents are used strategically for improving position in negotiation of future 
cross-licensing deals (called “bargaining chips” or “player strategy”). So we distinguish 
this class of patents that generate strategic value from other nonuse patents. Certainly, 
some non-strategic nonuse patents will generate some protective value. We focus on a 
certain class of nonuse patents that generate strategic value on top of conventional 
protective values.  
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Table 12.1 Values/benefits accruing to the inventor organization by the modes of use 
Values/benefits accruing to the inventor organization Mode of 
uses Direct Indirect/strategic 
Internal use 
Integration 
into own 
product/ 
process 
Enhanced product 
competitiveness 
 
Reduced manufacturing cost 
Enhanced absorptive capacity 
External use 
Licensing 
(unilateral) 
Licensing revenue Increased competition in the product 
market (-) 
Cross-
licensing 
Saved costs in not negotiating 
individual license agreements 
 
Access to others’ technology 
“freedom of operation” 
Strategic use 
Player 
strategy 
Enhanced position in 
negotiation for cross-licensing 
deal 
“freedom of operation” 
Strategic nonuse 
Fencing NA Securing the rent from the core 
inventions (which is related to but not 
covered by the focal patent) 
 
Heightening entry barriers to a certain 
product market  
Blocking NA Increasing competitors’ innovation 
costs 
 
Preventing competitors from further 
innovation  
Other nonuse 
Sleeping NA Option value 
Reducing litigation risk 
 
 
 
Non-practicing strategic patents are often cited as an example of how patents are abused 
to slow down innovation. The critics say that the threat of litigation and compensatory 
awards causes licensing royalties to inflate (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007) and moves firms 
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to build a protective web of patents to reduce the litigation risks. Also, keeping a large 
number of patents (especially not practiced patents) creates a huge amount of 
maintenance costs for a firm. Therefore, many large firms in complex industries support a 
policy measure to reduce non-practicing strategic patents.54 This can be called a “pro-
user” perspective of patents. On the other hand, if not classified as “misuse” (for the 
definition and cases of patent misuse, see Hoerner, 1984; Saunders, 2002), non-practicing 
strategic patents are legitimate. Moreover, they work as an incentive to investing in R&D. 
In particular, for small firms or start-ups having technology but lacking manufacturing 
facilities, fencing their core technology using non-practicing patents or blocking 
competitors from entering into the same technology markets are sometimes the only 
means by which they can appropriate from investing in R&D. This can be called a “pro-
holder” view of patents. This study does not aim to assess whether non-practicing 
strategic patents are anti- or pro-innovative but aims to identify which characteristics of 
technology, organization, and invention affect them. 
 
12.1. Hypotheses Development 
 
Strategic nonuse patents are a class of patents that are not commercially exploited but 
generate strategic rents to the owner of patents by blocking competitor’s technological 
advances or protecting the owners’ existing assets. This class of patents covers both 
“offensive blockade,” or thicket builder, and “defensive blockade,” or fence builder. 
                                                 
54 See, for example, amicus curiae filed by Cisco or IBM in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. et al. 
case (Supreme Court 04-1350). Also, see the public comments on the “Hearings on the Evolving 
Intellectual Property (IP) Marketplace” hosted by the Federal Trade Commission. 
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Some existing studies distinguish thicket and fence, but in this study we focus on their 
common characteristics: a defensive or protective role without commercial application. 
 
12.1.1. Size of upstream and downstream assets to protect 
 
From the interviews with managers in the semiconductor industry, Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) found that firms with large sunk costs in manufacturing facilities had large 
incentives to use patents for a safeguard against the threat of costly litigation as well as 
“bargaining chips” in licensing negotiation. They further showed that the patent 
propensity indeed increased with the capital intensity. Although they did not show how 
many of these patents are particularly intended for strategic nonuse, they claimed, based 
on the interviews, that the increased level of patenting would be somehow related to 
strategic nonuse. As seen in the patent infringement lawsuit by Polaroid against Kodak, 
patent infringement sometimes causes the shutdown of an expensive production facility 
implemented with the infringed technology. In order to prevent this significant loss, firms 
will tend to avoid infringing others’ patents when they build a new production facility. 
However, in some complex technology areas, it will be hard to identify before a court 
decision which technology infringes on others’ patents. In this case, patents not used for 
building their own facility but are related to potential litigators will be useful for 
negotiation. On the other hand, when a production facility is crucial for a firm’s 
competitive advantage and a certain technology is essential for building this facility, the 
firm will have a large incentive to hinder competitors from building a similar level of 
production facility by filing for blocking or fencing patents.  
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In order to identify this relationship empirically, however, we have to look at the 
comparative aspects of patent uses. In other words, how do the large sunk costs in 
production facilities affect the propensity of other uses? For internal integration, the 
larger the sunk costs, the lower the propensity to integrate an individual patented 
technology into the existing facility because of two reasons: first, firms with higher 
capital intensity will generally have other options to appropriate the innovation and 
maintain competitive advantage than patents. First-mover advantage, scale economy of 
production, and secrecy of production technology all play a role (Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). Second, upgrading the facility requires implementation 
costs. Also, organizational costs to write a new manual, to train workers, and to optimize 
the process will accrue in the upgraded facility. Therefore, upgrading the existing facility 
with an incrementally improved technology will be progressively less beneficial as the 
size of the facility (and the cost for upgrading) increases. Also, the larger the capital 
intensity, the smaller the incentive to license out the relevant technology will be. While 
the potential harm to the expensive facility due to knowledge leakage accompanying the 
license will increase, this risk factor may not be easily justified ex ante in the licensing 
agreement. The above arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. As capital intensity of a firm increases, the propensity of strategic nonuse 
of its patents will also increase. 
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A similar argument is applied to upstream technology assets. For contemporary firms in 
technology-intensive sectors, intangible assets, especially technology assets, are 
important resources to protect. Some technologies constitute an essential foundation for 
key products and processes, and some other technologies create direct rents by being 
traded in the market for technology. Sometimes in the complex technology industries, a 
single technology will not be enough to secure the rents from a product that can be made 
only through the combination of multiple technologies. In this case, a firm having a core 
technology will need a set of other technologies that are complementary to the core 
technology to fully leverage the power of the core technology. In discrete technology 
industries, the utility of a core technology will not be secured without having commands 
over the substitute technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Therefore, firms 
having a large portfolio of technology assets will have large incentives to protect it by 
filing for strategic nonuse patents. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. As the size of technological assets of a firm increases, the propensity of 
strategic nonuse of its patents will also increase. 
 
12.1.2. Bargaining failure and emergence of a dominant design 
 
Merges (1994) views the existence of blocking patents as a result of bargaining failure 
between innovators and radical improvers. When both the patentee and the infringer see 
mutual benefits from a bargain over the right to use the patent, they will reach one. 
Otherwise, they will face a risk of injunction or a forced bargain on top of costly 
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litigation fees. Then when do the patentee and potential infringer fail in bargaining? TCE 
points out transactional uncertainty as a main reason (Williamson, 1981). In the market 
for technology, major uncertainty stems from an asymmetric view on the prospect and 
value of technology (Arrow, 1969; Oxley, 1997). Because a single patent document 
cannot carry all the information required for a potential buyer to assess the value of the 
technology, it plays a crucial role in bargaining success for both parties to share a 
common understanding on the technology. This common understanding can be acquired 
through individual efforts (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) but also depends on a stage of 
technology evolution.  
 
Technological development follows a pattern characterized by a sporadic discontinuity 
and following incremental innovation. Dosi (1982) characterized it as a paradigmatic and 
normal stage. Abernathy and Clark (1985) and Henderson and Clark (1990) distinguished 
“architectural innovation” from “incremental innovation.” Anderson and Tushman (1990; 
1986) take a similar view by distinguishing “technological discontinuities” from 
incremental innovation. Despite different language and subtle differences among them, 
there are some common observations across these theories. First, in the phase of 
technological discontinuities, the value and real impact of innovative technology are 
hardly foreseeable to the existing firms. Therefore, technological uncertainty is prominent 
for this type of innovation. This discontinuous technology sometimes creates a new field 
of technology. Second, after this discontinuous technological innovation acquires a 
paradigmatic status, lots of incremental innovation follows and populates the field of 
technology. Technological knowledge in this phase, then, is well-diffused among the 
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participants and, therefore, the value and utility of incremental innovation become quite 
well-grounded on the common prospectus. This leads to the following conclusion: as a 
particular technology becomes more familiar to the players of the technology, 
technological uncertainty will decrease and, therefore, the odds of bargaining failure will 
decrease. In summary, we will see a lower propensity of strategic nonuse patents and a 
higher propensity of licensing as technological familiarity increases. 
 
Besides the transactional point of view, as a dominant design paradigm emerges, a rent 
that can be generated from a new incremental design will decrease. Competitive 
advantage will shift to the capacity of mass production and cost efficiency from a design 
initiative (Teece, 1986). This argument is in line with Schumpeter’s description of the 
“creative destruction” process or Utterback’s description of the emergence of a dominant 
design (Schumpeter, 1942; Utterback, 1994). Also, while wide diffusion of technological 
knowledge makes competitors’ inventing-around easier and a claimable portion of the 
patent lower (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000) (and, therefore, reducing the 
effectiveness of the protective role of a patent), it will lower the costs for integrating the 
technology in the existing facility. Therefore, strategic nonuse will also be less attractive 
than internal integration. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:    
 
Hypothesis 2. As technological familiarity of a patented invention increases, its 
propensity of strategic nonuse will decrease. 
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CHAPTER 13. Survey Results 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we provide explorative, bivariate analyses of the survey about reasons for 
patenting and reasons for actual nonuse. The main purpose of this chapter is to present 
the status of strategic nonuse of patents that the newly conducted survey reveals. So the 
chapter is not structured to center on the hypotheses we formulated above. Testing 
hypotheses will be a main focus of the next chapter, where we show the results from 
multivariate analyses. 
 
The survey asks two questions regarding strategic nonuse of patents. One question asks 
about intentions of using the patent at the time of the invention. The other question asks 
about the reasons the patent was not used. 
 
13.1. Reasons for Patenting 
 
The GT/RIETI survey asks why inventors filed for a patent. In particular, the survey asks, 
in five-point Likert scale with 1 for “not important” and 5 for “very important,” how 
important the following eight reasons were for their patenting: commercial exploitation, 
licensing, cross-licensing (improving bargaining positions in negotiation), pure defense, 
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blocking others, preventing inventing-around other key patents, inventor reputation, and 
firm’s reputation. 
 
In addition, we divide blocking patents into two mutually exclusive classes: “player 
strategy” and “fence strategy.” Cohen et. al. (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000) and others (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) found that 
some blocking patents were used as a bargaining chip in cross-licensing deals. This class 
of patents, named “player patents” by Cohen et. al., is appropriated in a different way 
from those patents integrated into commercial products or processes. While the latter 
generates revenues from product markets or technology markets (e.g., by licensing the 
patents), the former generates strategic rents for the owner to better access to other’s 
technology or secure the freedom of operation.55 Following Cohen et. al., we define a 
player strategy as having dual purposes of both cross-licensing and blocking (but in a 
broad sense, so as to include survey answers for “pure defense,” “blocking others,” and 
“prevention”). 
 
We interpret “blocking patents” broadly to include both offensive and defensive blockade 
(Blind et al., 2006). In our survey, we have three “blocking” questions: 1) pure defense 
(to ensure that the use of your own technology not be blocked by others), 2) blocking 
patents (preventing others from patenting similar inventions, complements, or substitutes), 
and 3) preventing inventing-around other key patents of your firm. More precisely, 
                                                 
55 See an example provided in Rivette and Kline (2000) about how S3, a small graphic chip maker, 
leveraged its position in a cross-licensing deal with Intel by holding up Intel’s developing next-generation 
processor using the patents acquired from a bankrupt chip maker, Exponential Technologies. Thanks to the 
resultant cross-licensing, S3 secured the freedom to develop its high-performance graphic chip beyond a 
siege of Intel’s patents.  
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“blocking patents” in our survey was meant to ask about offensive blockade and “pure 
defense” and “preventing inventing-around” about a defensive blockade. Initially, we 
impose a slightly different nuance on each of three questions. For example, “pure 
defense” aims to prevent others from degrading the patentee’s innovation that may stem 
from the patented technology. “Blocking patents” aims to prevent others from innovating 
further based on the patented technology. “Preventing invention-around” aims to prevent 
others from degrading profitability of the patentee’s other technology but related to the 
patented technology. These different nuances among three questions, however, seem to 
be mixed in practice and not to make a difference to some respondents in our survey. 
Indeed, scores of three variables are highly correlated to each other (Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.74; tetrachoric correlations=0.53 between pure defense and prevention, 0.73 
between pure defense and blocking, and 0.67 between blocking and prevention) and 
reflect one common latent factor. Therefore, we use “blocking patents” in a broad sense 
to include pure defense and prevention, while we used “blocking patents” narrowly in the 
survey. 
 
On the other hand, a “fence” patent is a subclass of blocking patents that are not intended 
for licensing or bargaining chips. This class of patents benefits the owner in a different 
way from the player patents in that it 1) prevents competitors from going ahead in the 
innovation race,56 2) protects other core technologies owned by the firm from being 
                                                 
56 An exemplary case is “Fleming valve” patent by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph company which 
refused to license the competitor, De Forest company, and blocked developing improvement technology. 
(Marconi Wireless & Tel. Co. v. De Forest Radio Tel & Tel. Co., 236 F. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)). The stymie 
in developing radio technology brought forth by fragmented patents was finally resolved by introduction of 
a consortium, RCA. (Merges, 1994). 
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invented-around,57 or 3) reduces future litigation risk (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). This 
class of patents is close to a “defensive blockade” in Blind et. al.’s (2006) usage. 
Following Cohen et al. (2002), we define fence patents as those patents filed for blocking 
purposes but neither for licensing nor for cross-licensing. Thus, fence patents and player 
patents are mutually exclusive subsets of defensive patents.58 
 
Figure 13.1 illustrates the proportion of “important” or “very important” for each reason 
for patenting. Not surprisingly, commercial exploitation (82.3%) is the most important 
reason to patent. Consistent with the findings from the Carnegie Mellon survey, blocking 
is reported as one of the most important reasons for patenting. Offensive blocking 
(46.2%) is the second highest and pure defense (44.9%) the third highest reason to patent 
in the survey. Also, about one-fifth of the patents in the survey were filed to prevent 
inventing-around. Overall, 71.6% (=1180/1647) of inventors in the sample reported that 
at least one of the three blocking purposes were important or very important for their 
patenting. As for the two external commercialization strategies, licensing and cross-
licensing, about a quarter and about half (50.2%) of inventors in our sample, respectively, 
reported them as important or very important reasons for patenting. For player strategy 
and fence strategy, 17.1% and 35.6% of patents in the survey, respectively, were reported 
as important or very important for patenting. 
 
                                                 
57 A famous case is a color proofing process technology invented by Roxy N. Fan, a scientist at Du Pont at 
the time of invention, and subsequently patented to Du Pont. The Fan patent was not commercially 
exploited by Du Pont but used for blocking out a competitor from the color proofing market in which Du 
Pont’s competing technology, Cromalin process, took 90 percent of the share (E. I. du Pont Nemours & Co. 
v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (D. Del.). aff’d. 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)) (Turner, 1998).    
58 Note, however, that they are not mutually exhaustive because fence strategy is one more constraining 
condition, licensing, than player strategy. 
 193
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Inventor's reputation
Player strategy
Preventing inventing-around other key patents
Cross-licensing (negotiation)
Licensing
Firm's reputation
Fence strategy
Pure defense
Blocking (offensive)
Commercial exploitation
 
Figure 13.1 Reasons for patenting 
 
Note: fence and player strategies were constructed from a combination of multiple 
reasons as described above 
 
 
 
Patenting strategy varies significantly across sectors. Figure 13.2 shows the share of the 
patents giving high importance to each reason within the sector. Again, commercial 
exploitation is the most prominent reason for patenting. The second highest reason is 
offensive blocking (in Chemistry, Process Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and 
Consumer Goods and Construction) or “pure defense” (in Electrical Engineering and 
Instrument). Process Engineering (which includes chemical engineering, textiles, paper, 
printing, food process, etc.) shows the highest share of blocking (54.3%) and preventive 
reasons (28.4%) among six sectors. The most prominent differences among sectors occur 
in cross-licensing. Consistent with the previous literature (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 
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2000; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), Electrical Engineering 
(39.7%) and Instruments (27.2%) show a higher share of cross-licensing while 
Mechanical Engineering (10.7%) and Consumer Goods and Construction (2.5%) show a 
very low rate. Also, player strategy shows a similar pattern with cross-licensing while 
fence strategy shows an offset-like pattern with cross-licensing. This pattern is roughly 
consistent with the results from the Carnegie Mellon survey, which observed that player 
strategy was more prominent in complex industries (such as electronics, instruments, and 
transportation equipment) than in discrete industries (such as food, textiles, drugs, and 
metals) and that fence strategy was more prominent in discrete industries (Cohen et al., 
2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).  
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Figure 13.2 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons of patenting by 
industry 
 
 
 
Next we examine the differences in motives for patenting by firm size and the complexity 
of technology. The survey shows significant differences in the reasons for patenting by 
the size of firms to which the respondent belonged at the time the invention was made. In 
our survey, the share of inventors giving high importance to commercial exploitation, 
licensing, and firm’s reputation is statistically significantly higher in small firms than 
large firms. While almost 43% of the patents from small firms are filed for licensing, 
only 27% of large-firm patents are filed for licensing. On the other hand, cross-licensing 
is reported as an important reason for patenting more in large firms (27%) than in small 
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firms (17%). A higher share of patents from large firms are for cross-licensing, player, 
and fence strategies. 
 
In order to examine whether the reasons for patenting differ by the characteristics of 
technology, we break down the technological areas into 30 subgroups. The first four 
columns of Table A. 8 in Appendix E characterize each technology in four dimensions: 
complexity of technology, importance of complementary technology, importance of 
patents, and importance of short lead-time. They are all constructed from the survey. 
Complex technology areas are identified using the survey. The GT/RIETI survey asks the 
inventors “how many domestic patents are jointly used in the commercial application of 
the invention.” It provided eight categories: 1, 2 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to 
500, 501 to 1,000, and more than 1,000 patents. We averaged the median values over 30 
subgroups of technologies and constructed a variable, “technological complexity.” Then a 
dichotomous variable, “complexity of product technology,” is coded 1 if the 
technological complexity of the subclass to which the focal patent belonged was higher 
than the median value of technology complexity. The complex technologies classified in 
this way include information technology, semiconductors, telecommunication, electronics, 
biotechnology, and chemical engineering. The non-complex (or discrete) technologies 
include textile, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and food, construction, and transportation 
technologies.59 Complexity of technologies calculated in this way is roughly consistent 
                                                 
59 The other three variables are all constructed from the survey questions about the strength of 
appropriability conditions. The GT/RIETI survey asks the inventors to rate, in a five-point Likert scale, the 
importance of eight appropriability conditions for protecting a firm’s competitive advantage regarding 
commercializing the invention. The importance of complementary technology is constructed from the 
maximum value of two items: “[f]irst mover’s advantage in follow-up R&D (developing complementary 
technologies and the patent portfolio)” and “[c]ollaboration with other firms having complementary 
technologies.” The importance of patents and the importance of short lead-time are constructed from the 
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with a simple dichotomy based on the qualitative studies (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Kusunoki, Nonaka, and Nagata, 1998).  
 
This characteristic of industry has discriminating effects on the patenting strategies as 
indicated by statistically significant differences for almost all reasons of patenting in the 
right pane of Table 13.1. Consistent with the findings of Cohen et al., player strategy is 
adopted significantly more in complex technology areas, while fence strategy is adopted 
more in discrete technology areas. This seems to stem from the prominence of cross-
licensing in complex technology. Two of the three blocking purposes (pure defense and 
prevention) show no significant differences by complexity of technology. Offensive 
blocking is slightly more favored in discrete technology.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reported value of each corresponding item. Similar to the technology complexity variable, we then average 
these values over 30 subgroups of technology and dichotomize them by industry median, respectively. 
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Table 13.1 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons for patenting by 
the size of firms and the complexity of technology 
 Firm size Complexity of technology 
 N 
Small 
& 
medium Large 
Pearson 
chi2(1) N Discrete Complex 
Pearson 
chi2(1) 
Commercial 
exploitation 1688 89.1 80.8 9.7*** 1689 86.1 79.4 12.6*** 
Blocking 
(offensive) 1649 45.2 46.4 0.1 1650 49.7 44.1 5.0** 
Pure defense 1655 41.4 45.6 0.2 1656 44.8 45.2 0 
Fence strategy 1637 30.6 36.5 3.1* 1637 41.8 31.5 18.3*** 
Firm's 
reputation 1663 37.7 28.9 7.5*** 1664 25.4 33.5 12.5*** 
Licensing 1646 42.7 26.9 24.9*** 1646 27.1 30.7 2.4 
Cross-licensing 
(negotiation) 1639 16.9 26.4 9.9*** 1639 16.5 30.9 43.5*** 
Preventing 
inventing-
around other key 
patents 1636 22.5 21.2 0.1 1637 22.5 20.8 0.7 
Player strategy 1634 13.5 18.1 3.0* 1634 12.0 21.2 23.0*** 
Inventor's 
reputation 1647 14.7 14.6 0 1648 12.0 16.7 6.7** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Above we show that profiles of patenting strategies vary by firm size and characteristics 
of industry (i.e., technological complexity of products). In order to further understand 
how the different profiles of patenting strategies between large and small (and medium) 
firms vary by industry, we cross-tabulate the share of importance of each patenting 
strategy by the size of firms and by complexity of product technology.  
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Table 13.2 shows the relationship of three strategies (detail statistics are presented in 
Table A. 9 of Appendix E). The table reads as follows: the share of patents filed because 
of the importance of player strategy is larger for large firms than for small or medium 
firms in complex technology. Licensing is unanimously favored by a larger share of small 
and medium firms than large firms in all technologies. Fence and player strategies show 
discrepancy by technology between large and small firms. Both fence and player 
strategies are more adopted by large firms overall. However, the differences are 
statistically significant in discrete technologies for the fence strategy and in complex 
technologies for the player strategy. This observation is largely consistent with the 
arguments that view the roles of patents as protecting the existing firm assets (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). More interestingly, player strategy is more favored by 
small firms in pharmaceutical, polymers, and biotechnology (although the difference is 
not statistically significant for biotechnology due to small N). On the other hand, small 
firms favor the fence strategy in electrical engineering technologies. This implies that, 
separate from the “assets-at-risk” argument, there may be a fundamental discrepancy of 
R&D and patenting strategy between small and large firms according to the 
characteristics of industry. 
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Table 13.2 Reasons to patent by firm size and by complexity of product technology 
Discrete Complex Small & medium; 
large all Pharm & Poly all Bio EE 
All 
  
Licensing >*** >*** >*** > > >*** 
Fence strategy <* < < < >* <* 
Player strategy > >*** <*** > <*** <* 
 
Note: Pharm & Poly: Pharmaceuticals & Polymers; Bio: Biotechnology; EE: 
Audio/Visual, IT, Telecom & Semiconductors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
In this section, we presented a similar finding by Cohen et al. (2002) that player and 
fence strategies account for a substantial share of firms’ patenting, and they are, indeed, 
subject to the complexity of product technology. In doing so, we applied an advanced 
measure of the complexity of product technology. We presented novel findings that 
patenting strategy differs by the size of firms. Moreover, the analysis shows that 
patenting strategies from different sizes of firms are heterogeneous across industry. In 
particular, diverging patenting strategies of firms according to their sizes are prominent 
(and somewhat distinct in their effects from the rest) in chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries.  
 
13.2. Reasons for Nonuse 
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In this section we present the results for the reasons a patent has not been commercially 
exploited. In our survey, we asked for the nonuse patents reasons a patent has not been 
used (Figure 13.3). Among 1,672 patents from firms that reported their modes of uses 
and/or the reasons for nonuse, 769 patents (46.0%) were not used at the time of the 
survey. A dominant share of firms were still exploring the commercial possibility (59.3% 
of nonuse patents or 27.3% of all reported patents) or used internally as a research tool 
(8.0%). However, our survey reveals that a significant share of nonuse patents was 
strategically exploited for blocking, either offensively (15.2%) or defensively (10.3%). 
Offensive and defensive blocking, together, account for 16.7% of patent usage. The other 
reasons for nonuse include a family that fall into obsolete patents (technology or market 
shift, downsized or failed line of business accounting for 18.9% together), a family 
related to lack of sponsors to commercialize the technology (licensees or financiers 
accounting for 5.2% together), or other technological problems (low technical level, 
delay in developing complementary technologies, or lack of technologies for application, 
accounting for 11.6% together). 
 
 
 202
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Lack of capital for starting a new firm
Low technical level
Lack of interst from potential licensses
New line of business failed
Delayed development of complementary technology
Lack of application technologies
Research tool
The line of business downsized
Preventing inventing-around (defensive blockade)
Changed technology or market environment
Blocking other firms (offensive blockade)
Still exploring the commercial possibility
 
Figure 13.3 Reasons for nonuse (N=1672) 
 
 
 
Among the various reasons for nonuse, we particularly focus on three families of reasons: 
1) strategic nonuse family including “blocking other firms” and “preventing inventing-
around, 2) obsolete patents family including technology or market shift, downsized or 
failed line of business, and 3) non-sponsor patents family including “lack of capital for 
starting a new firm” and “lack of interest from potential licensees.”60 The strategic 
nonuse family refers to blocking patents, both offensive and defensive. The latter two 
families refer to a proven failure of commercialization (obsolete patent family) and a 
                                                 
60 The results of an exploratory factor analysis based on tetrachoric correlations are consistent with this 
grouping. 
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potential institutional failure for commercialization (non-sponsor patents that failed to 
recruit investors for commercialization).  
 
The economic and technological values61 of strategic nonuse patents are lower than 
commercially used patents but higher than obsolete patents (Table 13.3). However, 
strategic nonuse patents are evaluated almost same level as non-sponsored nonuse patents. 
 
 
 
Table 13.3 Value of nonuse patents 
Economic value Technological value 
Mode of (non)use N 
Mean 
(percentile) N 
Mean 
(percentile) 
Any commercial use 748 60.02 757 65.49 
Strategic nonuse 225 44.86 236 52.49 
Strategic nonuse (broad) 337 46.09 359 53.50 
Lack of sponsors 71 45.70 76 53.03 
Obsolete patents 259 40.97 276 49.54 
Total 1339 53.71 1388 60.32 
 
 
 
Table 13.4 shows the value (both economic and technological) of strategic nonuse patents 
in the sample by firm size. In the sample, the value of strategic nonuse patents from large 
firm are lower than those from small or medium firms.  
 
                                                 
61 In our survey, we ask the inventor to assess the technical significance and economic value of the 
invention relative to other technical developments in the field during the year when the focal patent was 
applied for. We used the midpoint of each category (top 10%; 25% (but not top 10%); top 50% (but not top 
25%); and bottom half). 
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Table 13.4 Value of strategic nonuse patents by firm size 
Economic value Technological value 
Firm size N 
Mean 
(percentile) N 
Mean 
(percentile) 
Small & medium 13 49.81 16 63.91 
Large 212 44.55 220 51.66 
Total 225 44.86 236 52.49 
 
 
 
Next, we examine how the share of the three reasons is associated with a set of 
characteristics at invention-, firm-, and technology-level. The criteria examined are firm 
size, complexity of technology, the appropriability regime of patents, collaboration 
(whether or not the invention involves any external collaborator), type of innovation 
(product v. process), and inventor unit (whether the inventor belonged to a manufacturing 
unit at the time of invention). The summary results are presented in Table 13.5.  
 
While the share of strategic nonuse and obsolete patents is significantly higher in large 
firms, the share of non-sponsor patents is higher in small firms. The previous chapters 
show that large firms are more likely to use patents for commercial purposes, especially 
via internally integrating them. The survey shows that large firms not only have larger 
numbers of strategic nonuse patents but also filepatents for a larger number of proven 
failed technologies. This finding implies two things. First, patent propensity may be 
higher for large firms than for small firms. Large firms file for patents even such 
technologies that have no immediate commercial uses or marginally superior 
technologies. Second, particularly for obsolete patents, large firms may have broader 
capabilities for which they can apply even marginally superior technologies.  
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Next, the survey shows that there are more obsolete patents in complex technology than 
in discrete technology. This may reflect the short life cycle of technology in complex 
technology areas. Interestingly, collaborative inventions and inventions tightly coupled 
with manufacturing processes are lower in the rate of failure. Recall that we showed that 
the patents of these characteristics are also more likely to be commercialized (internally). 
It seems that collaboration and tight coupling to manufacturing process in the invention 
process will not only have positive effects on commercialization but also reduce negative 
effects of failure.  
 
Patent strength and the degree to which the invention is linked to the existing capabilities 
(i.e., competence-destroying or enhancing) do not make obvious differences on any of 
these reasons of nonuse. Other appropriability conditions (such as the importance of 
complementary technology or the lead time advantage) do not make a significant 
difference for these reasons, either.  
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Table 13.5 Share of three types of nonuse patents by several characteristics 
Criteria Value of criteria 
Strategic 
nonuse 
patents 
Strategic 
nonuse 
patents 
(broad) 
Obsolete 
patents 
Lack of 
capital or 
licensee 
Small and medium 7.6 14.9 12.1 10.0 
Large 18.3 27.3 20.5 4.2 Firm size (N=1672) 
Chi-square 17.3*** 17.4*** 9.6*** 14.9*** 
Discrete 17.6 25.9 15.7 3.7 
Complex 16.1 25.2 21.6 6.0 
Complexity of 
product 
technology 
(N=1672) Chi-square 0.7 0.1 9.1*** 4.5** 
Low 14.8 24.2 17.8 5.9 
Hi 18.3 26.6 20.4 4.5 
Importance of 
patents for 
appropriation  
(N=1670) Chi-square 3.7* 1.2 1.7 1.6 
No 17.2 26.9 21.2 4.7 
Yes 15.3 21.6 13.5 5.9 Collaboration (N=1665) 
Chi-square 0.8 4.7** 12.5*** 1.0 
Enhancing 19.1 26.1 19.5 4.4 
Destroying 14.8 24.9 19.1 5.6 
Competence-
enhancing or 
destroying 
(N=1665) Chi-square 5.2** 0.3 0.0 1.3 
Non-manufacturing 17.0 26.1 19.9 5.3 
Manufacturing 14.3 20.0 12.1 3.6 Inventor unit (N=1656) 
Chi-square 0.7 2.5 4.9** 0.8 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 14. Hypotheses Tests 
 
 
 
14.1. Data 
The estimation sample is based on the GT/RIETI survey and supplementary data sources 
including PATSTAT, the USPTO database, and COMPUSTAT as described in Chapter 4. 
Out of 1,919 valid responses, 1,807 cases are from firms. After deleting listwisely the 
cases that have missing values on our covariates, we have 1,241 complete cases for 
estimation.  
 
14.2. Variables 
This section introduces variables used for multivariate analysis. 
 
14.2.1. Dependent variables 
Our dependent variable, “strategic nonuse” is constructed using the GT/RIETI survey. A 
binary variable, “strategic nonuse,” is coded 1 if the patent was used for “blocking other 
firms” or “preventing inventing-around” and not used for any commercial purpose. We 
also construct a second measure of strategic nonuse by fusing information on the reasons 
for patenting with the reasons of actual nonuse. In the survey, some patents filed for 
strategic purposes are reported to end up with some other uses. About a half of them 
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reported to “still explore commercial opportunities.” They may indeed play a blocking or 
fencing role while waiting for commercial applications. Therefore, we identified those 
patents of high intention for strategic nonuse at the time of patenting additionally as 
strategic nonuse patents. A broadly defined strategic nonuse is coded 1 if the original 
variable is one or if nonuse is true and the reasons for patenting for blocking or 
prevention are reported important or very important. The strategic nonuse is different 
from fence or player strategies. Recall that player strategy is more than blocking. It is 
designated to using patents to improve a position in (cross-)licensing negotiation. 
Strategic nonuse as defined in this section excludes the patents used for licensing or 
cross-licensing. It is actual nonuse targeted for blocking competitors or preventing other 
core inventions owned by the holder of the strategic nonuse patents. Therefore, strategic 
nonuse includes all fence patents but a part of player patents.  
 
14.2.2. Explanatory variables 
Capital intensity 
Following Hall & Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004), we measure capital intensity 
using the deflated book value (constant U.S. dollars in 2000) of property, plant, and 
equipment divided by number of employees. In order to mitigate yearly fluctuation and 
reduce missing values, we use a three-year running average centered on the filed year of a 
focal patent. Main data sources are COMPUSTAT North America–Fundamentals Annual 
and COMPUSTAT Global–Fundamentals Annual.62 For a few firms, we directly find the 
data from their web sites. In the sample, about a quarter of firms are either private or 
                                                 
62 We use consolidated financial reports. Therefore, many subsidiaries in our sample are regarded as a 
parent company whose financial information is available. 
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foreign whose financial information are not available in either the COMPUSTAT or 
alternative sources mentioned above. They are coded as a dummy variable named 
“dummy for missing capital intensity.”  
 
Technological assets 
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is 
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal 
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal 
patent filed in year t is: 
 
  PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d) 
 
where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge which is set to 15% following 
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).  
 
Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated 
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated 
into the merger. We use the April 2008 version of the “EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Database” (henceforth, PATSTAT) provided by the European Patent Office. There are 
two advantages using PATSTAT for this purpose. First, PATSTAT provides relational 
tables and an SQL interface for the bibliometric information of the U.S. patents, which 
make data extraction much easier than other available data sources. Second, PATSTAT 
provides standard identification numbers of assignees, which corrected many typos and 
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spelling differences. We further cleaned the data by manually searching and correcting 
the list of assignees in the sample. 
 
Component familiarity 
We operationalize technological familiarity using the familiarity index of technological 
components suggested by Fleming (2001). “Component familiarity” captures the degree 
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his 
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of 
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology 
become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming, 
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes of the 
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the 
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component 
familiarity is in inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as 
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.  
 
In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from 
1976 to 1999 in each technology class and match them to the subclass of a patent in our 
sample.  
 
Component familiarity for patent i =  
å å
Î
´
iji Cc
k
tofrom
filedkpatentsall
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C
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where iC = { } ipatent  toassigned subclasspatent  , 
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  jc = patent subclass identifier, 
 
iC
N = number of different patent subclasses assigned to patent i, 
and knowledge attenuation factor, konkattenuati = 
)
loss knowledge ofconstant  time
kpatent  of distance temporalexp( , 
where temporal distance of patent k= 
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999 
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994 
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989 
 
Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 following Fleming (2001). We rescaled 
component familiarity by dividing it by 1000. 
 
Patent effectiveness 
In order to test the effects of patent effectiveness at the technology or industry level, we 
use two measures. One measure is constructed from the question of the GT/RIETI survey 
addressing patent strength in maintaining competitive advantage of the commercialized 
patented inventions. We aggregate the answer to this question in a five-point Likert scale 
at technology class. Because this question was directed to the inventors whose patents 
were commercialized, this may not properly represent overall effectiveness of patents. 
Thus, we also adopt the patent effectiveness measure provided by the Carnegie Mellon 
survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). We averaged the median value of the original 
CMS measure of patent effectiveness at International Standard of Industry Code (or ISIC) 
over four-digit NAICS code of assignee firms in our survey. About 16% of cases for 
which we could not find NAICS code were dummy-coded as “Missing patent 
effectiveness.”  
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14.2.3. Controls 
We included several variables to control for alternative factors that may influence the 
propensity of strategic nonuse. 
 
Fragmented ownership of a patent 
Ziedonis (2004) showed that the patenting propensity of firms in the semiconductor 
industry increased as the patenting ownership was more fragmented. She suggested that a 
large portion of the increased patenting would be ascribed to the patents filed for strategic 
nonuse. Although she did not prove the direct relationship between the increase of 
strategic nonuse patents and the fragmentation in that paper, she had provided anecdotal 
evidence on that in her previous paper with Hall (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Adapting 
Ziedonis’s fragmentation index at firm level to patent level, we constructed a “patent 
fragmentation index.” In the United States, an invention is patentable only if differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art should not be “obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains” (35 U.S.C. 103). Prior art is pertinent and applicable to the patent and 
has “a bearing on the patentability of any claim of the patent” (37 C.F.R. 1.501) as 
assessed by the applicant, examiners, or a third party.63 Therefore, in order to fully utilize 
the patented invention, the executor of the patent (e.g., the owner or a licensee) would 
need access to the entirety or a part of prior arts. The patent fragmentation index 
measures how widely the prior art that is beyond a command of the owner of the focal 
                                                 
63 For the discussion about citation of prior art, see a recent paper by Alcacer, Gittelman, and Sampat 
(2009) 
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patent is distributed. Fragmentation index of a patent k assigned to firm ki is constructed 
as 
 
FRAGk =1−     ,
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where kj refers to each unique assignee that is cited by a patent k assigned to firm ki  and 
whose patent was filed after 1984. kNBCITES  is the number of the U.S. patents cited by 
patent k, 
ki
NBCITES  the number of the self-cited U.S. patents, and 
kj
NBCITES the 
number of the U.S. patents cited by patent k and assigned to kj . We consider the cited 
patents filed only after 1984 because most patents filed before 1984 must have expired by 
the time the focal patents of the sample was granted and, therefore, would not claim for 
ownership rights. We also tested the fragmentation index without restriction of filed year 
of cited patents to find no difference. The patent fragmentation index indicates the 
difficulties (or costs) of bargaining that may be required for full access to the subject 
technologies claimed in the patent.64  
 
Strength of patents and appropriability regime 
                                                 
64 The patent fragmentation index measures how widely the ownership of technological components that 
might be need to use the technology claimed in the focal patent. This is different from the complexity of 
product technology which measures how many technological components are required to make a final 
product. For example, if one technological component that constitutes a technologically complex product is 
built on proprietary prior arts or based on discrete technologies, then the fragmentation index will be low 
while complexity index of product technology high. Correlation coefficient between these two measures in 
the sample is very low (-0.01) and not statistically significant (Table A. 10). 
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We control the strength of patents and the regime of appropriability at both patent-level 
and technology- and industry-level. The measures for the strength of patent include 
complexity of technology as a count of different technology subclasses assigned to the 
patent and number of claims. At the technology level, we control the primary technology 
fields as identified in the first IPC. Because the semiconductor industry is known to be 
prosperous in blocking patents, we control the semiconductor industry as identified by 
the primary NAICS codes (333295, 333994, 334411, 334413, 334515, and 335999) of 
assignee firms. We also control the strength of patent at the industry/technology level. 
The first measure is constructed from the survey question asking about the strength of 
appropriability of patents for commercialization. This variable is aggregated at 30 
technology classes. However, this variable has some problems. The variable is 
constructed from the assessment from the respondents who answered that they used the 
patents for internal commercialization. This limitation may distort the overall 
effectiveness of patents for appropriating innovation. Hence, we tested an alternative 
measure. The patent effectiveness measure provided by the Carnegie Mellon survey 
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) was well examined in the literature and showed 
consistent results. We matched the CMS patent effectiveness measure to the primary 
industry classification (NAICS) and assigned corresponding values, separated by product 
and process, to the observations of the sample. Although overall reliability of this 
measure is believed to be higher than the first measure, it also has problems, such as 
missing NAICS value, missing on product/process distinction, and errors generated by 
transformation and aggregation. We additionally control a dummy for missing values on 
this variable. 
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Openness of innovation process 
We control the openness of the innovation process by including two measures: diversity 
index of external collaboration and the breadth of openness. The first measure, 
constructed from the survey, is the count of different external entities with which the 
inventor organization had collaborated during the invention process. The breadth of 
openness is a similar measure used by Laursen and Salter (2004) constructed from the 
survey by counting the different channels of external knowledge sources.  
 
We also control the technological value of patents, the ownership of complementary 
assets (as measured by whether the inventor belongs to manufacturing units), complexity 
of product technology, firm size (as measured by the number of employees),65 whether 
there is an immediate demand for the technology, size of the invention projects (number 
of inventors and man-month), product/process, and basic-applied orientation of the 
inventor. Sample statistics are presented in Table 14.1. 
                                                 
65 Correlation coefficient between the firm size and the patent stock is 0.59 and statistically significant, 
which falls below the 0.70 threshold and, indeed, is discriminatory (Cohen et al., 2003).  
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Table 14.1 Sample statistics (N=1241) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Data source 
Strategic nonuse (narrow) 0.174 0.379 0 1 Survey 
Strategic nonuse (broad) 0.261 0.439 0 1 Survey 
Explanatory variables      
Patent effectiveness (CMS) 32.877 7.266 16.400 50.200 CMS 
Missing patent effectiveness 0.157 0.364 0 1 CMS 
Strength of appropriability of patents 3.748 0.294 2.875 4.222 Survey 
Capital intensity (M$/employee) 0.076 0.131 0 1.908 COMPUSTAT 
Dummy for missing capital intensity 0.259 0.438 0 1 COMPUSTAT 
Ln(patent stock) 5.473 2.740 0 9.865 PATSTAT 
Component familiarity (/1000) 0.085 0.154 0.000 2.489 USPTO 
Controls      
Fragmentation index 0.678 0.283 0 0.979 PATSTAT 
Large firm (employees >500) 0.861 0.347 0 1 Survey & Patent 
Inventor in manufacturing unit 0.084 0.277 0 1 Survey 
Competence-destroying invention 0.573 0.495 0 1 Survey 
Complexity of product technology 0.584 0.493 0 1 Survey 
Breadth of openness 4.666 2.899 0 10 Survey 
Diversity index of collaboration 0.434 0.863 0 8 Survey 
Technological value 2.218 1.068 1 4 Survey 
No immediate demand 0.222 0.416 0 1 Survey 
% Basic R&D (/100) 0.079 0.172 0 1 Survey 
Product invention 0.510 0.500 0 1 Survey 
Man-month (normalized) 0.182 0.229 0.005 1 Survey 
Number of inventors 2.797 1.916 1 16 Patent 
Complexity of technology (# USPC) 4.452 3.538 1 30 Patent 
Number of citations to the U.S. 
patents 17.697 24.478 0 399 Patent 
Number of claims 22.922 15.585 1 181 Patent 
Age of invention (months) 68.874 12.002 37 92 Patent 
Semiconductor industry 0.069 0.254 0 1 COMPUSTAT 
Electrical engineering 0.257 0.437 0 1 Patent 
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals 0.239 0.427 0 1 Patent 
Process eng, special equipment 0.135 0.342 0 1 Patent 
Mechanical eng, machinery 0.132 0.339 0 1 Patent 
Consumer goods & Construction 0.028 0.166 0 1 Patent 
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14.3. Multivariate Analysis 
Because our dependent variable is binary, we use a probit regression model. Column 1 
through 6 of Table 14.2 show the estimates using the narrowly defined strategic nonuse 
as dependent variable and column 7 with broadly defined strategic nonuse for robustness 
checks.66 First, we estimated binary probit regressions without patent effectiveness 
variables (column 1) and added two different measures of patent effectiveness (columns 2 
and 3). Column 2 was estimated with strength of patent appropriability (aggregated at 30 
technology groups) constructed from the survey and column 3 estimated with patent 
effectiveness measure (aggregated at four-digit primary NAICS) constructed using the 
Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). 
 
Next, in order to examine the discriminating effects of independent variables in 
relationship with other modes, we estimated multinomial logistic models (columns 4 
through 6). The reference outcome for the multinomial logistic models is “strategic 
nonuse,” and compared outcome levels are other nonuse (named “sleeping”), internal 
commercialization, and external commercialization. The four outcomes compared satisfy 
the IIA assumption as shown by the Small-Hsiao tests. Also, both Wald and Likelihood-
ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that strategic nonuse can be combined with any other 
outcome categories. This indicates that strategic nonuse patents are not only a meaningful 
category theoretically but also a valid category empirically. Indeed, the multinomial 
logistic regression reveals several important aspects to further our understanding on the 
drivers of strategic nonuse patents. For example, by treating strategic nonuse distinctively 
                                                 
66 We estimated all models twice using the two dependent variables. All the estimations did not show 
notable differences between two definitions, except for the capital intensity in the probit regressions. So we 
report the estimations based on the narrowly defined strategic nonuse as a standard.  
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from internal use, we could better understand the diverging effects of firm assets and 
patent effectiveness on them. By treating strategic nonuse distinctively from external use, 
we could test the bargaining failure arguments. Furthermore, the multinomial logistic 
regression reveals the distinctive effects of the technology development cycle on strategic 
nonuse compared to nonuse and internal use as well as external use. All estimated models 
show acceptable range of goodness-of-fit statistics (log likelihood and chi-square 
statistics are reported at the bottom of the table). In order to check the effects of dummy-
coding of one of the independent variables (capital intensity), we ran the models for the 
complete set of the sample after removing the observations missing the capital intensity. 
There is no change in the basic relationship from the presented models. 
 
Turning to our central variables of interest, as expected from Hypothesis 1a, capital 
intensity is significantly and positively associated with the propensity of strategic nonuse 
when it is broadly defined (column 7). As the capital intensity increases by $1 million 
above its mean, the probability of a patent being strategic nonuse increases by 17.1 
percentage points holding all the other variables at their means or modes. However, when 
using the narrow definition of strategic nonuse, the relationship turns marginally 
insignificant (but still keeping its sign positive). So we have limited support for 
Hypothesis 1a. Looking at the result of multinomial regressions, while the distinctive 
impact of capital intensity on the strategic use against sleeping patents is not clear 
(column 4), it is distinctive against “internal use” (column 5). Compared to internal 
commercialization, increase of the capital intensity by $1 million above its mean lowers 
the probability of strategic nonuse by 46.3 percentage points, holding all the other 
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variables at their means or modes.67 These results, in combination, make two 
interpretations possible. First, if we assume that even sleeping patents may play some 
protective roles, then we cannot tell whether the effects of capital intensity on strategic 
nonuse are related to the protective reason or to the use-suppressing reason. Second, if we 
assume no protective roles of sleeping patents, then our results imply that we cannot 
confirm the existence of protective roles of strategic nonuse patents, either. In this case 
the reason capital intensive firms file more strategic nonuse patents is more likely 
because they are left out of the internal commercialization process. In other words, 
although many strategic nonuse patents in capital intensive firms are internally 
commercializable, the higher level of costs integrating them into larger and probably 
more complex plants and facilities had suppressed their uses. So the latter case will be a 
byproduct of ordinary innovation activities. 
 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1b, the estimates of patent stock are significant and positive. 
This effect is net of firm size because we separately control firm size. The results read 
that firms having larger technological assets to protect are more likely to have strategic 
nonuse patents. Looking at the multinomial logit models, patent stock has a significant 
and positive impact on the propensity of strategic nonuse compared to internal 
commercialization (column 5) but no significant impact compared to sleeping patents or 
external commercialization (columns 4 and 6). This indicates that, similar to the 
                                                 
67 The main results are robust against missing values of this variable. A multinomial logistic regression run 
after excluding the missing values on the capital intensity shows no notable differences from the main 
results in signs, magnitude, and significance of coefficients on the key variables. Also, the relationships of 
the dependent variable and other key independent variables are held when the capital intensity variable is 
dropped from the regression.  
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arguments we made for capital intensity, we cannot isolate the protective effects from the 
use-suppression effects. 
 
Finally, our bargaining failure and dominant design hypothesis is well supported by the 
empirical estimation. The coefficient on component familiarity is highly significant (at 
1% level) and negative in binomial probit models (column 3 and 7). We tested whether 
the relationship is curvilinear by including a square term of component familiarity. Our 
data do not confirm the curvilinear relationship. In multinomial logit models, the 
propensity of both plain nonuse and any commercial uses increases as the familiarity with 
technological components increases. Comparing the coefficients on component 
familiarity for internal use (column 5) and for external use (column 6), the impact of 
component familiarity is larger between strategic nonuse and external use than between 
strategic nonuse and internal use. This supports the bargaining failure argument. On the 
other hand, the propensity of sleeping patents also increases as technology becomes more 
familiar, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the component 
familiarity in column 4. This observation bears an important policy implication. As 
technology becomes mature and, thus, widely diffused, building patent thickets or fences 
will be less attractive than commercial use or even plain nonuse. This is because, on one 
hand, reduced technological uncertainty promotes technology transactions and, on the 
other hand, protective effectiveness of either a blocking or fencing patent will decrease as 
the claimable property rights become limited. Conversely, strategic nonuse is more likely 
to be chosen in emerging technologies. This corroborates the evolutionary explanation of 
technological advances in which the rents from innovation in the emerging phase of 
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technology should depend largely on technologically advanced design. Strategic nonuse 
patents thus play a particularly important rent-protecting role in the design competition 
before a dominant design appears and competition shifts to price competition.  
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Table 14.2 Probit and multinomial logistic estimates of determinants of strategic 
nonuse 
 Probit Multinomial logistic  Probit 
  
Add patent 
effectiveness (reference=strategic nonuse)   
  base 
survey 
measure 
CMS 
measure sleeping internal external 
Broad 
definition 
Main variables        
  0.016** -0.027* -0.036** -0.024 0.012* Patent effectiveness 
(CMS)   (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.007) 
  -0.248 0.735** 0.135 0.555 -0.113 Dummy for missing 
patent effectiveness   (0.161) (0.340) (0.337) (0.376) (0.139) 
 0.266        Appropriability of 
patents  (0.205)        
0.415 0.390 0.409 0.018 -2.257** -0.852 0.567* Capital intensity 
(0.324) (0.325) (0.329) (0.647) (0.952) (1.008) (0.307) 
0.050 0.037 0.181 -0.568* -0.295 -0.042 0.109 Dummy for missing 
capital intensity (0.150) (0.151) (0.160) (0.335) (0.323) (0.391) (0.144) 
0.056** 0.057** 0.059** -0.059 -0.142*** -0.087 0.041* Ln(patent stock) 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.049) (0.047) (0.064) (0.022) 
-1.061** -0.938** -1.108*** 2.075** 1.582* 2.787*** -1.203*** Component 
familiarity (0.413) (0.406) (0.413) (0.812) (0.846) (0.841) (0.428) 
Controls        
-0.056 -0.052 -0.029 0.008 0.067 0.283 0.098 Fragmentation index 
(0.165) (0.164) (0.164) (0.329) (0.319) (0.434) (0.152) 
0.250 0.236 0.270 -0.765* -0.072 -1.218*** 0.190 Large firm 
(0.185) (0.185) (0.188) (0.408) (0.390) (0.434) (0.158) 
-0.156 -0.150 -0.131 -0.270 0.539* -0.254 -0.115 Inventor in 
manufacturing unit (0.164) (0.164) (0.167) (0.391) (0.320) (0.450) (0.151) 
-0.110 -0.111 -0.122 0.424** 0.015 0.456* 0.064 Competence-
destroying invention (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.185) (0.175) (0.234) (0.082) 
0.020 0.070 0.030 0.044 -0.037 -0.283 -0.024 Complexity of 
product technology (0.115) (0.120) (0.114) (0.235) (0.225) (0.295) (0.104) 
0.029* 0.028* 0.031** -0.051 -0.062** -0.020 0.013 Breadth of openness 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039) (0.015) 
-0.028 -0.024 -0.030 -0.162 0.140 0.176 -0.078 Diversity index of 
collaboration (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.128) (0.117) (0.132) (0.054) 
-0.182*** -0.181*** -0.183*** 0.043 0.454*** 0.608*** -0.184*** Technological value 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.094) (0.089) (0.119) (0.040) 
0.266*** 0.268*** 0.283*** -0.273 -0.602*** -0.818*** 0.199** No immediate 
demand (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.204) (0.204) (0.282) (0.096) 
0.316 0.299 0.268 0.087 -1.382** -0.438 0.354 % Basic R&D (/100) 
(0.251) (0.249) (0.250) (0.466) (0.538) (0.671) (0.234) 
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Table 14.2 (continued)       
-0.176** -0.170* -0.297*** 0.483** 0.626*** 0.348 -0.218** Product invention 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.107) (0.216) (0.212) (0.259) (0.095) 
-0.304 -0.296 -0.346 0.812* 0.541 0.734 -0.336* Man-month 
(normalized) (0.222) (0.223) (0.226) (0.465) (0.460) (0.557) (0.203) 
0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.085 0.049 -0.009 -0.028 Number of inventors 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.052) (0.044) (0.063) (0.023) 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.011 -0.030 0.006 Complexity of 
technology (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.012) 
0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 Number of citations 
to the U.S. patents (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 Number of claims 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.013 -0.002 Age of invention 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) 
-0.190 -0.202 -0.164 0.154 0.475 0.235 -0.046 Semiconductor 
industry (0.188) (0.189) (0.191) (0.391) (0.383) (0.499) (0.164) 
-0.249* -0.138 -0.174 0.142 0.322 0.566 -0.071 Electrical 
engineering (0.134) (0.157) (0.139) (0.286) (0.276) (0.350) (0.127) 
0.014 0.068 0.024 -0.046 0.054 -0.056 0.072 Chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals (0.152) (0.154) (0.150) (0.301) (0.299) (0.372) (0.137) 
-0.195 -0.105 -0.193 0.195 0.455 0.433 -0.057 Process eng, special 
equipment (0.155) (0.168) (0.156) (0.316) (0.312) (0.400) (0.140) 
0.033 0.117 0.059 -0.318 0.197 -0.885* -0.209 Mechanical eng, 
machinery (0.160) (0.172) (0.160) (0.337) (0.306) (0.453) (0.152) 
0.210 0.244 0.274 -1.963** 0.083 -0.428 -0.096 Consumer goods & 
Construction (0.270) (0.270) (0.275) (0.876) (0.497) (0.670) (0.265) 
-0.910** -2.005** -1.474*** 2.341** 1.439 -0.676 -0.815** Constant 
(0.413) (0.924) (0.473) (0.992) (0.940) (1.209) (0.415) 
N 1241 1241 1241 1241 1241 
Log Likelihood -533.35 -532.65 -529.75 -1462.90 -669.39 
Wald chi2 77.04 77.90 81.98 273.28 76.12 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.071 0.077 0.097 0.061 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Turning to the control variables, patents with higher technology values are less likely to 
be used for strategic defensive purpose. Patents without immediate business demands are 
more likely to be used for strategic defensive purpose. Consistent with conventional 
wisdom, these effects are relative to commercially used patents rather than to other 
nonuse patents, as clearly indicated by a significant relationship with uses but no 
significant relationship with other nonuse in the multinomial regressions.  
 
Interestingly, strategic nonuse patents are more likely to be linked to the existing 
capabilities of firms than other nonuse patents or externally commercialized patents, as 
indicated by positive and significant coefficients on competence-destroying invention for 
sleeping and external patents in the multinomial regressions. A similar pattern is shown 
for the firm size. The coefficients on large firms are significant and negative for both 
sleeping and external commercialization in the multinomial regressions. According to 
these two factors, strategic nonuse and internal commercialization strategy share 
similarities. Both uses of patents are more favored by large firm and less linked to 
competence-destroying inventions.  
 
The variables controlling for the strength of patents at patent level do not show 
significant relationship with the propensity of strategic nonuse. In columns 2 through 7, 
we additionally controlled for the appropriability regime. In column 2, we control the 
strength of patent for appropriating innovation constructed from the survey. This variable 
is aggregated in 30 technology classes. We expect that the higher the strength, the higher 
the propensity of strategic nonuse because the protective value of patents will be higher. 
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This variable is positively associated, but not significantly, with the propensity of 
strategic nonuse. This may be attributed to the measurement error. The variable is 
constructed from the assessment from the respondents who answered that they used the 
patents for internal commercialization. This limitation may distort the overall 
effectiveness of patents for appropriating innovation. Hence, we tested an alternative 
measure. The patent effectiveness measure provided in the Carnegie Mellon survey 
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) was well examined in the literature and showed 
consistent results. We matched the CMS patent effectiveness measure to the primary 
industry classification (NAICS). In column 2, it shows significant and positive 
association with strategic nonuse, as expected. Also, the effects are particularly distinct 
against sleeping and internally commercialized patents as indicated by the multinomial 
regressions in columns 4 and 5. This is consistent with conventional wisdom that stronger 
patents have a larger impact on protective use and uses through contracting. 
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CHAPTER 15. Conclusion to Part III 
 
 
 
This study reveals an empirical reality on the strategic use of patents. In the first part, we 
reported findings on the strategic use of patents using a recently collected survey to the 
U.S. inventors. This study shows that a significant portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed 
for strategic reasons, including blocking, preventing invention-around, player, and fence 
strategies. We also found that characteristics of technology and firms are significantly 
associated with different strategies. In particular, confirming findings from Cohen et al., 
player strategy is favored in complex technologies while fence strategy in discrete 
technologies. In addition, we found that large firms adopt player strategy more than small 
and medium firms.  
 
In the second part, we hypothesized that strategic nonuse was driven by several factors 
related to a firm’s financial and technological assets and technology characteristics. As 
our results indicate, firms are more likely to use a patent for strategic defensive purposes 
when they have valuable downstream assets. The size of technological assets, as 
measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also drives non-practicing strategic 
patents. The asset protective roles of patents were previously argued by Hall & Zidonis 
(2001; Ziedonis, 2004). This study is different from their studies in at least two points: 
first, instead of looking at patent intensity, we directly test the impact of assets on the 
presence of non-practicing strategic patents compared to other types of use. Second, we 
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examine the phenomenon across multiple sectors. Third, we showed that, not as well as 
capital assets, technological assets (patent stock) are also an important determinant of 
strategic use of patents. This finding is not free from caveats. Strategy of patent use (or 
nonuse) should depend on management direction of firms and industry dynamics as well 
as technology characteristics. Future research that incorporates these firm- and industry-
specific factors into analysis would advance our understanding on this important 
phenomenon.  
 
As technology matures and becomes more familiar, the propensity of strategic nonuse 
decreases because of increased propensity of commercial use. The increased commercial 
use of mature technology is driven by the nature of innovation (more incremental 
innovation) but also driven by lowered technological uncertainty. The latter has a greater 
impact on the external path of commercialization.  
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CHAPTER 16.  Conclusions 
 
 
 
16.1. Summary of Findings 
 
In Part I, we examined the effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and 
firm capabilities on the commercial uses of patented inventions. We found supporting 
evidence for the arguments that the patented inventions in mature technology are more 
likely to find a path to commercial applications because of a favorable selection 
environment of technology and lower uncertainty linked to the general characteristics of 
mature technology. In addition, the study shows that the impact of component familiarity 
on commercialization is stronger for complex technologies. We also argued that the 
patented inventions from capital-intensive firms are less likely to commercialize because 
of the presence of alternative competitive advantage, progressively increasing 
organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value of patents than the benefits 
from commercialization. Our empirical estimations based on the U.S. inventor survey 
support these arguments.  
 
In Part II, we examined the impact of technological uncertainty, strong internal 
complementary assets position, characteristics of knowledge search, and collaboration on 
the organizational path of commercialization. Based on Teece’s framework on the 
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profitability of innovation, we synthesized various theories to explain why firms choose 
different organizational paths in the downstream commercialization process. We found 
that technological uncertainty lowered the friction of market transactions of technology 
and, hence, favored external paths. The main argument of this hypothesis is borrowed 
from TCE but also linked to the evolutionary explanation of technological development. 
Stage of technological development, technological uncertainty, and profitability of 
innovation are interrelated with each other. 
 
As Teece argued and many following studies showed, a strong internal position for 
complementary assets have a strong positive impact on the internal commercialization 
paths. Also, as Tushman and Anderson argued, we found that there was a strong 
organizational inertia for a firm to tend to keep doing what it had been doing. This 
implies that firms’ development capability would have a strong path dependency and, 
therefore, may well fall into the competence trap (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and 
March, 1988).   
 
Departing from Teece, we argue that openness of innovation processes and network 
relationship should affect the choice of commercialization paths. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, empirical results show that external knowledge from industrial nature 
increases the propensity of internal commercialization. Proximity of industrial knowledge 
to specific industrial problems and a tendency to require more hands-on knowledge 
typically acquired from field experience would cohere authoritative controls more 
efficiently than distributed controls across firm boundaries. As hinted by KBV, internal 
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synergy of this type of technology is expected to be higher. Our analysis also indicates 
that collaboration has diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths. While 
collaboration with firms in vertical relationships tends to favor the internal paths, 
collaboration with firms in horizontal relationships tends to favor the external paths.  
 
Finally, in Part III, we reported findings on the strategic use of patents and then tested 
hypotheses about factors driving strategic nonuse. This study shows that a significant 
portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed for strategic reasons, including blocking, 
preventing invention-around, player, and fence strategies. We also found that 
characteristics of technology and firms are significantly associated with different 
strategies. In particular, confirming findings from Cohen et al., the player strategy is 
favored in complex technologies, while the fence strategy is favored in discrete 
technologies. In addition, we found that large firms adopt the player strategy more than 
small and medium firms. As our regression results indicate, firms are more likely to use a 
patent for strategic defensive purposes when they have valuable downstream assets. The 
size of technological assets, as measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also 
drives strategic nonuse. As technology matures and becomes more familiar, the 
propensity of strategic nonuse decreases because of increased propensity of commercial 
use. The increased commercial use of mature technology is driven by the nature of 
innovation (more incremental innovation) but also driven by lowered technological 
uncertainty. 
 
Table 16.1 summarizes the findings. 
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Table 16.1 Summary of the results 
Theory (Key literature) Measures Commercial-ization 
External 
commerciali
-zation 
Strategic 
nonuse 
Assets/ firm size 
(Schumpeter, Mkt4T, Hall & Ziedonis) 
Capital intensity 
Patent stock 
Small 
Small 
Small 
Not sig 
Large 
Large 
Dominant design (Utterback, Dosi) & 
TCE / Bargaining failure (Merges) Technology familiarity + + - 
Favorable selection environment of 
mature technologies 
(Nelson & Winter) 
Technology familiarity ? N/A N/A 
TCE 
(Mkt4T; Patent strength @ pat level) 
Number of different USPC’s; Number 
of claims Not sig Not sig Not sig 
Co-specialized assets Manufacturing unit Competence-enhancing 
+ 
N/A 
- 
- 
Not sig 
Not sig 
Open innovation 
(von Hippel, Chesbrough, Laursen & 
Salter, KBV) 
Importance of external knowledge Industrial Public + 
Networks/Alliance 
(Powell, Uzzi, March, Rothaermel) Inventive collaboration + Horizontal Not sig 
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16.2. Contribution to the Field 
 
This study examines the commercialization process of innovation. It shows that the 
innovation process is determined by multi-level factors at different levels (such as 
evolutionary stage of technological development at macro level, firm capabilities at 
organizational level, and various factors at project/invention level) and across 
organizational boundaries. Also, it casts doubts on the validity of using patents as a proxy 
for innovativeness. A majority of patented inventions are used for innovation, but a 
significant portion of them are also used for strategic purposes, which may have some 
anti-innovative effects. Moreover, our empirical estimations show that a larger patent 
stock of a firm raises the probability of strategic uses rather than commercial uses. This 
implies that it would be misleading to measure innovativeness using the number of 
patents if their actual uses are not properly considered.  
 
This study clearly shows the usefulness of project-level data in understanding innovation. 
The results from the study are based on a novel and rich data set covering a broad set of 
covariates at technology, firm, invention, and project levels. We show that invention- and 
project-level factors are indeed significant determinants of the uses of their outputs. In 
particular, detailed information on the nature, organizational background, knowledge 
flows, and the uses of inventions are shown important in understanding innovation. 
Patent publications also provide this information, but they are in many cases limited or 
incomplete. Despite their own weaknesses, large-scale surveys on innovation and 
invention will be a promising vehicle that can lead us to better understanding innovation.  
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The study has some theoretical implications. It shows that theoretical constructs from the 
evolutionary explanation of technology development (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 
1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994) and Teece’s dominant design 
explanation have some explanatory power in the uses of patented invention and 
profitability of innovations. In particular, we take a measure of a degree to which a field 
of technology is populated with patents as a proxy of maturity of a technology field. 
Furthering the arguments that relate this construct to search the behavior of entities 
(Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), we proposed a novel explanation how this 
construct can affect a selection environment of technology adoption. Our estimations, 
however, do not directly test the validity of this argument because this construct is 
confounded, both theoretically and empirically, with transaction cost effects. 
Nevertheless, general characteristics of a mature technology (or post-dominant design 
stage) such as lower technological uncertainty as suggested by evolutionary economists 
of technological advance seem to have empirical validity when plugged into a transaction 
cost explanation.  
 
Previous innovation surveys reported that non-patent appropriability means are heavily 
utilized by firms (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). This study 
suggests that strong ownership of alternative non-patent appropriability means (e.g., 
higher dependence on capital assets) may direct the inventions (patents) of commercial 
potential toward hindering the innovation of others. Then stacking of sitting-on or 
strategic nonuse patents will reinforce the appropriability of non-patent appropriability 
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means. So appropriability means are not independent from each other but mutually 
influencing. This observation suggests that the appropriability means may be not only 
endogenous within a regime of appropriability as claimed by Dosi et al. (2006) but also 
affected by other appropriability conditions. 
 
By examining the multifaceted aspects of the organizational trajectory of 
commercializing patented inventions, this study sheds new light on innovation theory, 
organizational theory, open innovation, and network perspectives of innovation. In 
particular, building on Teece’s framework about strategy for profiting from innovation, it 
shows that institutional aspects, including social relationship and knowledge exchange, 
should be regarded as important and independent factors affecting innovation. It also 
discusses a less-attended element of Teece’s framework: dominant design or 
technological cycle.  
 
First, we confirm that strong internal position for downstream complementary assets 
favor an internal commercialization strategy. In explaining the relationship between 
strong coupling with internal complementary assets and vertical integration of 
downstream commercialization processes, we enriched the discourse by synthesizing 
theoretical implications from TCE and KBV of a firm. The inventions coming out of 
strong coupling with firm-specific co-specialized assets will be more bound to the firm-
specific assets and retain a higher level of asset specificity between the research and 
commercialization process. More flavors of firm-specific elements in inventions will 
lower internal management costs required for coordinating two processes and increase 
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the costs of switching to external suppliers. This is an explanation based on TCE. KBV 
emphasizes the prospective aspect. The learning curve advantage and internal 
coordination attained through the coupling process during the invention process will 
provide a higher change of internal synergy. Both theories predict the positive 
relationship between strong internal coupling with complementary assets and vertical 
integration of downstream commercialization processes. As Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
claimed, TCE and KBV may explain the same phenomenon from different sides. 
Considering both theoretical implications will provide a more comprehensive 
understanding. Apart from the theoretical elaboration to synthesize two complementary 
theories, this finding contributes to the Teecian framework of profitability of innovation 
and arguments of markets for technology by providing a direct test of the effects of co-
specialized complementary assets on a choice of commercialization paths. One avenue of 
future research will be looking at how the effects of co-specialized assets on 
commercialization paths are moderated by the characteristics of technology (e.g., general 
purpose v. specialized) or by the stage of the technology-development cycle. Our 
conjecture is that the impact of co-specialized assets on the choice of commercialization 
paths will be weaker for general-purpose invention or in mature technology.  
 
Second, we confirm that TCE provides valid explanations in the governance structure of 
downstream assets. While most TCE arguments give attention to make-or-buy decisions, 
we extended them to integrate-or-sell decisions in an innovation context and provided 
empirical evidence conforming to theoretical explanation. However, as TCE literature 
admits, operationalizing TCE constructs is indeed difficult. For example, our 
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technological uncertainty measure, component familiarity, does not precisely isolate TCE 
constructs but is confounded with effects from the technological cycle. 
 
Third, this study reveals the importance of an institutional approach in understanding 
innovation. Furthermore, proceeding one step further from the open innovation 
arguments, it shows that the nature of external knowledge should be taken into 
consideration in studying innovation. The previous empirical studies focused on how 
broadly or deeply firms sourced external knowledge and how they affected intermediate 
output of the innovation process or firm performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen 
and Salter, 2006). In doing so, they did not turn their attention to the qualitative 
differences of sourced knowledge. Other studies examined a limited number of leading 
firms to show how they had successfully utilized some types of external knowledge for 
innovation (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; von Hippel, 1988). This study attempts to 
overcome the weaknesses of both studies by examining the impact of different types of 
external knowledge in a large-scale, cross-industry sample. Furthermore, it reveals not 
only that the different nature of external knowledge has a different impact on innovation, 
but also that it would be bound to a different commercialization strategy. While external 
industrial knowledge is conducive to internal commercialization, external public 
knowledge spawns external commercialization. Or, the other way around, firms that 
chose an internal integration strategy would have sought more industrial knowledge, 
while firms that chose to provide their inventions to external parties for 
commercialization might have resorted more on public knowledge. Certainly, the analysis 
leaves more questions open to be answered. Although we tried to justify distinctiveness 
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between external industrial and public knowledge in the context of mode of 
commercialization both theoretically and empirically, it still leaves ambiguity in concepts 
and measurement. First, it overlaps with basic-applied distinction. We argued that they 
were different because external public sources can deliver an applied type of knowledge, 
and external industrial sources can deliver basic type of knowledge. We also controlled 
for the elements of an R&D project. We suggested that, separate from the basic-applied 
type, technological fitness, learning-curve effects, and inclusions of organizational 
routines are some discriminating characteristics of this distinction. However, they need to 
be better articulated in the practical context. Second, external public knowledge is 
confounded with the maturity of the field of technology as we discussed in Part II. This 
also contributes to the ambiguity. In summary, further research on the characteristics, 
drivers, and impact of the different types of knowledge is required.   
 
Fourth, this study shows that collaborative networks, net of knowledge flows, influence 
the organizational trajectory of commercialization. Furthermore, it shows that relative 
position of the innovator in the network is indeed an important predictor of the trajectory. 
By the relative position in the network, we do not mean the structural or topological 
relations that many studies of networks focus on (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004) but the 
relative positions in the value chain or in competitive relations in the product markets. 
Previous studies argued why particular ties affect the firm or innovation performance 
(Afuah, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). This 
study contributes to the field by arguing and showing that firms utilize different types of 
networks for different innovation strategies. As a novel contribution, it shows that 
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perspectives on collaborative networks have unique explanatory powers in the region that 
TCE cannot address. Where technological uncertainty is high, collaboration has a 
stronger impact on the choice of organizational paths of the downstream process of 
innovation. This finding empirically corroborates Granovetter’s and Powell’s 
(Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990) arguments that economic theories alone are 
incomplete in explaining social behavior so that network perspectives can complement 
them.   
 
Fifth, the estimations of Part III indicate that firms are more likely to use a patent for 
strategic defensive purposes when they have valuable downstream assets. The size of 
technological assets, as measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also drives 
non-practicing strategic patents. The asset protective roles of patents were previously 
argued by Hall and Ziedonis (2001; Ziedonis, 2004). This study is different from their 
studies in at least two points: first, instead of looking at patent intensity, we directly test 
the impact of assets on the presence of non-practicing strategic patents compared to other 
types of use. Second, we examine the phenomenon across multiple sectors. Third, we 
showed that, not as well as capital assets, technological assets (patent stock) are also an 
important determinant of strategic use of patents. This finding is not free from caveats. 
Strategy of patent use (or nonuse) should depend on management direction of firms and 
industry dynamics as well as technology characteristics. Future research that incorporates 
these firm- and industry-specific factors into analysis would advance our understanding 
on this important phenomenon. 
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16.3. Limitations 
 
This study is not free from limitation. First, uses of patents are identified from the input 
from one of the inventors. Although the survey is directed to the lead inventor, who we 
assumed to be better informed than other inventors of uses as well as technological 
contents of the inventions, some of them may not care about the commercialization 
process and possibly provided inaccurate answers or responded “don’t know” to the 
survey. If this is random with regard to our variables of interest, then it will not cause a 
bias in the estimation. The worst case is that the inventors belonging to an organization in 
which innovation labor is well distributed across the organization (e.g., large firms) tend 
to be more ignorant of the downstream processes. Indeed, the proportion of those 
answering “don’t know” to the use questions are higher for large firms in the survey. 
Although we showed that this self-selection effect did not result in a significantly biased 
estimation for our analyses, a better and more accurate measure can be obtained by cross-
validating the data by additionally asking R&D or IP managers of firms.  
 
Second, we included a broad set of covariates at technology, firm, invention, and project 
levels. However, we could not control firm-specific effects. Individual firms may have 
different commercialization strategies or managerial tendencies. We could not fully 
control these firm-specific effects because our data set was cross-sectional. Constructing 
panel data for the uses of patented inventions at the scale of this study will demand huge 
resources that may not be mobilized by a small group of researchers. However, as 
national longitudinal surveys in education show, coherent longitudinal surveys on 
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innovation will substantially advance our understanding of innovation, we believe. 
Otherwise, a detailed case study for the limited set of firms will populate the gap. 
 
Third, the study does not directly test implications from product market characteristics or 
industry structure. Instead, it controls broad industry areas and the characteristics of 
technology fields. Licensing literature argues that some industry and product market 
aspects, such as the level of competition or the level of product differentiation, should 
affect the licensing propensity (Arora, 1997). Also, fuller understanding of external 
commercialization will be possible when we can consider dyadic relationships as well as 
aspects of financial markets, which we could not address in the study. Although we 
control some of these effects by including industry dummies, there may still remain some 
unobserved heterogeneity.    
 
Fourth, the sample of this study is composed of the U.S. patents whose equivalents were 
also filed in the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office. The additional 
costs incurred by filing and maintaining patents in multiple jurisdictions affect the sample 
characteristics in two different ways. First, because small and medium firms are relatively 
weakly positioned in financial status compared to large firms, they may have been 
underrepresented in this sampling frame than the sample composed of the patents filed in 
a single jurisdiction. Second, the additional costs may have the effect of raising the 
threshold of patenting to sieve out low-quality patents.   
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Fifth, this study does not address which types of patent uses or nonuses are desirable, or 
the impact of commercialization on firm performance or economy. We did not examine 
the amount of private or social benefits attached to each mode of patent use. We 
presented a survey result about inventors’ assessment of economic value of several types 
of nonuse in Table 13.3 and Table 13.4. However, this analysis is far from a 
comprehensive analysis from which we can draw a meaningful normative conclusion. 
The limitations come from weaknesses of measurement and analysis. First, inventors may 
not be in the best position to assess the economic value of their patented inventions. 
Indeed, assessing the economic value of a patented invention is not an easy task, 
especially if the invention is part of a complex product. This is why the controversy about 
the damage awards for an infringed patent is so sharply divided and equally weighed in 
the current debate of the patent reform. However, R&D managers or IP managers may be 
better positioned to know about it. Second, economic value needs to be defined in a more 
accurate way. Is it private economic value or aggregate social value? One way to assess 
(minimum) private economic value is to use patent renewal information. Another way is 
to look at performance in the product markets or stock markets. One type of social value 
can be captured by tracking how the patented invention contributes to developing future 
technology. Tracking citations to the focal patent by subsequent patents can be a measure 
of this type of social value. On top of better measures of value or performance, then we 
can examine how each mode of use (especially non-practicing strategic patents) affect the 
private and social value, on one hand, and how they are conditioned on a variety of 
factors including characteristics and maturity of technology or firm capabilities. This will 
be a promising avenue for future research. 
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16.4. Managerial Implications 
Some managerial implications on innovation strategy can be derived from this study. 
Managers in the firms targeting for integrating inventions into their internal production 
capabilities may need to give attention to the following aspects of the invention process. 
First, a tight link to firms’ existing downstream assets will help. Involving the field 
engineers working for manufacturing process in the invention process will be one way to 
do that. 
 
Second, when firms’ value chains are disintegrated, collaboration with participants of the 
value chain such as suppliers or customers will help.  
 
Third, coping with technological developments made by other firms and proactively 
absorbing them will help in commercializing the inventions. In this sense firms need to 
bolster competitive intelligence on technological trends of industry. Participating in 
industry forums/fairs or regular conversation with suppliers over technological issues will 
work.  
 
For the firms targeting external commercialization paths, the following strategies in the 
early stage of the innovation process will be worth considering. First, firms should 
evaluate the general level of demands for the technology and the level of potential users’ 
understanding the technology. Working on mature technology will be a safe choice. 
Incorporating publicly available knowledge into inventions will be another way. 
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Second, collaboration with potential users of the technology will be crucial. In particular, 
firms in horizontal relationships may already have an interest in the technology. 
Collaboration with them will probably make the invention process more efficient because 
of aligned goals and shared knowledge and, moreover, foster a trust relationship to make 
cooperation in the later stage of innovation easier. Especially in emerging technologies, 
horizontal collaboration will be more effective in commercializing the resultant invention 
over the networks of firms. 
 
Third, new companies will have to give more attention to public knowledge and such 
technologies that are not tightly linked to the existing capabilities of the incumbents. 
 
16.5. Policy Implications 
 
The study suggests some policy implications to promote external commercialization of 
inventions from our findings. First, we show that small firms are more likely than large 
firms to contribute to enlarging the market for technology.68 Enlarged markets for 
technology will bring many benefits to society by enabling knowledge exchange more 
fluidly across organizations and promoting R&D investment among small firms. Public 
policy promoting small firm innovations is therefore justified.   
 
                                                 
68 Recall that our estimation is based on “innovative” firms (see Section 4.1 for discussion of the sample). 
Accordingly, firms referred here, especially small firms, do not include non-innovative firms. 
 244
Second, we found that offering the patented inventions for external parties’ 
commercialization is not as popular in emerging technologies as in mature technologies. 
To make innovation systems more flexible and efficient, some policy measures that can 
promote knowledge dissemination in emerging technologies will be desirable.  
 
Third, corporate spin-offs are particularly specialized for competence-destroying 
innovation. This will be a blood vessel for economic evolution as noted by Schumpeter. 
To promote corporate spin-offs’ public knowledge is particularly important. Any policy 
to promote public knowledge will be beneficial. Furthermore, public knowledge will also 
increase the division of innovation labor by promoting the market for technology. 
Therefore, continuous support of the creation and dissemination of public knowledge will 
be essential to make the economy more lively and efficient.   
 
The study shows that patent thickets may decelerate as technologies mature. As a field of 
technology becomes mature and more populated with component technologies, 
inventions are more likely to be turned into commercial products and less likely to be 
strategically exploited. This implies that technology evolution may naturally dampen 
stacking-up of non-practicing strategic patents. On the other hand, emerging technologies 
will suffer more from stacking non-practicing strategic patents. This is a serious problem 
because competitions for design play a bigger role in emerging technologies than in 
mature technologies (Utterback, 1994). It is suggestive of the importance of asymmetric 
efforts to put the core inventions in emerging technologies in the public domain. 
Directing public funds and public organizations to conduct more research on emerging 
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technologies and to put their research results in the public domain (e.g., academic 
publications) will be one way to do this.  
 
Some implications to patent reforms in the United States can be also derived from this 
study. The study supports widely accepted beliefs of the importance of higher quality 
patents in innovation. Our results show that the higher the technological quality of patents, 
the more likely they will be to commercialize (especially externally) and the less likely be 
strategically used. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 pending in the United States Senate 
aims to raise patent quality by enhancing the USPTO examination process, allowing the 
public to engage in the examination process, expanding the existing inter partes 
reexamination process, and institutionalizing post-grant review procedures. This study 
does not provide direct answers to the points of technical discussions of the above 
proposal. However, it suggests that overall direction underlying these proposed changes 
to enhance the quality of patents is right and promotes innovation.   
 
In Part III, we show that the propensity of strategic exploitation, relative to plain nonuse 
or internal commercialization, is higher for those patents filed by firms from industries 
where patent protection is more effective. One element constituting the effectiveness of 
patent protection is the threat of litigation. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 proposes so-
called “apportionment-centric” damage awards, the gist of which is to restrict damage 
awards accompanying patent infringement to a portion of the total economic value of 
final products the infringed invention particularly contributes to. According to a survey 
conducted by Shane (2009), the proposed legislation will lower the damage awards by 
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about 30 percent. If this reduction results in a decrease of patent effectiveness, then the 
proposed change will have an effect on reducing strategic nonuse patents according to the 
empirical estimation of this study. However, the weakened patent effectiveness may also 
have a negative impact on external use of patents, including licensing as indicated by an 
insignificant difference in the coefficients on patent effectiveness between strategic 
nonuse and external use in the estimation of Table 14.2. Indeed, the advocates of the 
current system argue that reducing damage awards will shrink the market for technology 
and disincentivize investment in R&D. Total effects can be estimated only if the above 
two opposing effects are considered together along with the cost of litigation. Although 
further discussion goes beyond the scope of this study, let us finish this paragraph with 
one additional thought. Given that the current legal practices are inclined toward 
awarding “excessive” compensation to the litigants (Thomas, 2007), we doubt if the 
market for technology will really shrink simply by remedying this excessiveness. Of 
course, the infringer (or licensee) will be better positioned in litigation (or licensing 
deals) because of the reduced damage awards (or the reduced level of litigation risks), 
which, in turn, may make costly R&D investment less attractive to the patent holders. 
However, if the legal process removes only the excessive portion of compensation (which 
may be hard to accomplish in practice, especially in complex technologies), then the 
threat of litigation will be still present and the market for technology will be beneficial to 
both parties. 
 
If the proposed shift toward an apportionment-centric system of damages results in 
lowering strategic nonuse patents, the effects will be different between large and small 
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firms. The study shows that large firms (in terms of employees or capital/technological 
assets) are more likely than small or medium-sized firms to use patents for strategic 
purposes and less likely to commercialize them. If the protective (or assaultive) roles of 
patents decrease as the damage awards lower, the reduction of strategic nonuse patents 
will mostly come from large firms (or asset-intensive firms). Then, large firms will 
redirect R&D investment previously put into developing duplicative technologies to other 
productive activities, including developing innovative technologies. On the other hand, 
the thinner thickets may form a technological niche that can be exploited by small and 
medium firms. Certainly, relieving large firms of the burden of maintaining excessive 
amounts of nonuse patents may make them more efficient and result in strengthening 
their advantage in technological leadership to stifle small and medium firms. However, 
this may not necessarily undermine social welfare.  
 
As a way to reduce potential negative effects of non-practicing strategic patents, one may 
propose a “compulsory licensing” by which the owner of the non-practicing patents 
possessing a high potential for social benefits is forced to license them to a certain entity, 
which satisfies a certain condition. The compulsory licensing is deeply rooted in the 
tradition of intellectual property rights. The Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (in short, the Paris Convention), effective in 1883 and revised for the 
last time in 1979, states in Article 5. A (2) that “Each country of the Union shall have the 
right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to 
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred 
by the patent, for example, failure to work.” In its legal implementation, it has been 
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applied in a limited and cautious way. In the United States, only the patented inventions 
funded by the federal government are subject to compulsory licensing. The European 
Union articulates and restricts both the subject technology (i.e., “pharmaceutical 
products”) and beneficiaries (i.e., the manufacturer who export to countries with public 
health problems) in a very cautious way (Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006). Suppose that “a certain entity” in the 
proposal is an innovative small firm and “a certain condition” is commitment and ability 
to manufacture goods or services based on the licensed technology. For example, imagine 
a technology protected by a non-practicing patent is assessed to have a potential to 
enhance social welfare, but the owner of the patent refuses to license it or requires 
unrealistically high royalties without commercializing it himself. A compulsory licensing 
scheme then forces the owner to license the patent, at reasonable price, to innovative 
small firms who commit to making a socially beneficial product based on the patented 
technology and show an ability to complete the development projects. This proposal will 
have both pro-innovative and anti-innovative effects. Compulsory licensing may reduce 
patent abuse to promote innovation by putting in use the patents of wider social benefits. 
Indeed, a recent study by Moser and Voena (2009) shows that compulsory licensing of 
the foreign patents had a positive impact on domestic invention in the short-term. 
However, in the long-term, compulsory licensing may lower the value of patents and 
disincentivize an investment in innovation, which, resultantly, slows down innovation. In 
addition, expanding compulsory licensing to a wider range of products or territories 
requires a more cautious approach because of several practical problems. For example, in 
many cases, determining a threshold level of social benefits beyond which compulsory 
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licensing is eligible will be disputable. Furthermore, setting a reasonable licensing royalty 
is not an easy task either. Our analysis suggests that reduction of non-practicing strategic 
patents may largely come from large firms. However, it also shows that the value (either 
technological or economic) of non-practicing strategic patents is higher for small firms 
than for large firms (Table 13.4). Therefore, we cannot conclude whether the proposal 
will impact more on large firms or small firms based on our analysis. Before 
implementing this proposal, therefore, further research on both effects and practical 
issues mentioned above should cumulate. 
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APPENDIX A. Literature Review 
 
Table A. 1 Summary of empirical studies about licensing 
Paper Category Thesis/ Findings Country 
/industry 
Data/ methods 
(Arora, 1997) Determinants 
of licensing 
· Presence of specialized 
engineering-construction firms => 
increased licenses => lower entry 
barrier => induce large incumbents 
to license more 
· Licensing : industry structure 
o Presence of competing tech 
o # competing licensers 
· “licensing is most common in 
sectors with large scale production 
facilities, with relatively 
homogeneous products, and with a 
large number of new plants. It is 
less common in sectors marked by 
product differentiation, custom 
tailoring of products for customers, 
and small scales of production.” 
chemical · Historical 
industry case 
study 
(Bessy and 
Brousseau, 
1998) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· Horizontal agreements: market 
sharing; transactional contracts 
o K-commonality: more 
transactional 
· Vertical agreements: tech transfer; 
relational contracts 
France  
10 large 
firms 
 
· 10 Case studies 
· survey 
(Anand and 
Khanna, 2000) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· Prominent ind: Chemical, 
computer, elec 
· Robust cross-ind diff 
o Incidence of licensing 
o % ex-ante contracts 
o Exclusivity 
o % contracts among those w/ past 
dyadic relationship 
o # cross-licensing 
U.S. 
Firm 
level 
· Thompson SDC 
· 1612 Licensing 
contracts 1990-
93 
· Verified by 
Lexis-Nexis => 
1365 
· Compustat 
(firm size) 
(Gans, Hsu, 
and Stern, 
2002) 
 · Presence of patents: start-up is 
more likely to license to an 
incumbent rather than self-
commercializing 
USA · start-up 
commercializati
on strategy 
survey 
(Gans and 
Stern, 2003) 
Start-up 
comm. Vs. 
lic 
· Start-up strategy and interactions 
with incumbents 
· “crucial factor determining patterns 
of competitive interaction between 
start-up innovators and established 
firms is the presence or absence of 
a “market for ideas”” 
o Appropriability (excludability) 
conditions: type (e.g. patent or 
secrecy) rather than the level 
o Complementary assets 
 ·  
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Table A. 1 (continued)   
(Fosfuri, 
2004) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· Licensing tradeoff: “revenue 
effect” vs. “rent dissipation effect” 
· % licensing of a chemical firm 
o Quadratic(inverted-U) in # tech 
suppliers (competing tech) 
o (-) licensor’s market share 
o (-) Degree of product 
differentiation  
chemical · Large chemical 
firms 
· 1986-96 
(Kollmer and 
Dowling, 
2004) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· The importance of licensing 
decreases with the presence of 
alternative commercialization 
channels such as marketing and 
sales or offered services 
· presence of marketing and sales 
activities drives licensing non-core 
products 
USA/ bio · 70 
biopharmaceuti
cal firms 
· OLS, t-test 
(Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 
2006) 
 
Licensing 
propensity 
+ 
Patent 
propensity 
· Effectiveness of patent protection : 
licensing propensity (+) moderated 
by complementary assets 
 
Model: 
· DV: lic. Prop. & Pat. Prop. 
· IV: pat. Eff. 
· CA: R&D & manuf personnel 
interact daily 
· Controls: 
o BU size 
o Imp. Of Basic sci 
o Imp of Med sci 
o % R&D in basic sci 
o Tech competition (# rivals) 
o Ind fixed eff 
· Type org 
Firm 
level 
· CMS 
· 1991-93 
· OLS 
· GMM 
(Nagaoka and 
Kwon, 2006) 
x-licensing 
propensity 
· # cross-licensing 
o Patent > only know-how 
· X-lic/lic. 
o Firm size(empl, pats, R&D)” (+) 
o Symmetric firms: (+) 
Japan 
Manufact 
· 1144 lic 
contracts of 268 
firms 
· Nikkei EEDS 
· FY 1999 
(Kim and 
Vonortas, 
2006) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· # license agreements (all and non-
exclusive) 
o Current patent stock (+**) 
o Prior license (+**) 
o Patent intensity of industry (+**) 
o Complex industry (-) 
· # exclusive license 
o Complex industry (-**) 
· # cross-license 
o Prior license (+**) 
o Complex industry (+**) 
U.S. 
public 
firms 
 
· 9310 licensing 
agreements in 
90s 
· Random effects 
negative 
binomial 
estimation 
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Table A. 1 (continued)    
(Gans, Hsu, 
and Stern, 
2007) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
feature 
· Licensing propensity: patent grant 
(+) 
· The importance of a patent grant 
for licensing depends on the 
strategic environment in which the 
firm operates 
o Productivity efficiency effects 
(tech cycle) 
o reputation 
USA · 7649 licensing 
deals in the 90s 
· Cox 
proportional 
hazard rate 
models 
(Gambardella, 
Giuri, and 
Luzzi, 2007) 
Determinants 
of licensing 
· Willingness to license 
o Large and medium firm (-) 
o 4 digit IPC (+) 
o Knowledge from university (+) 
· Actual license 
o Large and medium firm (-) 
EU · PatVal-EU 
 
 
 
 
Table A. 2 Literature about knowledge characteristics and innovation 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measures of 
performance 
Variable Examined Effect 
Kogut 
and 
Zander 
(2003) 
General 
innovating 
firms 
(Sweden) 
Pooled 
cross 
section/ 
logit 
Knowledge 
transferred to wholly 
owned subsidiaries 
(=1) versus to a third 
party (licensed or 
joint ventures) 
Codifiability 
Teachability 
Complexity 
 
(all of these are constructed from 
multiple survey questions) 
-** 
-** 
+** 
Nerkar 
and 
Roberts 
(2004) 
Pharma-
ceutical 
Longitudi
nal/ firm-
fixed 
effects 
Total sales of a new 
product 
in its first full year on 
the market 
 
1. all products 
2. generic 
3. novel 
# of patents in the same 
therapeutic area as the new 
product for the past 10 yrs 
(proximal tech experience) 
 
# of patents in other 
therapeutic areas for the past 10 
yrs (distal tech experience) 
 
total product years of market 
experience in the focal 
therapeutic area (proximal 
market experience) 
 
total product years of market 
experience in other  therapeutic 
areas (distal market experience) 
+*** 
+ 
+*** 
 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+* 
+ 
 
 
+*** 
+*** 
+*** 
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Table A. 3 Empirical studies on knowledge sources and firm performance 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Measures of 
performance 
Variable Examined Effect 
(Cohen and 
Levinthal, 
1989, 1990) 
General Yale 
survey, 
FTC LoB/ 
Tobit, 
GLS 
Firm R&D intensity Importance of 
knowledge from: 
Users 
Suppliers 
Universities 
Governments 
 
 
++*** 
-*** 
+*** 
+ 
(Katila and 
Ahuja, 
2002) 
Global robotics 
industry (JP, US, 
EU) 
Panel 
/GEE 
Poisson 
Number of new 
products 
Search depth 
(repetition ratio of 
citation) 
 
Search scope (ratio of 
new citation) 
Invert-
U** 
 
 
+* 
Caloghirou, 
Kastelli, 
and 
Tsakanikas 
(2004) 
Food and beverage, 
Chemicals (w/o 
pharma), radio, 
television and 
communication 
equipment and 
apparatus, 
Telecommunication 
services, Computer 
and related 
activities  
Cross 
section/ 
OLS 
the percentage of 
firms’ sales that can 
be attributed to 
innovative products 
or services 
Patent databases 
 
scientific or 
business journals 
 
trade fairs and 
conferences 
 
reverse engineering 
 
the Internet 
-* 
 
+** 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
Laursen 
and Salter 
(2006) 
General (U.K.) Cross 
section/ 
tobit 
Fraction of firm’s 
innovative products 
to the world market 
Breadth: number of 
discrete knowledge 
sources (1-16) 
 
Depth: number of 
discrete knowledge 
sources that are highly 
exploited 
Invert-
U*** 
 
Invert-
U** 
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Table A. 4 Literature about knowledge sources and the choice of governance mode 
Author 
(Year) 
Industry Data/ 
Technique 
Choice of 
governance mode 
Variable Examined Effect 
Veugelers 
and 
Cassiman 
(1999) 
Manufacturing 
(Belgium) 
Cross 
section: 
multi-
nomial 
logit 
Of upstream 
innovation 
resources,  
1. make only 
2. buy only 
3. make and buy 
Information from 
competitors is 
important 
 
Information from 
internal sources is 
important 
-*** 
+*** 
+ 
 
-* 
-*** 
+** 
Fontana, 
Geuna, and 
Matt (2006) 
Food and beverage, 
Chemicals (w/o 
pharma), radio, 
television and 
communication 
equipment and 
apparatus, 
Telecommunication 
services, Computer 
and related 
activities 
Cross 
section/ 
negative 
binomial 
Propensity to 
participate in 
R&D 
collaboration with 
universities or 
PROs 
the mean of the 
percentage of new 
products and 
processes introduced 
in collaboration with 
external partners 
 
scientific 
and business journals 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+** 
 
 
Gambardella, 
Giuri, and 
Luzzi (2007) 
Cross-industry Pooled 
cross-
section/ 
Probit 
(selection) 
Willingness to 
license 
 
Actual license 
Knowledge from 
public research 
organization 
+*** 
 
+*** 
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APPENDIX B. Data Appendix for Part I 
 
Table A. 5 Correlation matrix for Part I (N=1239) 
1 Any commercialization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
2 Component familiarity 0.00 1.00                  
3 Capital intensity -0.14* -0.01 1.00                 
4 
Dummy for missing 
capital intensity 0.15* -0.03* -0.37* 1.00                
5 Large firm -0.10* -0.04* 0.22* -0.55* 1.00               
6 Ln(patent stock) -0.18* 0.01 0.28* -0.67* 0.59* 1.00              
7 
Inventor in 
manufacturing unit 0.10* -0.06* -0.03* 0.08* -0.07* -0.10* 1.00             
8 Industrial knowledge 0.14* -0.07* -0.05* 0.09* -0.06* -0.13* 0.05* 1.00            
9 Public knowledge -0.06* 0.11* -0.02* 0.03* -0.07* -0.05* -0.05* 0.42* 1.00           
10 
Dummy for 
collaboration 0.11* -0.03* -0.05* 0.13* -0.09* -0.17* -0.01 0.22* 0.14* 1.00          
11 Technological value 0.22* 0.00 -0.05* 0.12* -0.14* -0.16* 0.02 0.15* 0.21* 0.11* 1.00         
12 No immediate demand -0.09* 0.06* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 0.09* 0.00 0.07* 1.00        
13 % Basic R&D (/100) -0.09* 0.10* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04* 0.05* 0.24* 0.02 0.11* 0.12* 1.00       
14 Product invention 0.05* -0.04* -0.12* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03* -0.04* -0.04* -0.06* -0.04* -0.10* 1.00      
15 Man-month 0.05* 0.01 0.03* 0.03* -0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.14* 0.25* 0.11* 0.20* -0.03* 0.06* -0.08* 1.00     
16 Number of inventors 0.06* 0.04* 0.08* -0.05* 0.04* 0.09* -0.06* 0.07* 0.06* 0.02* 0.08* -0.03* 0.02* -0.05* 0.27* 1.00    
17 
Complexity of 
technology -0.03* 0.02* 0.13* -0.02 0.02* 0.00 -0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 0.00 0.08* -0.02* 0.01 -0.10* 0.04* 0.02* 1.00   
18 Number of claims 0.00 -0.06* -0.04* 0.07* -0.10* -0.10* -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.01 0.06* -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.09* 0.08* 1.00  
19 Age of invention 0.04* -0.01 -0.04* -0.06* 0.04* 0.05* 0.06* 0.04* 0.04* 0.01 -0.06* -0.03* -0.04* 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02* -0.06* 1.00 
20 Electrical engineering 0.00 0.07* -0.09* -0.06* 0.01 0.09* -0.06* -0.08* 0.03* -0.08* -0.04* 0.04* -0.01 0.03* -0.12* -0.12* -0.08* 0.00 0.08* 
21 Instruments -0.03* -0.03* -0.08* -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.05* 0.03* 0.04* 0.01 -0.02* -0.01 -0.05* 0.04* 0.02* 0.07* -0.12* 0.07* 0.04* 
22 Chemistry, pharma -0.05* 0.14* 0.20* 0.04* 0.01 -0.02* -0.07* 0.04* 0.15* -0.01 0.08* -0.01 0.15* -0.10* 0.17* 0.11* 0.26* -0.03* -0.07* 
23 Process eng 0.02* -0.07* 0.02* -0.01 0.02* -0.02* 0.06* 0.02 -0.10* 0.01 0.00 -0.03* -0.01 -0.12* 0.00 0.02* 0.05* -0.03* -0.02 
24 
Mechanical eng, 
machinery 0.03* -0.13* -0.04* 0.02* 0.03* -0.02 0.14* -0.05* -0.14* 0.06* -0.03* 0.03* -0.08* 0.11* -0.09* -0.08* -0.11* -0.04* -0.04* 
25 
Consumer & 
Construction 0.07* -0.06* -0.06* 0.11* -0.09* -0.09* 0.06* 0.10* -0.06* 0.05* 0.02 -0.07* -0.03* 0.09* 0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.05* -0.01 
* denotes 5% significance level 
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APPENDIX C.  Data Appendix for Part II 
 
Table A. 6 Correlation matrix for Part II (restricted sample, N=651) 
1 Internal commercialization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
2 
Inventor in manufacturing 
unit 0.09* 1.00                    
3 
Competence-destroying 
invention -0.11* -0.01 1.00                   
4 Component familiarity -0.12* -0.06* 0.02 1.00                  
5 Interaction (4*9) -0.10* -0.04* 0.05* 0.06* 1.00                 
6 Industrial knowledge 0.03* 0.02 0.11* -0.05* 0.06* 1.00                
7 Public knowledge -0.18* -0.06* 0.13* 0.11* 0.07* 0.47* 1.00               
8 Collaboration - vertical 0.05* 0.01 0.09* -0.08* 0.15* 0.28* 0.09* 1.00              
9 Collaboration - horizontal -0.11* -0.04* 0.07* -0.04* 0.71* 0.10* 0.09* 0.21* 1.00             
10 Collaboration - public -0.10* -0.02 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* 0.15* 0.38* 0.13* 0.13* 1.00            
11 Large firm 0.23* -0.10* -0.04* -0.04* 0.02 -0.01 -0.07* -0.02 0.02 -0.15* 1.00           
12 Ln(patent stock) 0.12* -0.11* -0.04* 0.01 -0.03* -0.11* -0.05* -0.14* -0.06* -0.12* 0.58* 1.00          
13 Technological value -0.13* -0.01 0.12* -0.01 -0.02 0.11* 0.18* 0.05* 0.00 0.08* -0.12* -0.13* 1.00         
14 No immediate demand 0.01 -0.04* -0.06* 0.01 -0.03* -0.01 0.10* 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.10* 1.00        
15 % Basic R&D (/100) -0.08* -0.05* 0.11* 0.04* 0.02 0.11* 0.26* 0.01 0.07* 0.14* -0.01 0.02 0.13* 0.11* 1.00       
16 Product invention 0.07* 0.01 -0.05* -0.04* -0.03* 0.07* -0.04* -0.03 -0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.08* -0.03* -0.08* 1.00      
17 Man-month -0.08* -0.04* 0.12* -0.02 0.02 0.15* 0.22* 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* -0.02 0.04* 0.15* 0.00 0.07* -0.07* 1.00     
18 Number of inventors 0.01 -0.07* 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06* 0.04* -0.05* 0.02 -0.02 0.05* 0.10* 0.05* -0.02 0.02 -0.04* 0.29* 1.00    
19 Complexity of technology -0.02 -0.08* 0.02 0.06* -0.05* 0.05* 0.10* 0.02 -0.06* 0.05* 0.01 -0.05* 0.12* 0.00 0.10* -0.09* 0.01 -0.03 1.00   
20 Number of claims -0.05* -0.05* 0.04* -0.04* -0.02 -0.01 -0.07* 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.11* -0.14* 0.11* -0.03* -0.02 -0.05* 0.02 0.10* 0.07* 1.00  
21 Age of invention -0.01 0.07* 0.02 -0.02 -0.04* 0.09* 0.12* 0.00 -0.05* 0.02 0.10* 0.13* -0.07* 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05* -0.10* 1.00 
22 Electrical engineering -0.04* -0.06* 0.05* 0.10* 0.00 -0.09* 0.01 -0.09* -0.02 -0.04* 0.05* 0.14* -0.01 0.05* 0.03* 0.03 -0.06* -0.08* -0.06* -0.01 0.08* 
23 Instruments -0.02 -0.02 -0.07* -0.03* -0.01 0.03* 0.09* 0.03* -0.02 0.03* -0.06* -0.03* 0.00 0.00 -0.05* 0.02 0.07* 0.14* -0.14* 0.03* 0.00 
24 
Chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals -0.06* -0.08* 0.02 0.14* 0.03* 0.07* 0.17* -0.04* -0.01 0.09* 0.03 -0.05* 0.04* 0.00 0.15* -0.11* 0.09* 0.05* 0.26* -0.03* -0.04* 
25 
Process eng, special 
equipment -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.08* 0.01 -0.01 -0.15* 0.04* 0.05* -0.04* 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 -0.10* -0.06* -0.01 0.06* -0.01 -0.02 
26 
Mechanical eng, 
machinery 0.14* 0.14* -0.01 -0.15* -0.04* -0.03* -0.14* 0.08* -0.02 -0.06* 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.11* 0.11* -0.06* -0.10* -0.13* 0.00 -0.04* 
27 
Consumer goods & 
Construction 0.01 0.06* 0.04* -0.07* 0.00 0.08* -0.05* 0.02 0.06* 0.01 -0.10* -0.09* 0.02 -0.08* -0.04* 0.12* 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05* 0.00 
* denotes 5% significance level
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APPENDIX D. Factor Analysis of Knowledge Sources 
 
In order to extract latent factors underlying knowledge sources, we conduct a factor 
analysis. First, GT/RIETI survey asks inventors to rate how important each source of 
knowledge for 1) suggesting and 2) completing the research that led to the patented 
invention, separately. We provides 12 categories of knowledge sources with 6-point 
Likert-scale (0: “Did not use”, 1: “Not Important” and 5: “Very Important”). The sources 
of knowledge shown in the survey are: “Scientific and technical literature,” “Patent 
literature,” “Fair or exhibition,” “Technical conferences and workshops,” “Standard 
documents (for example ISO standards or contributions),” “Your firm, excluding co-
inventors,” “Universities,” “Government research organizations,” “Customers or product 
users,” “Suppliers,” “Competitors (for example, by reverse engineering),” and “Other 
relevant sources (please specify).” Because our research hypotheses are only relevant to 
external sources of knowledge we do not include “Your firm, excluding co-inventors” in 
our factor analysis. Also, we examine answers in “Other relevant sources” and reassigned 
some of them to the closest of the above-listed categories. The remaining observations in 
“Other relevant sources”, whose number is ignorable, are not included in the factor 
analysis to reduce complexity in interpretation.69 In addition, we further restrict the 
sample to those patented inventions whose inventor belongs to firms (N=1740). 
 
To test the goodness-of-fit of the latent factor structure, we conduct a confirmatory factor 
analysis. We use SAS CALIS procedure. The Goodness-of-fit (GFI) index is 0.9965, 
Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.9979, McDonald’s Centrality Index (MCI) 
0.9980, Bentler & Bonnet’s Non-Normed Index(NNI) 0.9958, Bentler & Bonnet’s NFI 
0.9914, root mean square of residual (RMR) 0.0140, and root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) 0.0136. All these statistics well exceed the rule-of-thumb cut-
off criteria (0.95 for GFI and CFI; 0.90 for MCI; lower than 0.08 for RMR; lower than 
0.06 for RMSEA)(Hu and Bentler, 1999). The likelihood ratio chi-square statistic is 
28.79 for 22 degrees of freedom with probability 0.1511. This implies that the difference 
                                                 
69 We also conducted a factor analysis including “Your firm.” This item is grouped with “industry sources” 
and does not make much difference in the structure of latent factors. 
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between the observed and expected matrices is not significant. Therefore, we confirm the 
underlying factor structure as hypothesized. The reliability of measures for each factor as 
calculated by Cronbach’s a (rightmost column) is close to Nunally’s criterion of 0.7 
(Nunnally, 1978). The standardized factor scores and Cronbach’s a are summarized in 
Table 13. 
 
 
 
Table A. 7 Standardized regression factor scores 
Common factors 
Sources of external knowledge 
(manifest variables) 
Industrial 
knowledge 
Public 
knowledge 
 Cronbach 
Coefficient Alpha 
(standardized) 
Patent literature 0.1317 0.0115 
Fair or exhibition 0.3623 0.0579 
Standard documents 0.2018 0.0880 
Customers or product users 0.1398 0.0690 
Suppliers 0.1259 0.0524 
Competitors 0.1244 0.0657 
0.6772 
Scientific and technical literature 0.0248 0.1216 
Technical conferences and workshops 0.0598 0.3813 
Universities 0.0860 0.1744 
Government research organizations 0.1094 0.2750 
0.7138 
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APPENDIX E. Data Appendix for Part III 
 
Table A. 8 Technology characteristics and patenting strategy by 30 subgroups of 
technology 
Characteristics of Technology Patenting Strategy 
Technological Area 
Complexity 
of product 
technology 
Importance of 
complementary 
technology 
Importance 
of patents 
Importance 
of short 
lead-time 
Cross-
licensing 
Player 
strategy 
Fence 
Strategy 
Audiovisual Hi Hi Low Hi 52.8 28.9 15.4 
IT Hi Hi Low Low 47.4 24.7 23.7 
Optical Hi Low Hi Low 44.1 22.6 18.8 
Matprocessing/Textile Low Low Low Low 23.0 19.7 33.3 
Telecom Hi Low Low Low 44.0 19.0 14.7 
Semiconductors Hi Hi Hi Hi 41.1 16.1 16.1 
Motors Low Low Low Low 15.6 14.1 28.1 
Handl/Printing Hi Low Low Low 18.6 14.0 34.9 
Electr/Energy Hi Low Hi Hi 22.8 13.9 42.0 
ChemEngineering Hi Low Low Hi 15.4 13.5 28.9 
Pharmaceuticals/ 
Cosmetics Low Hi Low Hi 26.1 13.3 40.0 
Analysis/Measurement Hi Low Hi Low 25.0 12.5 34.7 
Materials Low Low Hi Low 24.5 11.5 41.2 
NuclearTechn Hi Low Low Low 22.2 11.1 22.2 
SurfaceTechn Low Hi Low Hi 11.5 9.6 39.2 
Agric&Food Process-
Mac Low Hi Hi Hi 18.2 9.1 45.5 
OrganicChem Hi Hi Hi Low 19.6 8.8 23.1 
Polymers Low Hi Hi Hi 17.3 8.6 32.1 
Transportation Low Hi Hi Hi 10.4 8.3 37.5 
ConstrTechn Low Low Hi Hi 8.3 8.3 41.7 
PetrolChem/materialsC Low Low Hi Hi 15.8 7.9 21.1 
MedicalTechn Low Hi Hi Low 14.0 7.8 36.2 
Environment Low Hi Hi Hi 20.0 6.7 40.0 
Biotechnology Hi Hi Low Hi 18.8 6.3 25.0 
MachineTools Hi Low Hi Low 7.0 4.7 27.9 
ConsGoods Hi Hi Low Hi 3.2 3.2 43.3 
MechElements Low Low Low Low 7.8 2.0 37.3 
SpaceTech/Weapons Hi Hi Hi Low 0.0 0.0 20.0 
ThermProcesses Low Low Low Low 0.0 0.0 33.3 
Agric&Foods Low Hi Low Hi 13.3 0.0 46.7 
Total         24.5 13.3 30.2 
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Table A. 9 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons of patenting by 
the size of firms and by industry 
Reasons to 
patent 
firm 
size 
EE Inst Chem 
& 
Pharm 
Process Mech Cons & 
Const 
All 
Small 
& 
medium 
83.9% 91.3% 87.3% 92.3% 93.3% 90.9% 89.1% Commercial 
exploitation 
Large 74.1% 77.9% 89.3% 81.5% 83.0% 80.6% 80.8% 
Small 
& 
medium 
43.4% 50.7% 43.4% 42.3% 44.8% 36.4% 45.2% Blocking 
(offensive) 
Large 44.4% 46.8% 45.3% 55.4% 42.2% 48.3% 46.4% 
Small 
& 
medium 
48.1% 34.3% 45.3% 46.2% 39.3% 27.3% 41.4% Pure defense 
Large 46.5% 51.2% 40.7% 48.7% 41.1% 41.4% 45.6% 
Small 
& 
medium 
30.9% 28.8% 25.9% 34.6% 40.0% 27.3% 30.6% Fence strategy 
Large 24.3% 40.8% 39.4% 40.5% 40.5% 60.7% 36.5% 
Small 
& 
medium 
36.4% 31.8% 46.4% 50.0% 26.7% 36.4% 37.7% Firm's 
reputation 
Large 36.4% 31.8% 23.1% 25.4% 24.9% 20.7% 28.9% 
Small 
& 
medium 
40.0% 33.8% 50.0% 50.0% 43.3% 54.5% 42.7% Licensing 
Large 36.4% 22.4% 27.1% 26.7% 18.4% 3.6% 26.9% 
Small 
& 
medium 
13.2% 21.2% 28.3% 8.0% 3.4% 9.1% 16.9% Cross-licensing 
(negotiation) 
Large 45.8% 27.6% 17.7% 20.9% 11.4% 3.4% 26.4% 
Small 
& 
medium 
22.6% 18.5% 28.8% 26.9% 17.2% 18.2% 22.5% Preventing 
inventing-
around 
Large 17.3% 24.3% 20.8% 29.2% 15.1% 31.0% 21.2% 
Small 
& 
medium 
11.3% 18.2% 20.8% 4.0% 3.4% 9.1% 13.5% Player strategy 
Large 30.1% 18.2% 11.4% 17.3% 9.2% 3.4% 18.1% 
Small 
& 
medium 
16.7% 13.6% 13.2% 20.0% 13.8% 9.1% 14.7% Inventor's 
reputation 
Large 18.8% 16.0% 13.9% 9.9% 11.7% 6.9% 14.6% 
 
 261
Table A. 10 Correlation matrix for Part III (N=1241) 
1 Strategic nonuse (narrow) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
2 Strategic nonuse (broad) 0.77* 1.00                          
3 Patent effectiveness (CMS) 0.03* 0.01 1.00                         
4 Missing patent effectiveness -0.07* -0.06* 0.00 1.00                        
5 Appropriability of patents 0.08* 0.06* 0.11* -0.01 1.00                       
6 Capital intensity 0.09* 0.11* -0.02* -0.21* 0.05* 1.00                      
7 Missing capital intensity -0.07* -0.07* -0.02* 0.64* 0.10* -0.35* 1.00                     
8 Ln(patent stock) 0.13* 0.12* -0.07* -0.46* -0.09* 0.24* -0.68* 1.00                    
9 Component familiarity -0.04* -0.05* 0.11* -0.01 -0.20* -0.01 -0.05* 0.01 1.00                   
10 Fragmentation index -0.02* -0.03* -0.01 0.10* -0.01 -0.10* 0.11* -0.15* -0.04* 1.00                  
11 Large firm 0.10* 0.10* -0.06* -0.42* -0.02* 0.22* -0.57* 0.60* -0.05* -0.06* 1.00                 
12 Manufacturing unit -0.02* -0.04* -0.06* 0.04* 0.00 -0.05* 0.08* -0.09* -0.05* -0.01 -0.06* 1.00                
13 Competence-destroying  -0.06* -0.01 0.07* 0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.06* -0.05* 0.02* 0.01 -0.04* -0.03* 1.00               
14 Complexity of product -0.02* -0.01 -0.13* -0.02* -0.45* -0.02* -0.13* 0.14* 0.12* -0.01 0.05* -0.05* -0.02* 1.00              
15 Breadth of openness 0.01 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.10* -0.03* 0.05* -0.06* 0.03* 0.06* -0.04* 0.01 0.07* -0.05* 1.00             
16 Collaboration diversity -0.03* -0.06* 0.05* 0.03* 0.04* -0.03* 0.07* -0.11* -0.04* 0.03* -0.04* 0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.20* 1.00            
17 Technological value -0.13* -0.15* 0.05* 0.14* 0.04* -0.05* 0.13* -0.17* -0.01 0.02* -0.15* 0.03* 0.14* -0.07* 0.15* 0.09* 1.00           
18 No immediate demand 0.05* 0.05* -0.07* 0.00 -0.04* 0.03* -0.02* 0.06* 0.04* 0.00 0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.06* 1.00          
19 % Basic R&D 0.05* 0.07* 0.07* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02* 0.10* -0.07* 0.01 -0.05* 0.10* 0.05* 0.11* 0.03* 0.10* 0.05* 1.00         
20 Product invention -0.04* -0.05* 0.44* -0.02* 0.00 -0.11* -0.01 0.01 -0.02* 0.03* 0.02 0.00 0.02* -0.07* 0.02* -0.01 -0.06* -0.08* -0.07* 1.00        
21 Man-month -0.02* -0.04* 0.10* -0.03* 0.05* 0.02* 0.02* 0.00 0.01 -0.04* -0.02* -0.04* 0.14* -0.05* 0.20* 0.10* 0.17* -0.03* 0.06* -0.06* 1.00       
22 Number of inventors 0.02* 0.00 0.08* -0.06* 0.08* 0.05* -0.07* 0.08* 0.05* 0.00 0.05* -0.07* 0.05* 0.01 0.10* 0.00 0.08* -0.03* 0.01 -0.04* 0.27* 1.00      
23 # USPC 0.03* 0.05* 0.01 0.00 0.05* 0.09* -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* -0.06* 0.04* -0.12* 0.06* 0.00 0.09* 0.02 0.05* -0.09* 0.04* 0.05* 1.00     
24 # backward citations 0.01 -0.01 0.07* 0.03* 0.12* -0.04* 0.07* -0.09* -0.03* 0.37* -0.03* -0.02 0.08* -0.11* 0.03* 0.01 0.03* -0.03* -0.02* -0.01 0.02* 0.11* 0.04* 1.00    
25 Number of claims 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.11* -0.02* -0.05* 0.09* -0.10* 0.05* 0.13* -0.12* -0.04* 0.01 0.03* 0.00 -0.01 0.05* 0.00 -0.03* -0.04* 0.04* 0.08* 0.07* 0.14* 1.00   
26 Age of invention 0.00 -0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.05* -0.02* -0.06* 0.05* 0.02* 0.01 0.04* 0.05* -0.01 0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02* 0.01 -0.04* 1.00  
27 Semiconductor industry -0.04* -0.02* -0.18* -0.14* -0.12* 0.06* -0.16* 0.08* 0.03* 0.01 0.09* -0.03* -0.03* 0.20* -0.02* -0.04* -0.06* 0.06* -0.03* 0.01 -0.10* -0.04* -0.01 -0.08* -0.02 0.05* 1.00 
28 Electrical engineering -0.07* -0.03* -0.23* 0.01 -0.54* -0.08* -0.09* 0.12* 0.04* 0.08* 0.03* -0.05* -0.01 0.49* -0.05* -0.07* -0.05* 0.06* -0.01 0.02* -0.11* -0.09* -0.06* -0.09* -0.01 0.08* 0.27* 
29 Chemistry, pharma 0.04* 0.04* 0.13* -0.03* 0.18* 0.19* 0.03* -0.03* 0.16* -0.21* 0.00 -0.06* 0.10* -0.36* 0.10* -0.03* 0.07* -0.01 0.14* -0.07* 0.18* 0.11* 0.24* -0.04* 0.00 -0.06* -0.13* 
30 Process eng. -0.01 0.02* 0.00 -0.03* -0.10* 0.04* 0.00 -0.02* -0.07* 0.03* 0.03* 0.06* -0.02* 0.03* -0.03* 0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.09* 0.00 0.02* 0.05* 0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.10* 
31 Mechanical eng, 0.01 -0.04* 0.00 0.02 0.02* -0.04* 0.06* -0.05* -0.12* 0.03* 0.01 0.12* -0.04* -0.28* -0.09* 0.04* -0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.01 -0.04* -0.03* -0.08* 
32 Consumer & Construction 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 0.11* 0.07* -0.05* 0.10* -0.09* -0.05* 0.07* -0.07* 0.04* 0.02* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02* -0.07* -0.03* 0.08* 0.02* 0.00 -0.03* 0.08* 0.03* -0.01 -0.05* 
* p<0.05 
 
262 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Abernathy, W. J., and James M. Utterback. 1978. Patterns of Industrial Innovation. 
Technology Review 80 (7):40. 
 
Abernathy, William J., and Kim B. Clark. 1985. Innovation: Mapping the winds of 
creative destruction. Research Policy 14 (1):3-22. 
 
Abrahamson, Eric. 1991. Managerial Fads and Fashions: The Diffusion and Rejection of 
Innovations. Academy of Management Review 16 (3):586-612. 
 
Acs, Zoltan J. 2002. Innovation and the Growth of Cities. Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
 
Acs, Zoltan J., and David B. Audretsch. 1987. Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm 
Size. Review of Economics & Statistics 69 (4):567. 
 
———. 1988. Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis. American 
Economic Review 78 (4):678. 
 
Afuah, Alan. 2003. Innovation Management: Strategies, Implementation and Profits: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Afuah, Allan. 2000. How much do your co-opetitors' capabilities matter in the face of 
technological change? Strategic Management Journal 21 (3):397-404. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt. 2005. 
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120 (2):701-728. 
 
Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton. 2003. I nteraction terms in logit and probit models. 
Economics Letters 80:123-129. 
 
Alcacer, Juan, Michelle Gittelman, and Bhaven Sampat. 2009. Applicant and examiner 
citations in U.S. patents: An overview and analysis. Research Policy 38 (2):415-
427. 
 
Anand, Bharat N., and Tarun Khanna. 2000. The Structure of Licensing Contracts. 
Journal of Industrial Economics 48 (1):103-135. 
263 
 
Anderson, Philip, and Michael L. Tushman. 1990. Technological Discontinuities and 
Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 35 (4):604-633. 
 
Arora, Ashish. 1997. Patents, licensing, and market structure in the chemical industry. 
Research Policy 26 (4-5):391-403. 
 
Arora, Ashish, and Marco Ceccagnoli. 2006. Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, 
and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing. Management Science 52 
(2):293-308. 
 
Arora, Ashish, and Andrea Fosfuri. 2003. Licensing the market for technology. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 52 (2):277-295. 
 
Arora, Ashish, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella. 2002. Markets for Technology: 
The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1969. The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the 
Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation. In The Analysis and Evaluation 
of Public Expenditure: The PPB System. Washington, DC: Joint Economic 
Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Session. 
 
Arthur, W. Brian. 1990. Positive Feedbacks in the Economy. Scientific American 262:92-
99. 
 
Arundel, Anthony. 2001. The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for 
appropriation. Research Policy 30 (4):611-624. 
 
Barney, Jay B. 1991. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management 17 (1):99-120. 
 
Baumol, William J. 2002. The Free-Market Innovation Machine. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Bessy, Christian, and Eric Brousseau. 1998. Technology licensing contracts features and 
diversity. International Review of Law and Economics 18 (4):451-489. 
 
Blind, Knut, Jakob Edler, Rainer Frietsch, and Ulrich Schmoch. 2006. Motives to patent: 
Empirical evidence from Germany. Research Policy 35 (5):655-672. 
 
Blundell, Richard, Rachel Griffiths, and John Van Reenen. 1999. Market Share, Market 
Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms. Review of 
Economic Studies 66 (3):529-554. 
 
264 
Business Wire. 2003. Samsung Electronics Announces 7th Generation TFT-LCD Glass 
substrate. Business Wire, June 3. 
 
Caloghirou, Yannis, Ioanna Kastelli, and Aggelos Tsakanikas. 2004. Internal capabilities 
and external knowledge sources: complements or substitutes for innovative 
performance? Technovation 24 (1):29-39. 
 
Cantwell, John. 2005. Innovation and Competitiveness. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Innovation, edited by J. Fagerberg, D. C. Mowery and R. R. Nelson. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Carlile, Paul R. 2002. A Pragmatic View of Knowledge and Boundaries: Boundary 
Objects in New Product Development. Organization Science 13 (4):442-455. 
 
Ceccagnoli, Marco. 2009. Appropriability, Preemption, and Firm Performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 30:81-98. 
 
Chandy, Rajesh K., and Gerard J. Tellis. 1998. Organizing for Radical Product 
Innovation: The Overlooked Role of Willingness to Cannibalize. Journal of 
Marketing Research 35:474-487. 
 
Chesbrough, Henry W. 2003. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
 
Chesbrough, Henry W., and Melissa M. Appleyard. 2007. Open Innovation and Strategy. 
California Management Review 50 (1):57-76. 
 
Christensen, Clayton M. 2003. The Innovator's Dilemma: Collins Business. 
 
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (16):386-405. 
 
Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken. 2003. Applied 
Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. 3rd ed. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Cohen, Wesley M., Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh. 
2002. R&D spillovers, patents and the incentives to innovate in Japan and the 
United States. Research Policy 31 (8-9):1349-1367. 
 
Cohen, Wesley M., and Steven Klepper. 1996a. Firm Size and the Nature of Innovation 
within Industries: The Case of Process and Product R&D. Review of Economics & 
Statistics 78 (2):232. 
 
———. 1996b. A Reprise of Size and R & D. Economic Journal 106 (437):925-951. 
 
265 
Cohen, Wesley M., and Daniel A. Levinthal. 1989. Innovation and Learning: The Two 
Faces of R & D. Economic Journal 99 (397):569-596. 
 
———. 1990. Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35:128-152. 
 
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh. 2000. Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms 
Patent (or Not): NBER. 
 
———. 2002. Links and Impacts: The Influence of Public Research on Industrial R&D. 
Management Science 48 (1):1-23. 
 
Conner, Kathleen R., and C. K. Prahalad. 1996. A Resource-based Theory of the Firm: 
Knowledge Versus Opportunism. Organization Science 7 (5):477-501. 
 
Criscuolo, Paola. 2006. The 'home advantage' effect and patent families. A comparison of 
OECD triadic patents, the USPTO and the EPO. Scientometrics 66 (1):23-41. 
 
Cushing, Christiadi, and Brian Cushing. 2007. Conditional Logit, IIA, and Alternatives 
for Estimating Models of Interstate Migration. In 46th annual meeting of the 
Southern Regional Science Association. Charleston, SC. 
 
David, Paul A. 1985. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review 
75 (2):332. 
 
Dosi, Giovanni. 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. Research 
Policy 11:147-162. 
 
Dosi, Giovanni, Franco Malerba, Giovanni B. Ramello, and Francesco Silva. 2006. 
Information, appropriability, and the generation of innovative knowledge four 
decades after Arrow and Nelson: an introduction. Ind Corp Change 15 (6):891-
901. 
 
Dubin, Jeffrey A., and Douglas Rivers. 1989. Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit 
and Probit Models. Sociological Methods and Research 18 (2):360-90. 
 
Dyer, Jeffrey H., and Kentaro Nobeoka. 2000. Creating and Managing a High-
Performance Knowledge-Sharing Network: The Toyota Case. Strategic 
Management Journal 21 (3):345. 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., and Jeffrey A. Martin. 2000. Dynamic Capabilities: What Are 
They? Strategic Management Journal 21 (10/11):1105-1121. 
 
Fleming, Lee. 2001. Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search. Management 
science 47 (1):117. 
266 
 
Fleming, Lee, and Olav Sorenson. 2001. Technology as a complex adaptive system: 
evidence from patent data. Research Policy 30 (7):1019-1039. 
 
Fontana, Roberto, Aldo Geuna, and Mireille Matt. 2006. Factors affecting university-
industry R&D projects: The importance of searching, screening and signalling. 
Research Policy 35:309-323. 
 
Fosfuri, Andrea. 2004. The Licensing Dilemma: Understanding the Determinants of the 
Rate of Licensing. In Universidad Carlos III De Madrid. 
 
Gambardella, Alfonso, Paola Giuri, and Alessandra Luzzi. 2007. The market for patents 
in Europe. Research Policy 36 (8):1163-1183. 
 
Gans, Joshua S., David H. Hsu, and Scott Stern. 2002. When does start-up innovation 
spur the gale of creative destruction? RAND Journal of Economics 33 (4):571-586. 
 
———. 2006. The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market For 
Ideas: Evidence From Patent Grant Delays: National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
 
———. 2007. The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market For 
Ideas: Evidence From Patent Grant Delays: National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
 
Gans, Joshua S., and Scott Stern. 2003. The product market and the market for "ideas": 
commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy 32 
(2):333-350. 
 
Gilbert, Richard J., and David M. G. Newbery. 1982. Preemptive Patenting and the 
Persistence of Monopoly. American Economic Review 72 (3):514. 
 
Giuri, Paola, Myriam Mariani, Stefano Brusoni, Gustavo Crespi, Dominique Francoz, 
Alfonso Gambardella, Walter Garcia-Fontes, Aldo Geuna, Raul Gonzales, 
Dietmar Harhoff, Karin Hoisl, Christian Le Bas, Alessandra Luzzi, Laura 
Magazzini, Lionel Nesta, Onder Nomaler, Neus Palomeras, Pari Patel, Marzia 
Romanelli, and Bart Verspagen. 2007. Inventors and invention processes in 
Europe: Results from the PatVal-EU survey. Research Policy 36 (8):1107-1127. 
 
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78 
(6):1360-1380. 
 
———. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology 91 (3):481-510. 
 
267 
Grimpe, Christoph, and Katrin Hussinger. 2008. Building and Blocking: The Two Faces 
of Technology Acquisition. ZEW Discussion Paper 08-042. 
 
Grindley, Peter C, and David J. Teece. 1997. Managing intellectual capital: Licensing 
and cross-licensing in semiconductors and electronics. California Management 
Review 39 (2):8-41. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay. 1999. Network location and learning: the influence of network resources 
and firm capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal 20 
(5):397-420. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, and Monica C. Higgins. 2003. Which ties matter when? the contingent 
effects of interorganizational partnerships on IPO success. Strategic Management 
Journal 24 (2):127-144. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, and Harbir Singh. 1998. The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing 
Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (4):781-814. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, and Maxim Sytch. 2007. Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence 
in Interorganizational Relationships: Effects of Embeddedness on a 
Manufacturer's Performance in Procurement Relationships. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 52 (1):32-69. 
 
Hall, Bronwyn H. 1990. The Manufacturing Sector Master File: 1959-1987. NBER 
Working Paper 3366. 
 
———. 2004. Exploring the Patent Explosion. Journal of Technology Transfer 30 
(1):35-48. 
 
Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 2001. The NBER Patent 
Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools: NBER. 
 
Hall, Bronwyn H., and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis. 2001. The patent paradox revisited: an 
empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995. 
RAND Journal of Economics 32 (1):101-128. 
 
Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1977. The Population Ecology of Organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology 82 (5):929-964. 
 
Harabi, Najib. 1995. Appropriability of technical innovations an empirical analysis. 
Research Policy 24 (6):981-992. 
 
Harhoff, Dietmar, Francis Narin, Frederic M. Scherer, and Katrin Vopel. 1999. Citation 
Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions. Review of Economics & 
Statistics 81 (3):511-515. 
268 
 
He, Zi-Lin, and Min Deng. 2007. The evidence of systematic noise in non-patent 
references: A study of New Zealand companies’ patents. Scientometrics 72 
(1):149-166. 
 
Heckman, James J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 
47 (1):153. 
 
Heller, Michael A., and Rebecca S. Eisenberg. 1998. Can patents deter innovations? The 
anticommons in biomedical research. Science 280 (5364):698-701. 
 
Henderson, Rebecca M., and Kim B. Clark. 1990. Architectural Innovation: The 
Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established 
Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1):9-30. 
 
Hoerner, Robert J. 1984. Patent Misuse. Antitrust Law Journal 53 (4):641-662. 
 
Hu, Li-tze, and Peter M. Bentler. 1999. Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance 
Structure Analysis: Conventional Criteria Versus. Structural Equation Modeling 6 
(1):1. 
 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Pia, and Kaisu Puumalainen. 2007. Nature and dynamics of 
appropriability: strategies for appropriating returns on innovation. R&D 
Management 37 (2):95-112. 
 
Jacobides, Michael G., and Sidney G. Winter. 2005. The co-evolution of capabilities and 
transaction costs: explaining the institutional structure of production. Strategic 
Management Journal 26 (5):395-413. 
 
Jaffe, Adam B. 2000. The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the 
innovation process. Research Policy 29:531-557. 
 
Jaffe, Adam B., Manuel Trajtenberg, and Michael S. Fogarty. 2000. Knowledge 
Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors. American 
Economic Review 90 (2):215-218. 
 
Jensen, Richard, and Marie Thursby. 2001. Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing 
of University Inventions. American Economic Review 91 (1):240-259. 
 
Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy L. Schwartz. 1975. Market Structure and Innovation: A 
Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 13 (1):1. 
 
Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy Lou Schwartz. 1982. Market structure and innovation, 
Cambridge surveys of economic literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
269 
Kash, D. E., and W. Kingston. 2001. Patents in a world of complex technologies. Science 
and Public Policy 28:11-22. 
 
Katila, Riitta. 2002. New product search over time: Past ideas in their prime? Academy of 
Management Journal 45 (5):995-1010. 
 
Katila, Riitta, and Gautam Ahuja. 2002. Something Old, Something New: A Longitudinal 
Study of Search Behavior and New Product Development. Academy of 
Management Journal 45 (6):1183-1194. 
 
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. 1994. Systems Competition and Network Effects. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (2):93-115. 
 
Kim, YoungJun, and Nicholas S. Vonortas. 2006. Determinants of technology licensing: 
the case of licensors. Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (4):235-249. 
 
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law 
and Economics 21 (2):297-326. 
 
Kogut, Bruce, and Udo Zander. 1992. Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, 
and the Replication of Technology. Organization Science 3 (3):383-397. 
 
———. 2003. Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the multinational 
corporation. Journal of International Business Studies 34 (6):516. 
 
Kollmer, Holger, and Michael Dowling. 2004. Licensing as a commercialisation strategy 
for new technology-based firms. Research Policy 33 (8):1141-1151. 
 
Kortum, Samuel, and Josh Lerner. 1999. What is behind the recent surge in patenting? 
Research Policy 28 (1):1-22. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: University Of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Kusunoki, Ken, Ikujiro Nonaka, and Akiya Nagata. 1998. Organizational Capabilities in 
Product Development of Japanese Firms: A Conceptual Framework and 
Empirical Findings. Organization Science 9 (6):699. 
 
Lafontaine, Francine, and Margaret Slade. 2007. Vertical Integration and Firm 
Boundaries: The Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 45:629-685. 
 
Lane, Peter J., and Michael Lubatkin. 1998. Relative absorptive capacity and 
interorganizational learning. Strategic Management Journal 19 (5):461. 
 
270 
Langinier, Corinne. 2005. Using patents to mislead rivals. Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue canadienne d'economique 38 (2):520-545. 
 
Lanjouw, Jean Olson, Ariel Pakes, and Jonathan Putnam. 1998. How to Count Patents 
and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application 
Data. Journal of Industrial Economics 46 (4):405-432. 
 
Lanjouw, Jean Olson, and Mark Schankerman. 2004. Patent Quality and Research 
Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators. Economic Journal 
114 (495):441-465. 
 
Laursen, Keld, and Ammon J. Salter. 2004. Searching high and low: what types of firms 
use universities as a source of innovation? Research Policy 33:1201-1215. 
 
———. 2006. Open for innovation: the role of openness in explaining innovation 
performance among UK manufacturing firms. Strategic Management Journal 27 
(2):131-150. 
 
Lemley, Mark A., and Carl Shapiro. 2005. Probabilistic Patents. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 19 (2):75-98. 
 
———. 2007. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. Texas Law Review 85:1991-2049. 
 
Levin, Richard C. 1988. Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological 
Performance. American Economic Review 78 (2):424. 
 
Levin, Richard C., Wesley M. Cohen, and David C. Mowery. 1985. R & D 
Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some 
Schumpeterian Hypotheses. American Economic Review 75 (2):20. 
 
Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, Sidney G. Winter, Richard 
Gilbert, and Zvi Griliches. 1987. Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987 
(3):783-831. 
 
Levinthal, Daniel, and James G. March. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic 
Management Journal 14:95-112. 
 
Levitt, Barbara, and James G. March. 1988. Organizational Learning. Annual Review of 
Sociology 14:319-340. 
 
Link, Albert L., and John Rees. 1990. Firm Size, University Based Researc, and the 
Returns to R&D. Small Business Economics 2:25-31. 
 
Long, J. Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2006. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent 
Variables Using Stata: Stata Press. 
271 
 
Malerba, Franco, and Luigi Orsenigo. 1995. Schumpeterian patterns of innovation. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 19 (1):47-65. 
 
Mansfield, Edwin. 1964. Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: 
Determinants, Prospects, and Relation to Size of Firm and Inventive Output. 
Journal of Political Economy 72 (4):319-340. 
 
March, James G. 1991. Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. 
Organization Science 2 (1):71-87. 
 
Merges, Robert P. 1994. Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The 
Case of Blocking Patents. Tennessee Law Review 62:75-106. 
 
Moser, Petra, and Alessandra Voena. 2009. Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the 
Trading with the Enemy Act. In The Oliver E. Williamson Seminar on 
Institutional Analysis. University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Murmann, Johann Peter, and Koen Frenken. 2006. Toward a systematic framework for 
research on dominant designs, technological innovations, and industrial change. 
Research Policy 35 (7):925-952. 
 
Nagaoka, Sadao, and Hyeong Ug Kwon. 2006. The incidence of cross-licensing: A 
theory and new evidence on the firm and contract level determinants. Research 
Policy 35 (9):1347-1361. 
 
Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Nerkar, Atul, and Peter W. Roberts. 2004. Technological and product-market experience 
and the success of new product introductions in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Strategic Management Journal 25 (8-9):779-799. 
 
Nerkar, Atul, and Scott Shane. 2007. Determinants of invention commercialization: an 
empirical examination of academically sourced inventions. Strategic Management 
Journal 28 (11):1155-1166. 
 
Nonaka, Ikujiro, Ryoko Toyama, and Akiya Nagata. 2000. A firm as a knowledge-
creating entity: a new perspective on the theory of the firm. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 9 (1):1-20. 
 
Norton, Edward C., Hua Wang, and Chunrong Ai. 2004. Computing interaction effects 
and standard errors in logit and Probit models. Stata Journal 4 (2):154-167. 
 
Nunnally, J. C. 1978. Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
272 
OECD. 2006. The OECD Database on Triadic Patent Families.  (December 2006). 
 
OECD, Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (Ed.). 2003. Preliminary 
Results of OECD/BIAC Survey on the Use and Perception of Patents in the 
Business Community. In Working Party on Innovation and Policy. 
 
Owen-Smith, Jason. 2003. From separate systems to hybrid order: accumulative 
advantage across public and private science at Research One universitis. Research 
Policy 32:1081-1104. 
 
Owen-Smith, Jason, and Walter W. Powell. 2004. Knowledge Networks as Channels and 
Conduits: The Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community. 
Organization Science 15 (1):5-21. 
 
Oxley, Joanne E. 1997. Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: 
A Transaction Cost Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13 
(2):387-409. 
 
———. 1999. Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact 
of intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 38 (3):283-309. 
 
Pavitt, Keith, M. Robson, and J. Townsend. 1987. The Size Distribution of Innovating 
Firms in the UK: 1945-1983. Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (3):297-316. 
 
Peteraf, Margaret A. 1993. The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-
Based View. Strategic Management Journal 14 (3):179-191. 
 
Pisano, Gary. 2006. Profiting from innovation and the intellectual property revolution. 
Research Policy 35 (8):1122-1130. 
 
Pisano, Gary P. 1990. The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1):153-176. 
 
Podolny, Joel M., and Karen L. Page. 1998. Network Forms of Organization. Annual 
Review of Sociology 24 (1):57-76. 
 
Powell, Walter W. 1990. Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization. In 
Research in Organizational Behavior, edited by B. Staw and L. L. Cummings. 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Powell, Walter W., Kenneth W. Koput, and Laurel Smith-Doerr. 1996. 
Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of 
Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1):116-145. 
 
273 
Reitzig, Markus. 2004. The private values of 'thickets' and 'fences': towards an updated 
picture of the use of patents across industries. Economics of Innovation & New 
Technology 13 (5):457-476. 
 
Rigby, Darrell, and Chris Zook. 2002. Open-Market Innovation. Harvard Business 
Review 80 (10):80-89. 
 
Rivette, Kevin G., and David Kline. 2000. Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the 
Hidden Value of Patents: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Roberts, Edward B. 1988. Managing Invention and Innovation. Research Technology 
Management 31 (1):11-27. 
 
Rothaermel, Frank T., and Warren Boeker. 2008. Old technology meets new technology: 
complementarities, similarities, and alliance formation. Strategic Management 
Journal 29 (1):47-77. 
 
Rothaermel, Frank T., and David L. Deeds. 2004. Exploration and Exploitation Alliances 
in Biotechnology: A System of New Product Development. Strategic 
Management Journal 25:201-221. 
 
———. 2006. Alliance type, alliance experience and alliance management capability in 
high-technology ventures. Journal of Business Venturing 21 (4):429-460. 
 
Rothwell, R., C. Freeman, A. Horlsey, V. T. P. Jervis, A. B. Robertson, and J. Townsend. 
1974. SAPPHO updated - project SAPPHO phase II. Research Policy 3 (3):258-
291. 
 
Sanders, Barkev S., Joseph Rossman, and L. James  Harris. 1958. Economic Impact of 
Patents. Patent, Trademark and Copyright Journal of Research and Education 2 
(3):340. 
 
Saunders, Kurt M. 2002. Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to 
Technology Suppression. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 15 (2):389-452. 
 
Scherer, F. M. 1965. Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of 
Patented Inventions. American Economic Review 55 (5):1097-1125. 
 
———. 1983. The Propensity to Patent. International Journal of Industrial Organization 
1:107-128. 
 
Scherer, Frederic M., and D. Ross. 1990. Industrial market structure and economic 
performance. Boston: Haughton Miffin. 
 
Schmookler, Jacob. 1954. The Level of Inventive Activity. Review of Economics & 
Statistics 36 (2):183. 
274 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into 
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. Translated by R. Opie. 
Galaxy Book, 1961 ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 1939. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process. Vol. I. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
———. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy: HarperPerennial. 
 
Shan, Weijan, Gordon Walker, and Bruce Kogut. 1994. Interfirm cooperation and startup 
innovation in the biotechnology industry. Strategic Management Journal 15 
(5):387-394. 
 
Shane, Scott. 2001. Technology Regimes and New Firm Formation. Management Science 
47 (9):1173-1190. 
 
———. 2009. The Likely Adverse Effects of an Apportionment-Centric System of 
Patent Damages. In Public Hearings Concerning the Evolving Intellectual 
Property Marketplace. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission. 
 
Shapiro, Carl. 2000. Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting. In Innovation Policy and the Economy. Washington, D.C.: 
NBER. 
 
Sheehan, Jerry, Catalina Martinez, and Dominique Guellec. 2003. Understanding 
business patenting and licensing: Results of a survey. In OECD Conference on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Economic Performance Paris: OECD. 
 
Soete, Luc L. G. 1979. Firm size and inventive activity : The evidence reconsidered. 
European Economic Review 12 (4):319-340. 
 
Somaya, Deepak, and David J. Teece. 2001. Combining Patent Inventions in Multi-
Invention Products: Transactional Challenges and Organizational Choices. 
University of California at Berkeley Working Paper. 
 
Stuart, Toby E., Ha Hoang, and Ralph C. Hybels. 1999. Interorganizational 
Endorsements and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 44:315-349. 
 
Teece, David J. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for 
integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15 
(6):285-305. 
 
———. 2006. Reflections on "Profiting from Innovation". Research Policy 35 (8):1131-
1146. 
275 
 
Teece, David J., Gary P. Pisano, and Amy Shuen. 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management. Strategic Management Journal 18 (7):509-533. 
 
Thomas, John R. 2007. Prepared Statement of John R. Thomas. In Hearing on "The 
Patent Reform Act of 2007": U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. 
 
Tong, Xuesong, and J. Davidson Frame. 1994. Measuring national technological 
performance with patent claims data. Research Policy 23:133-141. 
 
Train, Kenneth. 2003. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tsai, Kuen-Hung. 2005. R&D productivity and firm size: a nonlinear examination. 
Technovation 25 (7):795-803. 
 
Tsai, Kuen-Hung, and Jiann-Chyuan Wang. 2005. Does R&D performance decline with 
firm size?--A re-examination in terms of elasticity. Research Policy 34 (6):966-
976. 
 
Turner, Julie S. 1998. Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient 
Infringement, The. California Law Review 86:179-210. 
 
Tushman, Michael L., and Philip Anderson. 1986. Technological Discontinuities and 
Organizational Environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 31:439-465. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. 2002 Economic Census: Survey of Business Owners. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
Utterback, James M. 1994. Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Uzzi, Brian. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic 
performance of organizations: the network effect. American Sociological Review 
61 (4):674-698. 
 
———. 1997. Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (1):37-69. 
 
van Zeebroeck, Nicolas, Niels Stevnsborg, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
Dominique Guellec, and Eugenio Archontopoulos. 2008. Patent inflation in 
Europe. World Patent Information 30 (1):43-52. 
 
van Zeebroeck, Nicolas, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and Dominique Guellec. 
2006. Claiming more: the increased voluminosity of patent applications and its 
276 
determinants: Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre 
Emile Bernheim (CEB). 
 
Veugelers, Reinhilde, and Bruno Cassiman. 1999. Make and buy in innovation strategies: 
evidence from Belgian manufacturing firms. Research Policy 28 (1):63-80. 
 
von Hippel, Eric. 1988. The Sources of Innovation: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 1994. "Sticky Information" and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for 
Innovation. Management Science 40 (4):429-439. 
 
Wade, James. 1995. Dynamics of Organizational Communities and Technological 
Bandwagons: An Empirical Investigation of Community Evolution in the 
Microprocessor Market. Strategic Management Journal 16 (Special Issue):111-
133. 
 
Whinston, Michael D. 2003. On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical 
Integration. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19 (1):1. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractural Relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2):233-61. 
 
———. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. 
American Journal of Sociology 87 (3):548-577. 
 
———. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York: Free Press. 
 
———. 1991. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (2):269-296. 
 
———. 2002. The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to 
Contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16:171-195. 
 
Winter, Sidney G. 2006. The logic of appropriability: From Schumpeter to Arrow to 
Teece. Research Policy 35 (8):1100-1106. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham. 2004. Don't Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for 
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms. Management Science 
50 (6):804-820. 
 
277 
Zucker, L. G., M. R. Darby, and J. S. Armstrong. 2002. Commercializing Knowledge: 
University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology. 
Management Science 48 (1):138-153. 
 
Zucker, Lynne G., and Michael R. Darby. 1996. Star Scientists and Institutional 
Transformation: Patterns of Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the 
Biotechnology Industry. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 93 (23):12709-12716. 
 
Zucker, Lynne G., Michael R. Darby, and Marilynn B. Brewer. 1998. Intellectual Human 
Capital and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises. American Economic 
Review 88 (1):290-306. 
 
 
 
278 
VITA 
 
 
 
Taehyun Jung was born and grew up in Seoul, Korea. He started the Joint Ph.D. Program 
in public policy of the School of Public Policy, Georgia Tech and Andrew Young School 
of Policy Studies at Georgia State University in 2003. Before he joined the doctoral 
program, he had worked for IBM as a business and IT consultant. He received M.A. in 
Economics from Yonsei University and M.Sc. in Physics from Seoul National University. 
Since August 2008, he has been working as a scientific researcher at the Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) in Germany. 
